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IMMEDIATE INTUITION
IN THE NEW RATIONALISM OF ALBERT SCHWEITZER

by

John Dickinson Regester
(A.B. Allegheny, 1920; S.T.B. Boston, 1922)

A Dissertation
submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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THE HISTORY OF THE

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. General Topic.

In the spring of 1922 there were given at Mansfield College, Oxford, a series of lectures, on the Dale Foundation, which were shortly afterward published in two volumes under the general title of a philosophy of civilization.¹ They contain a statement of the philosophical outlook of an Alsatian scholar, Dr. Albert Schweitzer, who had already achieved distinction as a university teacher, theologian, writer, musician and medical missionary. The author, known most widely as writer of the Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung (Eng. tr., The Quest of the Historical Jesus) and as biographer of Bach, is, as his accomplishments would indicate, a man of unusual genius, range of intellectual achievements, and spiritual vigor. His work in philosophy expresses these qualities. It is not a piece of technical literature, and in fact it abjures, for reasons which are grounded in its viewpoint, many of the topics and problems which constitute the material of professional discussion. It is, however, the work of a scholar who is philosophically trained, who in a work on Kant's philosophy of religion has shown himself master of the most critical philosophical spirit and method, and who is freely at home with the detail and inner spirit of philosophical thought.

Of Schweitzer's Kulturphilosophie one may say, as the noted French organist and composer Charles M. Widor said of his treatment of Bach, that it is a work with horizons. The outlook embodied in it arises from a survey, of uncommon extent for any individual, of the spiritual accomplishments of man (religious, artistic, historical, and scientific), and from the material of a peculiarly rich and intense spiritual activity. Schweitzer has, further, a way of penetrating to the heart of thought, and of keeping clear, in the midst of elaboration, the main themes and motives. He approaches philosophy not from the standpoint of treatment of a body of academic material, but from that of a thinking man who wishes to know what persistent and ordered thought has secured or can achieve in answer to the problems of man's relation to himself and to the world. The project is comprehensive and elemental, and its execution is direct and vigorous as is the character of the author. It frankly acknowledges that it is not disinterested, but it asks what honest, open, and undistorted grounds it has for its interests. It asks whether active optimism and ethical will have a basis in reality, and seeks to find whether there can be secured for the ideals of civilization any "real and permanent foundation in thought."

In this work, as in all Schweitzer's writings, one has the sense of dealing with a vitally earnest and deeply sincere spiritual effort. Where one disagrees with it as well as where one agrees, the conviction remains that it is

a significant work, and that its writing is a positive contribution to thought about philosophical problems. It is no ordinary work, or one that can be forgotten. The impression of it is unescapable. There is here (not entirely in the two volumes in question taken by themselves, but in the life of the man as a whole, and here expressed) a significant and fruitful outlook through which life finds meaning, unity and direction. A spiritual achievement of this sort is so much the common and necessary objective of life, and so rare as an actual accomplishment, at least in any individually reflective way, that one cannot but wish to understand and appraise it.

2. Albert Schweitzer, The Man.

(1) Life. Before any further statement of the objects, interests, and problems of the study is undertaken, it would be helpful to know more of the life and character of the man in whose world-view we are interested. Albert Schweitzer was born on January 14, 1875, in Upper Alsace as the son of an Evangelical minister. His father was then pastor in the town of Kayzersberg, but removed six months later to Günsbach, which remained the family home. There he passed what he has called a delightful childhood, with the companionship of a younger brother and three sisters, of whom one was older than himself.

In the home there existed the influence of culture and of religion. On both his mother's and father's side there was musical ability, and also what might be called a clerical

tradition. The spirit was not in any way narrow, however, but intellectually rationalistic and creedally liberal. There was the discipline of a well-regulated home, but with it respect for the personality and the real convictions of the children. Though in the mother there was a marked reserve in feeling, the relation between parents and children was one of companionship and free confident communication.

Meagerness of financial resources cast a shadow upon the home for some time, and engendered constant anxiety and denial during the years of Schweitzer's youth. Then a small fortune left by a distant relative banished the worst of the money-worries, and during the last years of his school-time, as Schweitzer expresses it, "lag....wieder voller Sonnenschein über meinem Vaterhaus."¹ Schweitzer's youth, he testifies,² was on the whole a happy one, in which the harmony and understanding between children and parents was the chief contributing element. The consciousness of undeserved good fortune (in health, strength, and happiness of youth) and of responsibility for it, constituted in fact, Schweitzer relates, one of the two strongest experiences of his early years, of which the other one was sympathy with the pain which prevailed round about in the world.

Schweitzer's formal education began in the village school. This was not common for the children of the educated class, who began directly in the Gymnasium, but for the fact Schweitzer says he has all his life been glad. From it came a knowledge of the village children and a respect for their

equal powers. No doubt much of the genuine social democracy which is so pronounced in him is due to it. At the age of nine, however, he began attending the Realschule at Münster, at a distance of about two miles, which he daily walked. The following year, at the generous invitation of his godfather, and grandfather's half-brother, who was director of the elementary schools of Mülhausen, he went to live with him and his wife, "Aunt" Sophie, in order to attend the Gymnasium of that city. Life there was under strictest discipline and regulation, but was enriched by reading (for which he had a great passion), discussion, and music. The course at the Gymnasium was finished when Schweitzer was eighteen, and in the fall of 1893 he went to the University of Strassburg to study theology. In the spring of 1898 he passed the state examination in theology; and a scholarship which he won, which carried with it the expectation that he would work for the degree of Licentiate, enabled him to study in Paris and Berlin. The following winter semester was thus spent at the Sorbonne; and the summer semester, at the University of Berlin.

While in Paris Schweitzer made a critical study of Kantian philosophy of religion, presenting a dissertation with the subject Die „Religionsphilosophische Skizze“ der Kritik der reinen Vernunft for the degree of doctor of philosophy, which he received in 1899, and publishing during the same year a larger work on Kant's philosophy of religion. On his return to Strassburg after the travel-year he became assistant pastor in St. Nicholas' Church, a position which he held for ten

years while also engaged in university work. In 1900 he received the degree of Licentiate in Theology, and in 1902 became a Privatdocent on the theological faculty. His dissertation in theology, with addition of other material had been published in 1901 under the title Das Abendmahl im Zusammenhang mit dem Leben Jesu. In 1904 a study of Bach appeared, and in 1905 Schweitzer was made honorary organist of the Paris Bach Society. The latter year, however, he came to the decision to go as a medical missionary to the natives of Africa. He began medical study; and at the end of 1912, received a degree in medicine. In the meantime there were published, a work on the critical investigation of the life of Jesus, the Von Reimarus zu Wrede, Eine Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung, which made him internationally known as a theologian; a study of French and German organ construction and playing; a history of the critical study of Paulinism; and a work on the mental health of Jesus.¹ At Easter time, 1913, he set out for a mission station in Equatorial Africa, where, with the financial aid of proceeds from his books and music, and of gifts from friends, he erected a small hospital, and, with the assistance of only his wife and native helpers, he cared for the sick of the district until war conditions made the continuation of the work impossible and forced his return to Europe in 1917. The need to recuperate health and finances kept him there for several years. During this time he published the story of his work in Africa, the philosophical work which is the object of our

years while also engaged in religious work. In 1902 he
received the degree of Bachelor of Arts from the University of
Cambridge. He was a member of the Philosophical Society. His
specialization is in the history of the philosophy of science and
of the history of the philosophy of mind. He has published a number
of books and articles. In 1905 he published a book on the history of
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the philosophy of mind.

interest, a series of lectures on Christianity and other world-religions which had been given to a Quaker Missionary Conference at Selley Oaks Institute near Manchester, England, and memoirs of his childhood.¹ In February of 1924 he started back again to Africa, and reestablished his work. The public recognition which his activity had secured won him the help of other doctors. This led to the extension of the work, and Schweitzer is now on a second visit to Europe, where he is active in its interest.

(2) Traits and Mental Development. Of the character of the man something has already been suggested in the opening paragraphs. The most outstanding impression one receives of him is that of a sensitive sympathy with all human experience and an intense interest in the physical and spiritual fortunes of humanity. He is aroused to service, as by an irresistible power, in the face of men's physical misfortunes and pain, their mental problems, and their spiritual difficulties.

Practical activity and administrative work, which Schweitzer carries on so well for the service of humanity, are not in themselves, however, most natural to his temperament. As expressions of the intensity and vigor of his character in the service of a conviction, they are characteristic, but the primary bent of his genius is toward the conquest in thought of the problems which confront the spirit, and toward the attainment of a plan of life. Only by first making his way through difficulties, and then as an expression of an insight which has been won and is thereby disseminated, does Schweitzer

come to free, vigorous expression of active life.

Primarily Schweitzer is reserved and shy in personal disposition. He is gifted with particular sensitiveness and intensity of feeling, but is disposed to be unexpressive. He has from childhood been serious in his apprehension of life and its ills,¹ with by no means a merry character, as he says, but nevertheless with "die Schwäche dass ich leicht zum Lachen zu bringen war."² He was, moreover, he admits "zu sehr verträumt."³ With intellectual awakening, however, the dreaming became an active reflection on elemental questions. The earnestness of intellectual interests and the intense sympathy with life, of which his peculiarity of laughter was a symptom, won a victory over his reserve, and the solution of the difficulties of life-view led to action.

Piety and religious interest are deeply rooted in Schweitzer. His earliest recollections center about the church - the feel of the servant-girl's cotton glove over his mouth when he yawned or sang too loud in the services to attendance at which he looked forward during the whole week, the reflection of the organist in the organ-mirror which disappeared when the preacher entered the pulpit and which was mistaken for the devil, and the impression of quiet and solemnity. He says,

Aus den Gottesdiensten, an denen ich als Kind teilnahm, habe ich den Sinn für das Feierliche und das Bedürfnis nach Stille und Sammlung mit ins Leben genommen, ohne die ich mir mein Dasein nicht denken kann. Darum vermag ich der Meinung derer nicht beizutreten, die die Jugend am Gottesdienste der Erwachsenen nicht teilnehmen lassen wollen, ehe sie etwas

davon versteht. Es kommt gar nicht auf ein Verstehen an, sondern auf das Erleben des Feierlichen. Dass das Kind die Erwachsenen andächtig sieht und von ihrer Andacht mit ergriffen wird: dies ist es, was für es bedeutungsvoll ist.¹

Then there was also the religious life of the home, and the telling of Bible stories by his father. To these were added the religious instruction in school, particularly that of Pastor Schäffer, a religious personality and more than average orator who "konnte die biblischen Geschichten hinreizend erzählen."²

In Schweitzer's religious life there has been throughout a strong element of personal feeling which approaches the mystical. The church of his youth was shared by Protestant and Catholic congregations, and a deep impression was made by the seeming magnificence of the Catholic chancel flooded by sunlight, and by its windows through which "schaute man auf Bäume, Dächer, Wolken und Himmel hinaus, auf Welt, die den Chor der Kirche in die unendliche Ferne fortsetzte und mit dem Scheine der Verklärung umflossen war." In this manner, "wanderte mein Blick," Schweitzer says, "aus der Endlichkeit in die Unendlichkeit. Stille und Friede überkamen meine Seele."³ For worship in general, he insists that "Das Auge bedarf stimmungsvoller Ferne, in der das Ausserliche Schauen sich zum innerlichen wandelt."⁴ Music had also a large place in Schweitzer's religious feeling, and its moving power and harmony with the thoughts of his heart are mentioned.⁵

A strong love for nature has also been a marked feature

in Schweitzer's character throughout his life. The daily walks between his home and the Realschule at Münster, which he attended when nine, were taken preferably without the other boys who made the trip, in order that he might enjoy nature in its beauties and seasonal changes. The decision to send him the following year to Mülhausen was met with grief, because, he says, "Es war mir, als risse man mich von der Natur los."¹ To be cut off from nature, he states again in his account of the Mülhausen days, was one of the things which he felt most keenly during his first year there. The walks which he was allowed to take when older are also among the memories which persist. What impressed him in nature, he relates, was the absolute mysteriousness. The assurance of the scientific text books and their confident explanations ("Ihre zuversichtlichen auf das Auswendiglernen zugeschnittenen Erklärungen -² die, wie ich schon merkte, bereits auch etwas veraltet waren..") satisfied him in no respect, and filled him with positive hatred. His strongest impression was of the forever inexplicable character of what is called Force or Life.

In scholastic fields Schweitzer was not a ready or receptive pupil. He tells, as an incident which had prophetic meaning, that as his father took him to school for the first time he cried all the way. He was, as was mentioned before, too given to day-dreaming to be a good student, and in some things, such as explanation of literature, he was, he confesses, not merely an inattentive scholar, but even a scholar in opposition, shutting out attention and dipping here and there according to

taste. In the first term at the Gymnasium at Mülhausen his reports were poor, and a conference between his father and the Principal was arranged, in which it was suggested that it might be well to withdraw him from the school. Then a new form-master, self-disciplined and conscientious in even the smallest matter of class duty, stirred his admiration and was taken as his model. From that time on he was a fairly good scholar, and soon acquired marked intellectual interests.

For languages and mathematics Schweitzer had no aptitude, but in history he had real ability. History was during his earlier school-days his chief interest; his next, was natural science, which, he says, "hatte für mich etwas eigentümlich Aufregendes."¹ In the former, as well as the latter, he was affected by a consciousness that knowledge consisted in more or less thorough description, and that the process under investigation was full of riddles.

The occupation with philosophy followed from the sense of the problematic in nature and in human history. Its inception, however, was in the influence, which Schweitzer calls the most profound of his Gymnasium days, of the Principal, Wilhelm Deecke, a scholar of distinction. "Unvergesslich," Schweitzer says, "sind mir die Stunden, in denen er mit uns Plato las und uns dabei mit der Philosophie überhaupt bekannt machte."² The influence of this teacher is a factor of which serious account must be taken. In tribute to him Schweitzer says in the short biography of one of his doctoral dissertations, "Nur wer den tiefen sittlichen Ernst, von welchem der Unterricht dieses

hervorragenden und bescheidenen Lehrers getragen wurde kannte, vermag den Einfluss zu ermessen, den er auf seine Schüler ausgeübt hat."¹

The close of Schweitzer's course in the Gymnasium found him eager to go on to the university, and determined to carry on the study of philosophy and music along with theology. Under the influence of music, he had lived from childhood. Instruction in it had been begun in very early years, and during his years in the Gymnasium it had been among his greatest experiences to play on the organ of the Mülhausen Church. By this musical interest, as well as by religious thought, an impulse was given to his philosophical activity. In the intellectual history of the above-mentioned bibliography he says,

Auf das philosophische Gebiet wurde ich von zwei Punkten aus gedrängt. Einmal durch den Zusammenhang der theologischen Studien mit der Religionsphilosophie überhaupt, so dann durch ästhetisch-künstlerische Interessen, welche in dem philosophischen Studium nach Klarheit rangen.²

(3) Appearance and Personal Impression. In his appearance and personality Schweitzer seems to make a vivid impression. An excellent word-picture, not only of appearance but also of social presence, is given in an article by W. Montgomery in the Hibbert Journal. He says,

Imagine....a tall, handsome, powerfully built man.... with an easy natural manner....in the favorable acceptance of the term...a man of the world. An Alsatian by birth, and resident for long periods in Paris, he speaks French as readily as German....he is an interesting talker, but beyond that he is one of those men whose personality tells directly. The impression which one receives from him, first, last, and all the time, is one of immense but well-disciplined energy. In any company he would count, and in any circumstances would not be negligible.³

A similar impression from hearing him speak in Switzerland after his recent return from Africa is referred to by Lucia Ames Mead in a letter published in the Boston Herald during October, 1927. She says, "He was the most impressive personality who came within my range in over three months travel, which in London and Geneva had given me sight and hearing of some of the most notable persons in the world."¹ Dr. Von Müller, who speaks of his figure as suggestive of that of Nietzsche, says in conclusion of an article in Westermanns Monatshefte,

Von welcher Seite man auch dem Menschen Albert Schweitzer nahekommen mag, immer wird man gefesselt sein von der schlichten Grösse und Tiefe und von der eigenart dieser Persönlichkeit. Wer ihn einmal in seinem Wesen oder in seinem Werk persönlich erlebt hat, für den wird dies Erlebnis für immer seinen Wert und seine fortwirkende Kraft behalten.²

The basis of such impressions is apparently not so much the intellectual accomplishments of the man, notable as these are, but the directness and sincerity of his human fellowship, the genuineness of his social reactions, and the strength and enthusiasm of his convictions. The effect is not only of greatness, but of attractiveness. Intellectual freedom and evangelical zeal, strength and gentleness, are the qualities combined in him in the thought of Nathaniel Micklem, author of a foreword to the English translation of Schweitzer's lectures on Christianity at Selly Oaks Institute. He adds, "It is not easy to explain in words that will not appear extravagant how greatly we were drawn to the man himself."³

3. Purposes and Problems of the Inquiry.

The qualities of Schweitzer's person belong in large measure to his thought even in printed form. In his writings one feels the vigor and unity of his outlook on life. It is presented in the Kulturphilosophie with intellectual freedom and originality. It seeks to set itself off from the traditional philosophy of our western culture, and to enter into criticism of it. It makes suggestion of a new method of attaining a dependable world-view, and refers to itself as a new type of rational thought.

The object in taking this philosophical outlook as a subject for investigation is, in the first place, to establish, with as much definiteness as it will permit, what the full nature of the viewpoint is. There are several reasons why this is necessary. One set of these is in Schweitzer's work on philosophy itself. In the first place, not all of the roots of the system, or its full spread, are evident in the Kulturphilosophie alone, but these are only known when it is taken in connection with the other writings. Then, the treatment, which is plainly, and in a good sense of the word, popularly written, does not have a technically exact and complete presentation of its position on all philosophical issues which are involved; these must be determined, and must be made more evident and systematically coherent, if we are to see the implications of the viewpoint in its full extension and to be able to appraise it. A further need for clarification also arises out of Schweitzer's use of certain terms such as monism

and dualism, optimism and pessimism, and world-view. They are words which show variations in reference and meaning even in the circles of most precise philosophical usage, and in Schweitzer's quite individual employment of them they are confusing and misleading. The other set of reasons which call for an exposition is more objective. There has been no thorough critical treatment of the outlook, particularly in English-speaking circles; but still, interpretations have been put upon it which are inconsistent with each other and with what the writer of the dissertation understands as its nature. Part of the difficulty here arises from the peculiarities in terminology which were referred to, and part from the attempts to locate Schweitzer in existing classifications. His thought, whatever else may be said of it, is decidedly individual, and is not amenable to such treatment. Some affinities must, of course, be taken account of, but the mental attitude of the classifying approach is so much a part of the established viewpoints that it misses the spirit and suggestion of Schweitzer's declarations.

Beyond the establishment of the nature of the viewpoint, secondly, the dissertation has the object of determining to what degree the system fulfills the purposes of its construction and lives up to its pretensions. First, is it a philosophical departure, and is its method in any sense a new one? Secondly, if so, in what measure is it a significant and fruitful contribution?

In particular, in the understanding and evaluation of

Schweitzer's proposed philosophy of civilization, one sees that the central and most significant feature of it is an element of intuition. It is this which must be particularly observed, with regard to its nature and position, and which must be especially appraised, for it is the coping-stone of the whole edifice.

We might, then, briefly enumerate the purposes of the dissertation as follows:

(a) To bring the philosophy of civilization set forth in Schweitzer's Kulturphilosophie into relation to his other writings and work, for the sake of a better understanding of it;

(b) To determine, in so far as the writings permit, the definite nature of Schweitzer's positions on important philosophical issues, and their systematic character; and in so doing,

(c) To clarify the meaning of Schweitzer's individual and peculiar use of the terms dualism, optimism, and world-view, and to eliminate the misunderstanding of his system through his employment of them in reference to it; and

(d) To correct certain misunderstandings and misrepresentations which have appeared in critical treatments; and thus,

(e) To give to a new and vital expression of philosophical thought a more thorough critical exposition than it has so far had;

(f) Through an examination of its philosophical procedure, its logical and epistemological principles, and its meta-

physical content, to appraise Schweitzer's attempt to give the ideals of civilization "a real and permanent foundation in thought;" and

(g) In particular, to determine whether in the element of intuition, which is the heart of his new rationalism, Schweitzer has given

- i. A definite and original contribution to philosophical thought, and
- ii. An independent and adequate basis for active ethical will.

The first study must be that of Schweitzer's earlier writings. In them the foundations of the philosophical structure are laid, and in them the tendencies of thought are at work which later appear in it.

SCHWEITZER'S RELIGIOUS ETHICS

1. Interest in Religious Ethics

It is important to consider Kant's interest in religious ethics in the light of his philosophy. The theory of ethics is based on the idea of the moral law, which is a law of reason. It is a law that is not derived from any external authority, but is a law that is inherent in the human mind. Kant's theory of ethics is based on the idea of the moral law, which is a law of reason. It is a law that is not derived from any external authority, but is a law that is inherent in the human mind.

PART ONE

SCHWEITZER'S WORKS AND THE CRITICS

The first of the criticisms of Schweitzer's ethics is that it is too subjective. It is based on the idea of the moral law, which is a law of reason. It is a law that is not derived from any external authority, but is a law that is inherent in the human mind. Kant's theory of ethics is based on the idea of the moral law, which is a law of reason. It is a law that is not derived from any external authority, but is a law that is inherent in the human mind.

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CHAPTER TWO

SCHWEITZER'S RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE KANT'S

1. Interest in Religious Values.

We are accustomed to consider Kant's thought in relation to the two poles of his interest: the starry heavens above (typifying the realm of physical nature and its laws in general), and the moral law within. It serves well to characterize Schweitzer, to indicate his relation to these interests of Kant's. There is lacking in him Kant's direct scientific interest in the natural world and its amenability to universal apriori laws. The sphere of moral action, on the other hand, and with it the objects of religion, form the center of Schweitzer's thought. The main concern in all Schweitzer's writings is the rational foundation of ethical ideals and conduct, but in view of his religious background and training, it is natural that the religious foundations should receive first consideration. Religion is with Schweitzer in itself a real and permanent interest, and yet it is always viewed, even where it is the direct object of investigation, with reference to its relation to the ethical life.

In the Religionsphilosophie Kant's Schweitzer is concerned to test with intellectual honesty and rigor the philosophical foundations of belief in the objects of religion as they were laid in the retrenched and consolidated, but supposedly impregnable position of Kant's critical idealism. An echo of

this undertaking which lies at the beginning of Schweitzer's intellectual quest is heard in the later Kulturphilosophie, where he remarks that the ethical and at the same time optimistic philosophy of Rationalism which gave society a current and healthful foundation for its civilization "was unable in the long run to meet the criticism of pure thought" despite the fact that Kant "tried to provide the tottering building with new foundations."¹ More closely regarded, in the Religionsphilosophie Kant's itself, the conclusion of Schweitzer's investigation is that the seer of Königsberg nowhere gives a philosophy of religion which is founded upon Critical Idealism and which lies within its boundaries. The plan projected in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, to go in a practical employment of reason beyond the knowledge accorded by reason in its theoretical use, and thus to establish the ideas of freedom, God, and immortality, he holds, is not carried out as proposed.

2. Plan and Method.

Schweitzer modestly says of his work on Kant that "Sie will kein Werk über Kant's Religionsphilosophie sein; sie hat nicht die Absicht, ein Urteil zu fällen, sondern ihr Zweck geht dahin, neben den Werken über Kant's Religionsphilosophie Kant selbst wieder Gehör zu verschaffen."² What it offers, he says, is "in der Hauptsache eine kritische Analyse der Gedanken Kant's, welche mit den religionsphilosophischen Problemen in irgend einer Beziehung stehen."³ The method followed in this undertaking is to treat each of Kant's writings which are concerned - namely, the "religionsphilosophische Skizze"

of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (that is, the three sections of the "Kanon der reinen Vernunft"¹), the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, the Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, and the Kritik der Urteilskraft - in turn, and then to relate and compare the course of thought of each with that of the others.²

The result of Schweitzer's investigation, notwithstanding the modest pretensions of the work, is new light both for the understanding and for the evaluation of Kant's thought with regard to the objects which are of interest to religious faith - self, God, and immortality. The usual presentation of Kant's philosophy of religion proceeds from the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, but Schweitzer, by assembling Kant's various treatments of the problems of philosophy of religion and comparing them, both shows the development of his thought (in which, he suggests, one may have a picture of the development of the philosophy of religion of the Nineteenth Century) and brings the writings into a mutual criticism of each other which serves to reveal more clearly how far Kant has fulfilled his intentions, and what his results are.

3. Concerning the "Skizze".

The relation of Critical Idealism to a philosophy of religion founded upon it, as shown in the section leading from the Transcendental Dialectic, is first pointed out by Schweitzer. The transcendental hypotheses establish nothing on top of the sceptical conclusions of the Dialectic, but

they keep the questions of religious belief open against the transcendent pretensions of disbelief, and it is then Kant's thought that there is a practical employment of reason in which it has further dealings with the same ideas and may place them beyond a problematic status.

In the fact that Kant, in tracing the identity of the ideas of reason in the two uses, gives two differing derivations of the practical ideas (from the system of Transcendental Ideas in the one case, and from the system of Cosmological Ideas in the other),¹ Schweitzer concludes that the two systems are not different, but only two cross-sections, at different distances, of the same lines proceeding from a vertex in the idea of freedom,² to the realization of which all the efforts of reason are in reality directed. When the transition of the ideas to the realm of practical interest was effected, he observes, the plan for a philosophy of religion would not go forward as projected. The idea of freedom inevitably took the place of transcendent importance, and in relation to it, Schweitzer says, "entscheidet sich die Frage [negatively, according to his view], ob der kritische Idealismus mit moralisch-religiösen Interessen sich verbinden lässt..."³ The question which was left unsettled by theoretical reason was that of transcendental freedom, but Kant sets it aside as inconsiderable when dealing with practical interests, Schweitzer points out, and affirms a practical freedom which falls within natural causation only allowing for causality through reason, and which is said to be provable through

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experience. His comment is:

Hierdurch widerspricht dieses Verhalten dem religions-philosophischen Plane der ganzen transcendentalen Dialektik, zerstört die verkündete Einheit des spekulativen und praktischen Interesses der Vernunft und macht den wichtigen Teil der Untersuchungen der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, welcher sich auf das Freiheitsproblem bezieht und die Vorbereitung der Idee der Freiheit zur praktischen Realisierung enthält, vollständig wertlos; wir müssen nämlich konstatieren, dass bei der praktischen Realisierung der Freiheitsidee auf S. 608 u. 609 eine in jeder Hinsicht auffällige und neue, mit dem kritischen Idealismus sich gar nicht berührende Fassung der Freiheitsidee auftaucht, welche sich nun in die Stelle der transcendentalen eindrängt und die letztere ganz wertlos macht.²

What Schweitzer considers as the new and alien element here is the suggestion that there is pure practical reason only in consideration of the moral law. Even though the concept of moral law is not fully developed here, and is not brought into relation to the idea of freedom, the practical freedom which is asserted is actually ethical freedom, and it refers to human action only, whereas the transcendental freedom stood above any distinction of appearances and actions. The projected plan is thus destroyed, for the freedom practically established is neither in its presuppositions nor extent identical with the idea of freedom before its practical realization, and with this the unity of reason in its theoretical and practical employments is given up.³

In general, Schweitzer concludes, this religious philosophy of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft completely ignores the plan projected, and does not at any point presuppose the Transcendental Dialectic or represent the philosophy of religion of Critical Idealism.⁴ He considers the "Skizze" to be something written earlier than the main part of the Dialectic and only

imperfectly reworked for its position.¹ What is distinctive of it, he thinks, is the intermixture, in undeveloped form, of two lines of thought which in the further development of the Kantian philosophy of religion separate from each other² with ever increasing distinctness.

4. The Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.

The Kritik der praktischen Vernunft develops the philosophy of religion of Critical Idealism the most consistently of any of Kant's writings, according to Schweitzer, but nevertheless with changes in the plan, and with confusion of the results. There is, to begin with, the characteristic difference of method from that planned. The ideas are first independently derived from the moral consciousness, and then have to be identified with the ideas of theoretical reason. It is, however, Schweitzer brings out, in reality no postulate of freedom which is dealt with, but the problem of transcendental freedom. This proves to be soluble in accordance with the presuppositions of Critical Idealism,³ by means of which it is possible to refer natural occurrences, as phenomenal, to an intelligible ground.

That the solution is unsatisfactory is almost immediately indicated, Schweitzer affirms, by the reappearance of the problem (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, p. 121) in what he calls its higher or really ethical form.⁴ This occurs through a shift in the question from the natural necessity of action to its order. By this change the problem is carried over into the intelligible world, and there it cannot again be

solved by Critical Idealism through its method of distinguishing the phenomenal and noumenal. The question then takes the form, how change from evil to good is possible as free self-determination in the intelligible order.

The intrusion of the ethical problem of freedom in the Kritik is, however, only momentary, because Kant assumes that¹ it is settled in the first question. He is satisfied by a reference to intelligible causation in place of natural necessity, and regards this as moral determination. It is at this point, however, in Schweitzer's view, that Critical Idealism shows itself incapable of taking account of morality. The relation of the natural and intelligible orders is taken as also that of the natural and moral orders. Since phenomena and noumena are not two different systems, the realm of morality similarly ceases to be something other than the natural, and is its metaphysical ground. Critical Idealism says here, according to Schweitzer, that what presents itself to us in the mechanism of nature is the super-sensible causality of moral law, and conversely, that what is moral law is that which presents itself to us in the causality of nature. In this the power of ethical judgment is destroyed.

The transcendental idea of freedom, Schweitzer says, has devoured the practical, and the interests satisfied are merely the theoretical, not the ethical. Under the influence of this result, not consciously recognized, the other two ideas were treated simply as postulates which arise from the moral law, though in the conclusion Kant falsely assumed that the original plan had been carried out.

5. Kant's Religion.

The Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft stands, according to Schweitzer, on wholly different ground than that of Critical Idealism. Its problem of freedom, he says, is not the theoretical question, but the genuine problem of freedom, that of ethical personality, which derives from the law-giving reason, not from the theoretical.

The difficulty of the conception of perfected personality, particularly in view of the briefness and uncertainty of life, led the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft to formulate the idea of immortality.¹ Schweitzer rejects this way of meeting the difficulty, however, on the ground that it is possible only if one identifies ethical personality with metaphysical ground as in the Kritik, where this was seen to rest on an undeveloped conception of the nature of ethical personality and to lead, when consistently carried through, to an ethical indifference² in regard to moral judgments of earthly conditions. That Kant here satisfies the ethical interest in the continuation of life in a different manner (by the idea of a moral judgment³ in the timeless intelligence of God), Schweitzer regards as a sign of a deepened conception of moral personality,⁴ but he points out that the idea of God as moral judge has not first been established as a practically necessary conception,⁵ but is only taken over from historical Christianity. While, then, an apparent connection has been made between the moral law and the concept of God, which is the point of difficulty for Critical Idealism,⁶ it is not sound; and in reality the project of

deriving all material from the fact of moral law has been
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 given up.

Kant's trouble with the concept of perfection, in Schweitzer's view, is due to the fact that the individual man is considered as the object of moral judgment. He regards it as the high point of Kantian philosophy of religion when in the third part of this work the individualistic point of view is abandoned, the possibility of perfection is made dependent upon a moral community of mankind, and the realization of this community is specified as a duty.²

The duty to strive for a universal ethical society is recognized by Kant as unique in kind, since it calls on a person to devote himself to something which he cannot know to be within his power, and since it is not given in the fact of the moral law, but to the contrary dismisses considerations of personal perfection.³ It is here made the ground for the idea of God.⁴ Between this way of securing the concept, in relation to the motivation of the moral activity of the individual at the common ethical task of humanity, however, and that of Critical Idealism, which gives God the place of guarantor of the correlation of happiness with goodness in the individual in another world, there is, Schweitzer declares, "gar nichts gemein."⁵

It is only in the way of the Religion, Schweitzer thinks, that the concept of God is secured in a manner in which it can be brought into relation to the moral law.⁶ The idea of God thus attained, however, in relation to ethical development

so far as it proceeds in the world, makes a use of it which departs from the earthly world of morally developing humanity¹ unpermissible. Critical Idealism, in disregarding this, weakens the significance of ethical judgment of the present moral development, Schweitzer declares, as evidenced by the fact that neither of the *Kritiks* which have been considered takes a standpoint from which the necessity, or possibility, arises, of passing over to ethical evaluation of the social disposition of humanity in reference to the moral end which is thought² of as the highest good.

6. The Kritik der Urteilstkraft.

Schweitzer points out that the Kritik der Urteilstkraft is a work not foreseen by the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, but one whose conception of judgment is later attained and is in contrast to that presented in the earlier work.³ The real possibilities of its suggestion that the esthetic conception of the world can mediate between the intellectual and the moral views of it, however, are not achieved, he declares. In fact, the problem in that form is not even well considered, he says, because Kant, instead of proceeding to a scientific treatment of esthetics, in the method of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, by showing how synthetic judgments apriori are possible and then systematically deriving the rational apriori principles, took them over from experience, and through the accidental state of the esthetic thought of the time confined himself within the limits of the pleasing, the beautiful, and the sublime, as though the nature of

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esthetic judgment in general would thereby be given.

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There are places where the general concepts of the introduction break through the narrow limits of the treatment, where the esthetic judgment stands in relation to judgment in general and to its distinctive function of grasping the manifold of appearances fashioned by the understanding according to some principle of unity, where the concept of Zweckmässigkeit is treated as identical with this principle of unity belonging to judgment and accordingly as apriori and determinative of pleasure and displeasure, and where a broad concept of art which relates it to both nature and morality is used. But what occurs in general is that a critique of taste displaces the projected critique of esthetic judgment, art is narrowed to the fine arts, and a complete reversal of the logical relation between fitness and feeling of pleasure occurs.³

As in the case of the "Skizze", there has been introduced, Schweitzer thinks, an earlier writing which does not successfully carry out the plan of the work. The narrow faculty which is discussed does not accord with the more developed ideas of the general introduction, and it has no claim to apriori principles. The concept of fitness is established as an apriori principle for the judgment of nature only in relation to the fact that it can be arrived at as a principle of unity, not as a factor of experience, which only reveals natural mechanism. When Kant reversed the logical relation of the principle of fitness and feeling of pleasure,

Schweitzer says, he lost the possibility of securing an apriori character for the esthetic judgment and the notion of fitness associated with it.¹ The genuine possibility which esthetic judgment has for the connection of theoretic-² al reason and moral reason was thus made impossible. Kant felt the connection which this faculty achieves, Schweitzer says, but failed to establish it.³

The development in the case of the critique of teleological judgment is considered by Schweitzer to be more propitious. It proceeds in closer accordance with the originally projected plan, and from the concept of fitness as an apriori principle of judgment for the comprehension of natural occurrence.⁴ The general faculty of judgment furnishes a concept of fitness which leads to the idea of the totality of nature as a system in view of some end, and to the thought of an "Endzweck der Natur," through which our faculties transcend⁵ the limits of the sensible world of appearance.

What Schweitzer finds as significant in this line of thought is, that man must be regarded as the end in relation to which all other objects of nature form a system of ends, but, since the pursuit by man of happiness as his goal makes him incapable of setting and striving for an end of existence, that there remains as his goal only the quality of goodness of rational beings, who, holding themselves independent of nature in their determinations, use nature as a means in accordance with their free purpose for this end which lies beyond nature but can nevertheless be regarded as its

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end. He stresses the fact, furthermore, that in this treatment the concept of happiness, which was the medium of arriving at the concept of God in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, is excluded, and that the concept of the human community is introduced as the factor through which the teleology passes over into an ethico-theology. The transition is here effected in view of a concept of the highest end as "das höchste Gut in der Welt," which through the context is related to the community and is conceived as the perfected

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moral society. In this line of thought the idea of God as ethical Law-giver is a necessary practical assumption, since it alone makes possible the conception of a universal ethical existent. Thus the concept of God as World Ruler is secured in a way which does not identify the causality of natural occurrence with that of moral law and so destroy the basis
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of ethical judgment.

It is at this point, that of God's relation to the world and to morality, according to Schweitzer's criticism, that the philosophy of religion of Critical Idealism encounters its chief difficulty. He says that it does not succeed in bringing God into relation to the moral law without endangering either the autonomy of the moral law or God's position as World Creator and Ruler. The identification by Critical Idealism of the moral world with the intelligible, which is not another world than the phenomenal, but the actuality of its appearances, destroys moral distinctions and the reality of the moral judgments. On the other hand, to proceed to morality

from the moral law alone, though it would preserve moral seriousness, would threaten the position of the ethical God as World Ruler. This procedure is possible only in case of a radical dualism, which would also threaten morality.

Schweitzer says,

So muss also die religionsphilosophische Untersuchung, will sie diese Konsequenzen nicht ziehen, zu ihrem Ausgangspunkt neben der apriorischen Thatsache des Sittengesetzes noch ein Faktum zur Voraussetzung haben, welches den Grund zu einer Verbindung des Welterschöpfers und des sittlichen Gesetzgebers enthält, und zwar in der Form, dass in der Verbindung dieser beiden Begriffe das Prinzip des Weltgeschehens und das Prinzip des sittlichen Geschehens nicht ineinander übergehen. Dieses Faktum bietet allein die mit der Teleologie in Verbindung gesetzte Thatsache des Sittengesetzes: aus derselben resultiert - mit Vermeidung des Glückseligkeitsgedankens - der Begriff des Menschen als moralischen Endzwecks der Schöpfung, verbunden mit dem Objekt der sittlichen Bethätigung dieses Wesens, dem höchsten Gut, als der vollendeten sittlichen Gemeinschaft des Menschengeschlechts.¹

In the case of the Kritik der Urteilkraft, however, the ethical theology which has been made possible is destroyed, Schweitzer thinks, through the assumption of a relation to the results of Critical Idealism and the displacement of the concepts proper to the course of thought by those of that system.² The individual point of view, interest in immortality, and the concept of happiness, enter into a line of thought not founded upon them or capable of union with them, and exclude the concept of the highest good with reference to which man is regarded as the goal of creation. Thus the foundation of the idea of God which relates Him at once to the world as its Creator and to an autonomous moral law is destroyed, and the attempt to develop an actually ethical

theology fails. A satisfactory philosophy of religion (that is, an ethical theism), Schweitzer concludes, cannot be built up consistently and unequivocally on the foundations of Critical Idealism, or of any thought system oriented with reference to the epistemological inquiry and dominated primarily by theoretical problems.

7. Conclusions.

The writings of Kant which deal with philosophy of religion, when taken together, show a development in religious thought which is marked by increased ethical energy and a decreased influence of the system of Critical Idealism, Schweitzer asserts. He finds in Kant two lines of thought, one distinguished by an individual point of view and the other by a universal outlook which treats moral humanity as subject. Both are present in undeveloped and unmediated form in the "religionsphilosophische Skizze," which shows evidence of being an early work which has been given a merely apparent and actually artificial relation to the Critical Idealism of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft into which it is incorporated.

The first point of view (the individual) stands in most natural relation to Critical Idealism. It receives its most consistent and distinctive development in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, the work that most faithfully follows the plan for a philosophy of religion which is developed by the Transcendental Dialectic. Here three postulates are

developed from the moral law: freedom, immortality as a necessary assumption of activity in accordance with moral obligation, and God as guarantor of the highest good, or conjunction of happiness with moral worth.

Despite this close relation of the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft to the Dialectic, there are deviations from the plan. The three concepts are not taken over directly from a theoretical activity of reason which left them problematic, and then proved by it in a further practical employment, but are deduced from the inherent law of a faculty of practical reason with the anticipation of showing their identity with the three ideas of the faculty of theoretical reason. Then the process of identification with the theoretical ideas is carried out only for the concept of freedom, and in becoming identical with the intelligible law of occurrence it ceases to have any relation to moral distinctions and judgments. The force of this consequence is not directly recognized, but it sufficed to bring the course of thought to a halt uncompleted, and left the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft with the theoretical Idea of transcendental freedom and two practical postulates. Thus it is seen, Schweitzer says, that the results of the moral law cannot be coordinated with those of theoretical reason, and that "Die Thatsache des Sittengesetzes an sich führt nicht auf das moralische Aequivalent der spekulativen Vernunftideen."¹

The Kritik der Urteilskraft attempted in a new way to unify the severed intellectual and moral reason, but failed.

The reasons were an intrusion of a critique of taste to supplant esthetic judgment in its operation as an apriori rational faculty, and a failure to carry through the principle of teleological idealism.

What the third Kritik did accomplish, Schweitzer says, was to bring to expression features of Kant's religious thought which were in the "Sketch" but had dropped out of the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft under the influence of the system of Critical Idealism, and to unite them with the deepened conception of moral law which belonged to the later work, thus preparing for the development of Kant's religious thought which is presented in the Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Schweitzer says,

So weist die Ethiktheologie nach vorwärts auf die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, nach rückwärts auf die religionsphilosophische Skizze; in der geringen Berührung mit der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft zeigt sie, dass die Kantische Religionsphilosophie in einem Entwicklungsstadium begriffen ist, welches sich als Fortbewegung von der Religionsphilosophie des kritischen Idealismus darstellt.¹

In this relation the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, he says, "ist gleichsam ein enger Pass, durch den das Gedankenheer Kant's auf dem Zuge von dem Gebiete der vorkritischen Unentwickeltheit zu dem Gebiete der reifsten Gedankenvollendung hindurchziehen musste."²

The Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft is the work, Schweitzer declares, which "stellt....die höchste Vollendung der kantischen Religionsphilosophie dar."³ In it, he says, Kant stands, by virtue of the social outlook,

"weit über seiner Zeit," and to the work there belongs, in addition to its ethical seriousness, a modern and vital aspect. The moral richness of its thought, however, rests directly in the fact that it breaks its bond of relation to Critical Idealism. Schweitzer says,

Die Energie des sittlichen Denkens hat den Gedanken-
gang aus der engen Bahn, in welche der kritische
Idealismus die kantische Religionsphilosophie drängte,
herausgetrieben; zugleich mit ihrer Bewegungsfreiheit
erhält sie den vollen Gedankenreichtum, den sie in
unentwickelter Form schon aufwies, ehe sie sich in
konsequente Beziehung zum kritischen Idealismus setzte.¹

Between the determinations of Critical Idealism and the Kantian moral law, Schweitzer declares, there is a fundamental opposition which roots in the very nature of the former and makes any thorough-going combination impossible. He says,

So ist, auf welchem Punkt die Untersuchung auch ein-
setzt, das Resultat dasselbe: eine nach den Voraus-
setzungen des kritischen Idealismus normierte und
orientierte Religionsphilosophie ist ein sich selbst
zersetzendes Produkt....die vollendete Religions-
philosophie des kritischen Idealismus löst sich
selbst auf.²

It is only by overstepping the bounds of Critical Idealism, as Kant actually does through the strength of his ethical earnestness, that a philosophy of religion is possible.

The consistent development of the philosophy of religion of Critical Idealism, which Kant never gave, was presented by Schopenhauer, according to Schweitzer, just directly

"weil er Kant's sittliche Tiefe nicht besass."³ Thus, he says,

die sittliche Indifferenz des abendländischen erkennt-
nistheoretischen Problems, welche bei Kant überwunden
schien, bricht in dem Augenblicke wieder durch, wo
eine auf Kant fussende Persönlichkeit, ohne die sitt-
liche Tiefe des Gründers des kritischen Idealismus zu

begreifen, die Resultate der Kritik der reinen Vernunft zu sichten und konsequent durchzubilden beginnt.¹

The ethical line of thought in Kant's philosophy of religion, or as Schweitzer in one place calls it, the "ethische Religionsphilosophie innerhalb der kantischen Religionsphilosophie," in which "das sittliche Element prävaliert und die kritisch-idealistischen Voraussetzungen zerstört," on the other hand, he says,

hat auch....ihre konsequente Ausbildung später durch die weitere Verstärkung des ethischen Elements dahin erfahren, dass der idealistisch-kritische Unterbau derselben zertört wurde und jede erkenntnis-theoretische Begründung der Möglichkeit eines Uebersinnlichen ohne Beziehung auf die sittliche Nötigung aus der Religionsphilosophie ausgeschieden wurde.²

It was Ritschl who, without having clearly recognized his relation to Kant at this point, gave this development to Kant's philosophy of religion: - taking as subject the moral personality in so far as it is made possible through relation to ethical society, and securing the practical assumption of God as perfect moral Personality only with reference to the perfection of ethical humanity without being able to relate Him to the world considered apart from man's perfection. Thus, Schweitzer says,

bildet jede dieser beiden in der kantischen Religionsphilosophie verfolgbaren Gedankenlinien, wenn sie sich in ihren Konsequenzen erfasst, ein religionsphilosophisches System für sich, wobei entweder die kritisch-idealistischen Voraussetzungen die ethische Bedingtheit desselben neutralisieren, oder die letztere die ersteren aufhebt.³

Here Schweitzer in his conclusion, not through hostility to religion, but in a sincere attempt to find the security of its

foundations, out-Kants Kant himself, or, if the further barbarity of expression will be permitted, out-destroys the all-destroyer. Not even on the path of a practical employment of reason, in contrast with a merely theoretical, have the beliefs of religion in freedom, God, and immortality been established. So far as these objects of religious interest are concerned, the outcome of Critical Idealism, while it remains true to its presuppositions, viewpoint, and method, is purely destructive, even in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.

The only positive elements in the philosophy of religion of Kant, according to Schweitzer, are in the places where he unwittingly oversteps the limits of Criticism. There, out of his own ethical depth and energy, he gives a variant and truly ethical formulation of the problem of freedom - which is, by virtue of that fact, not amenable to solution by the suggestion of a double existence, in the chain of mechanical causation which belongs to appearances on the one hand, and in the course of free action of intelligible reality on the other.

Thus in the early study of the philosophy of religion of Kant there are already drawn the outlines of Schweitzer's positivism, which in one place or stage goes far beyond that of Kant but in so doing finds a basis for its own defeat and a ground for belief. To the treatment of Schweitzer's positivism and his whole theory of knowledge we shall, however, have to return later. In the meantime it is necessary to take account of the writings of Schweitzer which, while in a different field, that of the life of Christ, hold an important place in the development of his philosophical thought.

CHAPTER THREE

THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS

1. The Impulse of the Theological Investigation.

The transition from what was a philosophical, even though theologically related field to a purely theological one (and that the field of the historical life of Jesus and of the early development of Christianity) had perhaps some external and fortuitous conditions underlying it. After completion of his course in the philosophical faculty Schweitzer had entered upon theological study, and he prepared as his dissertation for the degree of Licentiate in Theology a work on Das Abendmahlsproblem auf Grund der wissenschaftlichen Forschung des 19. Jahrhunderts und der historischen Berichte in which certain conceptions arose which led to fuller exposition in the "Skizze des Lebens Jesu" (Das Messianitäts- und Leidensgeheimnis), and which made necessary both Die Geschichte der Leben-Jesu Forschung and Die Geschichte der paulinischen Forschung.

For the original choice of this field, however, and for the prosecution of continued inquiries, the inner logic of Schweitzer's intellectual problems would seem to be determinative. With his central interest in the foundation of our ethical ideals and activity, after the rather negative conclusion of his inquiry into Kant's philosophy of religion, the almost inevitable place for him to turn to find

the source of the ideal elements in our civilization, under the influence of the philosophical positivism of Ritschl, with whose name he closes his treatment of Die Religions-philosophie Kant's, was to the field of historical religion.

2. Das Abendmahl and the Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung.

(1) Introductory. What the outcome of this theological study for Schweitzer's general philosophy was, will appear in the course of the presentation. Its immediate effect upon theological opinion was revolutionary and disturbing. Beginning with his "Skizze des Lebens Jesu" with which he supplemented the dissertation on the Last Supper, and bringing in for support his extensive and painstaking review of the history of the investigation of Jesus' life by German scholarship, he made an attack upon the picture of Jesus presented by modern liberal theology, and insisted that the historical Jesus was characterized by eschatologically conditioned teachings and ministry.

The Messianitäts- und Leidensgeheimnis, which first presented Schweitzer's views on Jesus, was, despite the revolutionary character of its contents and the vigor of their presentation, only a comparatively slight work, as the subtitle would indicate, and moreover that of a new figure in the field of theology. Its conclusions were in conflict with the strenuous and sustained effort of liberal theology to trace the figure of a rational and intelligible historic Jesus; and these conclusions, if sound, were destructive of

that figure. Its reception was such as to be characterized by Walter Lowrie, in the preface to the English translation, as "a conspiracy of silence," though it is hardly to be supposed that its treatment, or lack of treatment, was so deliberate as the phrase suggests.

It was the Von Reimarus zu Wrede, then, which, appearing five years later, obliged Schweitzer's views to be noticed and discussed. This scholarly survey of the critical investigation of the life of Jesus, with which German theology had been chiefly preoccupied, could not be neglected.

For this chief theological work of Schweitzer's his choice of titles would seem to be unfortunate. That this is true of more of his titles might be noted in consideration of the Kritische Darstellung unterschiedlicher neuerer historischer Abendmahlsauffassungen and the Kritik der von medizinischer Seite veröffentlichten Pathographien über Jesus, which, whatever their merits as dissertation topics, gain much in expressiveness by transformation to Das Abendmahl im Zusammenhang mit dem Leben Jesu and Die Psychiatrische Beurteilung Jesu. In the case of the work under consideration, however, a gain in style and descriptive clarity through the change of the title Von Reimarus zu Wrede to Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung in the second edition (1908) was balanced by a loss in respect to indication both of the writer's conception and accomplishment.

The work is not, as a matter of fact, a complete history of the investigation of the life of Jesus by critical theology.

There are a number of men, "sometimes of equally great erudition " as those with whom Schweitzer deals, who have written lives of Jesus, as W. D. Mackenzie remarks in Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, but who "have not made the history of the circle which he is describing and their names and works, for the most part, constitute a pathetic stream-¹let at the foot of his pages."

(2) The Viewpoint and its Original Element. Von Reimarus zu Wrede is for the author a suitable title just because in the critical movement treated he sees not a number of disconnected attempts at construction of the life of Jesus, but a single process, unified under the aspect of a tragedy of the historical study of Jesus. The development, as it is conceived, is Hegelian in its dramatic form (though Schweitzer does not try to present it in that mold), for it is an episode of progress in which the liberal and rational life of Jesus produced by the historical sense of the 19th Century arises as antithesis to the supernatural life of traditional theology, but reveals by its own thorough development its inadequacy and untruth, and emerges in the eschatological conception.

A much more apt designation for the object of study is thus given by the English translation in its title, The Quest of the Historical Jesus. What we have here is in reality the epic-tragedy of a heroic quest; that to find the Christ of modern Christianity in history, in the prosecution of which liberal theology destroys its own faith. Summarizing this

episode in the "Schlussbetrachtung" of the Geschichte,
Schweitzer says,

Es ist der Leben-Jesu-Forschung merkwürdig ergangen. Sie zog aus, um den historischen Jesus zu finden, und meinte, sie könnte ihn dann, wie er ist, als Lehrer und Heiland in unsere Zeit hineinstellen. Sie löste die Bande, mit denen er seit Jahrhunderten an den Felsen der Kirchenlehre gefesselt war, und freute sich, als wieder Leben und Bewegung in die Gestalt kam und sie den historischen Menschen Jesus auf sich zukommen sah. Aber er blieb nicht stehen, sondern ging an unserer Zeit vorüber und kehrte in die seinige zurück. Das eben befremdete und erschreckte die Theologie der letzten Jahrzehnte, dass sie ihn mit allem Deuteln und aller Gewalttat in unserer Zeit nicht festhalten konnte, sondern ihn ziehen lassen musste.¹

Schweitzer presents three stages in the critical study of
Jesus' life, connected with three problems.² The first period was concerned largely with miracle, and was brought to a close by David Friedrich Strauss, who settled that, as far as the main stream of scholarship was concerned, the life of Jesus was to be purely historical rather than supernatural. The second problem was concerned with sources, and it was determined by the Tübingen School, that the life of Jesus should be Synoptic rather than Johannine. The epoch concerned with the question was closed, and a new one was opened by Johannes Weiss,³ "by whom the general conception of the Kingdom was first rightly grasped," - that is, as future and apocalyptic.⁴

It was this third problem about the life of Jesus, eschatological or not eschatological, brought to the front by Johannes Weiss but so far only narrowly considered, with which Schweitzer was concerned. To Johannes Weiss, and in some measure to Reimarus, who was "der erste und einzige vor Johannes Weiss....der es erkannt und ausgesprochen hatte, dass

Jesu Predigt nur eschatologisch war,"¹ Schweitzer attributes one of the most illuminating suggestions for the solution of the problems in the life of Jesus, and for the creation of a true historical picture, in so far as that is possible.

Schweitzer's criticism of the eschatological school was that it had not used this suggestion to the full extent of its value. He says,

Es ist geradezu unerklärlich, dass die eschatologische Schule mit der Einsicht in die Eschatologie der Reichgottespredigt nicht auch zugleich auf den Gedanken des Dogmatischen in der Geschichte Jesu kam. Eschatologie ist ja nichts anderes als dogmatische Geschichte, welche in die natürliche hineinragt und sie aufhebt. Ist es nicht schon a priori dass einzig Denkbare, dass derjenige, der seine messianische Parusie in Bälde erwartet, in seinem Handeln nicht mehr von dem natürlichen Gang der Ereignisse, sondern nur von jener Erwartung bestimmt wird? Das chaotische Durcheinander in den Berichten hätte darauf führen müssen, dass hier die vulkanische Natur eines unermesslichen Selbstbewusstseins, nicht irgend welche Nachlässigkeit oder Manier in der Ueberlieferung, die Ereignisse durcheinander geworfen hat.²

It is this thought, "of the 'dogmatic' element in the history of Jesus," which is the unique feature in Schweitzer's view of Jesus and which makes it so revolutionary.

(3) Rejection of the "Liberal Life of Jesus." The liberal life of Jesus which Schweitzer rejects as artificial and untrue is that which modern critical scholarship had constructed to displace the supernatural Christ of traditional theology. In it the miraculous has received rational explanation, and the eschatological sayings have been rejected as spurious. Its Jesus is the ethical teacher who sublimated the popular conceptions of Messiah and Kingdom of God, who taught an advanced morality, who inaugurated a new society of men charact-

erized by trust of God and human brotherhood, and who died for its establishment.

With this picture, which he regards as a historical falsification, Schweitzer makes no quarter. His pronouncement is,

Der Jesus von Nazareth, der als Messias auftrat, die Sittlichkeit des Gottesreiches verkündete, das Himmelreich auf Erden gründete und starb, um seinem Werke die Weihe zu geben, hat nie existiert. Es ist eine Gestalt, die vom Rationalismus entworfen, vom Liberalismus belebt und von der modernen Theologie in ein geschichtliches Gewand gekleidet wurde.¹

The rationalistic bias of our age has led us to project back into the past what belonged to our own time. It has created the historical Jesus in its own image, and offered to the race not the spirit of Jesus itself but a Jesus "constructed by modern theology." Jesus as a man who enters into our age, one like ourselves, he asserts, never existed. Thus, he says,

zwischen dem modern-historischen und dem eschatologischen Leben Jesu keine Vermittlung existiert².....
Gesetzt dass nur die Hälfte, nur ein Drittel der Wrede und der Skizze des Lebens Jesu³ gemeinsamen kritischen Beobachtungen sich als richtig erweist, so ist die modern-historische Geschichtsauffassung um ihren Besitzstand gebracht.⁴

The critical objections which are here referred to are⁵ chiefly these. Theology reads in between the lines of the Markan accounts, by means of psychological conjecture, a development of Jesus' conceptions, and an education of the disciples, of which there is no word in the evangelist. It makes an unproved distinction of an "historical kernel," which means really a use of its conception as a criterion of historical validity. It has put connecting links of construction between the sections of the Gospel narrative where there are really breaks. The complete want of connection in

the incidents is due to the fact that a dogmatic element (the Messianic secret of Jesus and all the concealments which go with it) determined the course. If one adopts the eschatological solution, it "at one stroke raises the Markan account as it stands, with all its disconnectedness and inconsistencies, into genuine history."

(4) Schweitzer's Life of Jesus.¹ Schweitzer's picture of the life of Jesus differs both as regards inner consciousness and outer circumstance from that with which we are familiar. Schweitzer recognizes that it is strange, but because there is "something quite incomprehensible" to us in the ministry of Jesus itself.

Jesus' public ministry, according to Schweitzer, lasted less than a year. After coming in contact with John the Baptist, He appeared in Galilee proclaiming the near approach of the Kingdom of God. He expected this about harvest time, and so after a few weeks at the most He sent out His disciples to make known as speedily as possible what was to happen. He told them in plain words (Mt. x²³) that He did not expect to see them again in the existing age, but the Parousia of the Son of Man, identical with the dawn of the Kingdom, would take place before they could make a hasty journey through Israel to announce it.

Though thus publicly announced, the coming of the Kingdom was in a sense a secret. There was nothing in the outward circumstances to justify this prediction, or that of imminent suffering such as was foretold at the sending out of the

Twelve. The grounds were not historical, but were in the subjective ethical earnestness of Jesus cast in the doctrinal mold of the time.

Jesus had also a second secret - the conviction that in the "time of the end" He was destined to be the Messiah. The only persons to whom this was revealed were Peter, James, and John, until Peter, in spite of a promise of secrecy, inadvertently let it be known to the other disciples. About it, Jesus enjoined secrecy upon the Twelve, but Judas revealed it to the High Priest, and its confession by Jesus upon question was the ground of His condemnation.

A third secret, that of the Passion, developed after the return of the Twelve from their mission, and on account of the delay of the Kingdom and of its antecedent period of suffering. Jesus' conviction of the imminence of these events was not weakened, but, since they did not come, it seemed that something beyond the movement of repentance had to be done. Jesus conceived that God had heard the prayer for deliverance from tribulation which had accompanied that for the coming of the Kingdom, and had made possible its vicarious accomplishment in a definite voluntary suffering in His own person. He accordingly went up to Jerusalem with the purpose of suffering for others and thus bringing in the divine Kingdom.

Schweitzer thinks that a liberal and rational construction of the life of Jesus presents insurmountable difficulties and incomprehensible problems, but that these difficult-

ies and problems are overcome by the eschatological conception. However unnatural the eschatological outlook may be to us, to attribute it to Jesus explains what is puzzling in His life. What is peculiar in His life is due to the fact that its course was not governed by historical events but by doctrinal presuppositions.

In this representation of the life of Jesus there are several especially striking and significant differences from the usual picture. Jesus' Kingdom of God was a wholly future one,¹ and was to be established by Divine intervention. Of it Jesus was not a founder, but only an announcer. His difference from John the Baptist was only in His secret Messianic consciousness. Not only was His Messiahship not proclaimed to the public, or suspected by it, but it was for Jesus Himself a wholly future state in which He was to appear in the universal transformation.² In no case did Jesus use the term "Son of Man," as theologians have supposed, for an existent, humble, ethical Messiahship, or to educate the public to such a conception. He had two uses of the term, one with those who knew His secret, and another with the uninitiated, in which it was not apparent that He thought of Himself as identical with the coming Son of Man.³ Jesus' purpose in general was not pedagogic. He sought to educate neither the public nor His disciples. The prediction of the coming of the Kingdom was His only message, and beyond that His words were in parables which contained a supernatural knowledge which was only for those who had ears to hear - that is, who

were chosen of God. That His ministry was not one of teaching was determined by the fact of His apocalyptic outlook. This involved also the further consequence that Jesus taught no positive ethics, but only a probationary righteousness in view of the impending "end of all things."¹ Social situations and ethical precepts would be transcended in the Kingdom upon whose threshold they stood, and what Jesus taught was an "Interims-Ethik." It was not meant to be a permanent and universal code of conduct, but a statement of what was fitting as occasion and preparation for the coming of the Kingdom. It was not an absolute ethics, but relative.

With the death of Jesus, the divine intervention in human affairs did not occur, however. There was no apocalyptic coming of the Kingdom nor Parousia of the "Son of Man." The early Christian Church accordingly began to reconstruct both its eschatology and its Christology. Jesus, who had not thought of Himself as a present but only as a future "Son of Man," was represented as Messiah in His earthly life. This reconstruction of viewpoint occurred in some measure even in Mark,² but is manifested most fully in the Gospel of John. The latter deliberately transforms the eschatological elements, and destroys the historical Jesus in order to present His earthly life as that of the Messiah.³ There arose the conception of a spiritual Messiahship, and of an inner Kingdom. The "Interims-Ethik" became an absolute ethics. The eschatological expectations were transformed into the Christian conception of immortality.

3. The Geschichte der paulinischen Forschung.

(1) Occasion and Field of Investigation. In advancing such a new and divergent conception of the ministry of Jesus, it became Schweitzer's task to show how this set of beliefs and events developed into early Greek theology. If there is no natural and possible transition, the theory is condemned by the facts of history, regardless of any degree of consistence and applicability in its relation to the Gospel material. The responsibility for this further inquiry Schweitzer recognized and undertook in his Geschichte der paulinischen Forschung, 1911, to which he refers as "die Fortsetzung meiner Von Reimarus zu Wrede betitelten, 1906 erschienenen Geschichte der¹ Leben-Jesu-Forschung."

The work follows the general method of that which dealt with the critical investigation of the life of Jesus, presenting a history of the study of Paulinism, but in this case, instead of attaching his own views to the historical survey, Schweitzer has left them to be developed in a later work, under the title Die Mystik des Apostels Paulus, which has not yet appeared. Here, beyond the historical treatment of the Pauline study, only an analysis of the problem which it confronts, and the limiting conditions of its solution, are definitely offered.

In marked contrast to Schweitzer's superlative praise of German scholarship in its investigation of the life of Jesus are his judgments upon its work in Pauline theology. "Die paulinische Forschung," he says, "stellt nicht eben eine

Glanzleistung der Wissenschaft dar. Gelehrsamkeit wurde reichlich aufgewandt; aber es fehlte am Denken und Ueberlegen.¹ The faults which have made it so impotent have been want of plan, and failure to see the scope of the problem. Schweitzer says, "Statt eine geschlossene Diagnose zu versuchen, behandelte man die einzelnen Symptome für sich mit den Mitteln, die gerade zur Hand waren,"² with the result that the investigation has followed intricate paths and engaged in long and devious wanderings.

(2) Paul's Independence from Greek Thought. According to Schweitzer, "Das Problem (of Pauline study) hängt in den beiden grossen Fragen, was die Lehre Pauli mit dem Urchristentum und was sie mit dem Griechentum gemeinsam habe."³ A serious, though not insurmountable, difficulty for the solution of these problems arises out of the fact that the general features of the dogma of early Christianity have to be derived from Paul, but, on the other hand, the problem as a whole is simplified by the fact that the second of the fundamental questions has been clearly answered by the history of the Pauline study. The answer is that,

Paulinismus und Griechentum haben nur die religiöse Sprache, aber keine Gedanken miteinander gemeinsam. Der Apostel hat das Christentum nicht hellenisiert. Seine Vorstellungen sind von denen der griechischen Philosophie und denen der Mysterienreligionen in gleicher Weise unterschieden.⁴

The bulk of the book is given to the demonstration in detail of the above conclusion. It treats both the "theologians" who assert the influence of philosophic Hellenism and the "students of comparative religion" who refer Paul's

theology to the Oriental mystery-religions, who in their contradictory derivations of the features of Paulinism give "a case of Satan's being driven out by Beelzebub."

There are two general types of considerations on which the conclusion is based. The first is that when the assumption of Hellenic influence has been adhered to with courage and logical consistency, it has led to results which are compatible only with a radically altered tradition and history of Christianity, in which either the oldest Christian writings are referred to the second century or else Christianity is regarded as originally a product of Hellenistic-Oriental syncretism. On the other hand, Schweitzer says,

Die Erklärung....die zeigt, dass das System des Heidenapostels aus den elementarsten eschatologischen Prämissen erwächst, und die zugleich begreiflich macht, warum die folgende Generation auf der von ihm betretenen Bahn nicht weiter-gehen kann hat seine Urchristlichkeit und, in diesem Sinne, auch die „Echtheit“ der Hauptschriften bewiesen.¹

The second objection to attributing Hellenic influence is that the alleged affinities cannot stand an examination which takes account of their real essence and of differences in which the analogous features are conditioned. Paul's conception of the spirit in general, Schweitzer says, is not Greek as is commonly assumed because of the antithesis of spirit and flesh, but is a development of primitive Christian doctrine. The conception is not wholly spiritual but "natural," and it stands in indissoluble relation with a doctrine of the future age which is not ethical but physical.

Paul's doctrines of sacraments and of redemption are the

features which are sometimes referred to the mystery-religions, since they are without basis in Late Judaism, but several points of caution against this view need to be observed. First, Paulinism must be kept distinct from any general New Testament religion governed by Johannine doctrine, which in common with the Greek Fathers and the mystery-religions uses the conception of rebirth, over against Paul, who¹ speaks always of death and resurrection. Secondly, the extension of these cults was from the beginning of the second century onward, and "Paulus die Mysterienreligionen, wie sie uns vorliegen, wohl nicht gekannt haben kann, weil sie in dieser ausgebildeten Gestalt damals noch nicht existierten."² Thirdly, no such general mystery-religion as the persons interested in making the comparison develop from the various³ mystery-ideas actually existed.

Schweitzer does not leave the case to be settled thus, however, but considers the special cases of analogy in sacrament. So far as the cultus meal is concerned all that is certain is that in both cases such a meal existed, and no⁴ connection direct or indirect has been shown; it would be only by violence to his words that anyone could ascribe to Paul the conception of a sacramental eating and drinking of the body and blood of Christ.⁵ The attachment of significance to lustrations belongs to all religions and does not constitute a connecting peculiarity. For Paul's distinctive conception of baptism, which has nothing to do with purification but effects a possession of pneuma, the mystery-religions

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have no analogy. According to Schweitzer,

Zu beachten ist, dass das Eschatologische in den Sakramenten Pauli überall durchbricht. Sie wirken nicht Wiedergeburt, sondern Auferstehung. Etwas, was in der nächsten Zukunft offenbare Realität sein wird, machen sie vorgreifend schon jetzt unsichtbar wirklich. Die griechischen Mysterien sind zeitlos....Bei Paulus ist das Sakramentale zeitlich begrenzt. Die heiligen Handlungen existieren erst zeit kurzem und sind auf diese letzte Generation beschränkt. Ihre Kraft kommt ihnen von dem her, was sich in der Welt der Endzeit abspielt. Sie machen die Gläubigen dem Herrn darin gleich, dass sie sie einige Weltaugenblicke vor der Zeit auferstehen lassen, wenn auch nach aussen nichts davon offenbar wird. Es handelt sich um eine PRODROMALERSCHHEINUNG des nahen Weltendes.

Wollte man von der Eschatologie abstrahieren, so würden die paulinischen Sakramente sinn- und wirkungslos. Sie sind in die Zeit zwischen der Auferstehung Jesu und seiner von der Totenaufstehung begleiteten Parusie eingespannt. Ihre Energie ruht in der vergangenen und der noch ausstehenden Tatsache.....der kommende Auferstehungszustand für die kurze Zeitspanne, die dem jetzigen Weltablauf noch bleibt, schon vorweggenommen wird. Die Wiedergeburt aber setzt eine uneschatologische Weltanschauung voraus, in der das Individuum mehr oder weniger mit einer normalen Lebensdauer rechnet, für die es ein neben und über dem irdischen einhergehendes, inneres, göttliches Sein sucht. Erst in dem Augenblick, wo die Eschatologie zurücktritt, kann der griechisch-mysterienhafte Begriff der Wiedergeburt den alten mystisch-eschatologischen der proleptischen Auferstehung verdrängen. Darum taucht er bei Justin und im vierten Evangelium alsbald auf. Von da an wirkt die Taufe die Wiedergeburt. Bei Paulus schuf sie nur vorzeitiges Sterben und Auferstehen.²

The solution of the question of the relation of the second factor, the mystical doctrine of redemption, to the mystery-religions has already been suggested in what has been said about the sacraments and their effect. What is brought about is not a regeneration, but a proleptic resurrection which is relative to the coming end of things, - it is "keine Vergottung....sondern nur die Versetzung in die übersinnliche Körperlichkeit, die mit einem kommenden neuen Weltzustand gegeben

ist." ¹ "Orientalisch-griechische und paulinische Mystik als entsprechende Grössen behandeln," Schweitzer says, "heisst ein Stück in Zweiviertel- und eines in Dreivierteltakt miteinander aufführen und dabei einen einheitlichen Rhythmus heraushören." ²

Of the fact that Paul does not present a Hellenization of Christian thought, his relation to the later history of dogma would give further evidence, Schweitzer says. It is in the doctrine of rebirth, as has already been noted, that Paul differs from both John and the mystery-religions. The differences which exist between Paul and Jesus are also differences between the early Christian community and Jesus which arose ³ as the logical consequences of His death and resurrection. They consist of the theories of what pertains to the special time between the latter event and the expected Parousia. The most radical change in Christian thought (due to the delay in the fulfillment of this expectation) was the decline of the eschatological element, and it falls between Paul and the ⁴ Fourth Evangelist. The fact is, that Christian dogma does not, and through the force of historical development could ⁵ not, base itself upon Paul. It is through recognition of the eschatological character of his doctrines that the fact of its independence from him becomes understandable.

(3) Paulinism a Development of Eschatological Doctrine. All that is distinctive in the mission and doctrine of the Apostle to the Gentiles develops naturally out of Late Judaism and of the Christian intensification of the eschatologic-

al conception, Schweitzer believes. How this is true in the cases of Paul's doctrine of sacraments and doctrine of redemption has already been shown. Furthermore, this view of the origin and character of Paulinism reveals the Apostle's universalism and attitude toward the Law as neither mere practical attitudes nor Hellenizations, but as positions reached "Rein durch die Art, wie er die urchristliche Lehre systematisch zu Ende dachte.." ¹ "Den zureichenden Grund für diese Anschauung findet er," Schweitzer says, "in der besonderen Weltlage zwischen Tod und Parusie Christi." ²

(4) Conclusion. Schweitzer does not profess to give a thorough constructive investigation of Pauline doctrine in the Geschichte der paulinischen Forschung. However, it is apparent from the above treatment that he does go beyond his criticism of the attempts to find elements of Greek philosophy and Oriental mystery-religion in Paul to suggest that the apparent confusion and lack of unity in Pauline doctrine may be resolved, and the problems of Pauline study may find solution, in the eschatological viewpoint.

While this work is helpful for understanding Schweitzer's whole thought system, it has fewer contributions of a philosophical nature than the Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung. This may be attributed to both its more strictly historical character and its definite place in the justification of the eschatological conception of Jesus. The philosophical predispositions of the author strike fire, however, in the concluding paragraphs, where he says,

Freilich könnte es sein, dass diese „positive Kritik“ denen, die auf alsbald dogmatisch und homiletisch ausmünzbare Ergebnisse sehen, arg „negativ“ vorkommt. Das hat aber nichts zu bedeuten. Es ist das Los der Kleingläubigen der Wahrheit, dass sie als echte Petriner römischer und protestantischer Observanz jammernd da versinken, wo die an den Geist glaubenden Pauliner auf dem Meere der Ideen ruhig und sicher einherschreiten.¹

4. Schweitzer's Attitude Toward Eschatology.

Definition of Schweitzer's attitude toward eschatology is needed. In finding the thought of Jesus and of the early church dominated by eschatological expectations, Schweitzer does not, as some have supposed, mean to force these upon Christianity, as belonging to its essence. With Jesus they were not abnormal phenomena, but were the chief values in his spiritual inheritance. In His attitude to them, He was related in a rational way to a prospect which was socially regarded as possible. It is only when today, after the course of history has shown that this idea is not God's plan, persons still try to cherish that hope, that it can be regarded as a phantasy.²

For Schweitzer the life of Jesus is "die Tat der grössten Selbstbejahung der Eschatologie, zugleich aber auch....der Eschatologie Ende."³ It inaugurated, he says, a spiritualization of which the final consequence was to be that the values of its supersensuous elements were to be realized only in present earthly spirituality, and their transcendental features were to be regarded as only the rubbish of an eschatological world-view.⁴ Jesus' Messianic consciousness introduces, he asserts,

jene selbstherrliche Vergewaltigung des Jenseits durch das Diesseits..welche wir rückblickend als die Geschichte des Christentums erfassen, die wir an uns selbst als das Wesen des religiösen Fortschreitens und Erlebens erleben, deren Ende wir nicht absehen noch ahnen..... In gewaltiger Revolution wurde, im Geiste der Urtat des Selbstbewusstseins Jesu, im Widerspruch mit gewissen der gewisesten seiner Worte die Ethik weltbejahend. Gewaltiger aber wird die Revolution sein, wenn die letzten stehengebliebenen Trümmer der jenseitig-übersinnlichen Weltanschauung werden abgetragen werden, um den Platz für die rein diesseitig-wirkliche geistige Welt freizulegen. Alles widerspruchsvolle Vermitteln und Aufbauen der modernen Theologie ist nur ein Versuch, die letzte Enteschatologisierung der Religion aufzuhalten, ein notwendiger und aussichtsloser Versuch....Bei dem letzten Schrei am Kreuz ist die ganze eschatologisch-übersinnliche Welt in sich selbst zusammengestürzt, und als reale geistige Welt blieb nur die diesseitige, an die Sinnlichkeit gebundene, die Jesus mit seinem allmächtigen Wort in der Welt, die er verneinte, erschaffen hatte.¹

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Schweitzer's view of Jesus is to be treated later, but it needs to be said here, that it is an equally great misunderstanding of Schweitzer, on the other hand, to suppose that he regards the eschatological expectation in Jesus and in the early church as a negative element which detracts from their significance.³ Jesus' theoretical world-view is not what is significant for our day, and is not the measure of His value. It does not matter how Jesus conceived of the Kingdom or of the way in which it was to be brought about; what is of consequence is that He had such intense faith in the overthrow of the actual by the ideal, and that He centered His whole life upon the realization of this. In these features He exhibited the true nature of man, and revealed God.

Jesus' outlook was other-worldly and world-negating. It was world-accepting only in that it strove to bring the supernatural into the present, and in the fact that "er durch die

Erfahrung der Jahrhunderte in der Geschichte zur Weltbejahung fortschritt." ¹ Our modern view, on the contrary, is world-accepting, and does not rest in Jesus' outlook. The norm, Schweitzer says, is

Für das Allgemeine, unsere Welt- und Gesellschaftsformen: Weltbejahung, im bewussten Widerspruch mit der Anschauung Jesu, weil die Welt sich selber bejaht hat! Diese allgemeine Weltbejahung aber, wenn sie christlich sein soll, muss in dem Einzelgeist durch die persönliche Weltverneinung, welche Jesu Worte predigen, verchristlicht und verklärt werden.²

When we are freed from dogmatic supernatural prepossessions such as ruled in the thought-world of Jesus, world-affirmation occurs in us automatically, Schweitzer says, but it needs to be the energetic affirmation of the spiritual ideal against the actual. Schweitzer declares,

Aus diesem Kampf allein kann unserer Zeit die religiöse Energie kommen. Es war aber Gefahr, dass die moderne Theologie, um Ruhe zu haben, die antiprotestantische Weltverneinung in den Worten Jesu aufhob, den Bogen entspannte und den Protestantismus aus einer religiösen eine Kulturmacht werden liess.³

The spirit of religion cannot be one of conformity to the world; it must be one of otherness, even while it is not transcendental and while its spirituality is related to earthly existence. Genuine religion and morality must derive from the personal spirit, not from consideration of the world or from adaptation to it. Thus, though the particular eschatological view of Jesus was transient, the spirit of His life was eternal. Schweitzer says,

Man hat gemeint, dass die eingestandene Eschatologie die Bedeutung dieser Worte für unsere Zeit aufheben würde.....Nun besteht aber das Ewige der Worte Jesu gerade darin, dass sie aus einer eschatologischen

Weltanschauung heraus gesprochen und von einem Geiste aufgestellt sind, für den die damalige irdische Welt, ihre geschichtlichen und gesellschaftlichen Zustände schon nicht mehr existierten. Sie passen daher, wie sie sind, in jede Welt, denn in jeder Welt heben sie den, der ihnen ins Auge zu sehen wagt und nicht daran deutelt und dreht, aus seiner Zeit und seiner Welt heraus und machen ihn innerlich frei, dass er geschickt wird in seiner Welt und seiner Zeit schlichte Kraft Jesu zu sein.¹

The eschatological view of the history of the world falls away, but, within an affirmative attitude toward natural existence, the spirit of critical distinction from the actual world, and of earnest effort to bring the spiritual into the present, which belongs to the ethical subject and is exemplified in Jesus, continues to work. It is not necessary to reconstruct the life and viewpoint of Jesus as a model for the modern Christian. Reconstructions of the consciousness of Jesus, conforming with our own psychology, are powerless and ineffectual, but His words, without reference to His theoretical views (which were, at any rate, certainly those of His own day and not of ours), are able to convey their meaning and to work their influence in the life of the individual.

5. Die psychiatrische Beurteilung Jesu.

In the interpretation of Jesus' outlook as eschatological there is for Schweitzer no depreciation of Him. Hogg apprehends this clearly where, in an article in the International Journal of Missions, he says, "We must realize that he reveres our Lord, because of, more than in spite of, that aspect in his understanding of Christ's life enterprise which offends the average Liberal Christian." Throughout his whole treat-

ment it is Schweitzer's assumption that Jesus was not a visionary enthusiast in devoting Himself to the actualization of the eschatological expectation, but a morally earnest spirit addressing himself to the most spiritual and ethical feature which belonged to the social tradition and consciousness.

The direct examination of this question of the mental health of Jesus, Schweitzer took up in the dissertation which he presented at the University of Strassburg for the degree of Doctor of Medicine, under the title Kritik der von medizinischer Seite veröffentlichten Pathographien über Jesus, and in the later slightly enlarged form of this entitled Die psychiatrische Beurteilung Jesu.¹ His purpose, as he expresses it in the preface, is to give the conjecture that Jesus was somewhat psychopathic, which had first been offered by David Friedrich Strauss and oft repeated, a thorough examination. Along with the special obligation for this investigation which he acknowledges as a result of his conclusions in the historical field,² he points, quite properly, to his special qualifications for the task as established by his former theological and historical studies and his medical training.

Schweitzer first makes the criticism of the writers who have interpreted Jesus' consciousness as pathological, that they are uncritical in their choice and use of sources.³ In a preliminary sketch of the results of critical study of the literature Schweitzer excludes the Talmud and Apocryphal Gospels and the single tradition of Luke, and urges caution

about the Fourth Gospel, from whose doctrinal representation of Jesus three-fourths of the evidence of mental abnormality¹ is drawn. Matthew, with the exception of the first two chapters, and Mark, allowing for some misunderstandings and confusion of the tradition, are regarded as dependable, and in certain particulars as of striking genuineness.

From this exclusion of the fanciful youth stories and of the transcendent claims of the Fourth Gospel, Schweitzer does not, however, profit as much as might be expected, since the Jesus whom he finds in the Markan narrative is not the ethical teacher known to liberal theology, but a purely eschatological prophet. He represents the conclusion of historical research to be "dass die Erwartung der messianischen Wiederkunft das Zentrum der Gedanken Jesu bildet und sein Empfinden, Wollen und Handeln viel stärker beherrscht, als man bisher annahm,"² and "dass Jesus sich für den Messias gehalten und seine glanzvolle Wiederkunft auf den Wolken des Himmels erwartet hat."³

Schweitzer sketches the life of Jesus briefly and on the lines of his earlier writings. Of the period before Jesus' public ministry little is known. With four brothers and some sisters, He was a member of the family of a carpenter. That He was descended on His father's side from David, Schweitzer⁴ thinks, "darf als gesichert gelten," though this claim has been represented as an instance of the expansive disposition of paranoia. The public ministry was characterized throughout by the proclamation of the nearness of the Kingdom of God.

The implications of this message did not need to be described in detail, for the system of thought was familiar to the hearers. Of the ruler of the future kingdom, however, there were diverse conceptions. The prophetic expectation of a descendant of David, and the apocalyptic notion of a heavenly being who would have the form of a "Son of Man", were both current. For this unreconciled contradiction, Jesus, in the expectation of the imminent appearance of the Kingdom, had a personal solution - namely, that He was appointed to the dignity of future Messiahship, and that in the transformation to be effected by the coming of the Kingdom He would be revealed as "Son of Man." This He did not include in His proclamation of the Kingdom, and only toward the last did it become known to his disciples. Through its betrayal to the High Priest, and Jesus' confession of it under question, it became the occasion of His death, which He welcomed as a vicarious fulfillment of the sufferings of the final time, which it appeared He must voluntarily bring upon Himself in order to usher in the Kingdom.

This representation of the life of Jesus, Schweitzer thinks, does not give ground for the assumption of a delusional development such as is asserted by the writers whom he considers. Such a supposition "Schon a priori wenig Wahrscheinlichkeit für sich hat,"¹ Schweitzer asserts, because, despite the commonness of such religious paranoia with accompanying illusions, which Binet-Sanglé shows by a long list of clinical observations, one must not forget that these cases "zumeist bald nach Ausbruch ihrer Krankheit interniert werden und dass es gerade diese

Formen nicht sind die sich Anhänger und Jünger erwerben und Sekten gründen." ¹ Neither an origin of a delusional idea nor a development of a delusional system can be exhibited.

For the wider question, whether Jesus' declarations and conduct give warrant for one to conceive of a pathological consciousness, Schweitzer says, it is to be taken as a rule that whatever religious conceptions He shared with His contemporaries and took over from tradition are not to be regarded as pathological no matter how alien and inconceivable they may be to our way of thought. ² Disregard of this consideration, along with an uncritical attitude toward the sources, has been a chief fault of the pathographers, who have, without show of warrant, promptly classified as an abnormal phenomenon whatever was unique and strange from our point of view.

The conceptions involved consist of belief in the rule of this world by evil spirits and in demon-possession; in the imminence of the coming of God's Kingdom; in the appearance of the Messiah and of good angels with the beginning of the new age; in the accompaniment of the coming of the Kingdom by a period of tribulation, damnation of the wicked, resurrection and transformation of the righteous and elect, and a glorification of nature with super-earthly fruitfulness; in the vicarious suffering of the Messiah; and in a period of earthly humanity of the Messiah. The final idea does not appear in the confused thought of Late Judaism about the person of the Messiah, but for one who attempted to conceive and

clarify the divergences, Schweitzer says, "gab es keine andere Lösung als die, dass er ihn noch in der irdischen Weltzeit aus den Nachkommen Davids geboren sein und dann bei der Verwandlung, die für alle Erwählten mit dem Weltende gegeben war, in die überirdische Herrlichkeit des Messias-Menschensohnes erhoben werden liess,"¹ it being understood that for Jewish thought "dies mit einer Abstammung von Gott in metaphysischem Sinn gar nichts zu tun hat."² The belief in the imminence of the events was not general, but it was prepared for by the movement which arose from John the Baptist. Together with the former idea it meant that the future Messiah was already to be sought among the living descendants of David. As a human being he would be destined to endure with the nation the period of the tribulation, or, as Jesus came to think (under the influence of Isaiah 53) when there was delay of the expected suffering, to undergo it voluntarily in their behalf. These special ideas had thus a normal character within the general frame of the others, all of which were elements of social belief and tradition. However strange they may be to us, they are no more pathological, Schweitzer might say, than a modern man's assumption of a heavenly future state.

That Jesus applied His conception of the Messiah directly to Himself is striking, but it falls far short of being evidence of a pathological condition, and there are no indications of a course of development of the idea governed by inner causes.³ The relations of Jesus to His opponents, who were real not fancied, appear also to be quite diametrically opposite

to those of the psychopath, being not restrained but open and active. So far as illusions are concerned, the evidence comes chiefly from the traditional and less authentic elements in the Gospels, or depends upon over-literal interpretation. In any degree to which they are established by the dependable sources, they would not indicate a psychopathic condition. Most of the questioned features are understandable and rational from the point of view of Judaic thought; even Jesus' determination to bring about His own death, strange as it is, is a necessary feature of the eschatological outlook. The judgments of the writers who find a psychopathic condition in Jesus, Schweitzer concludes, "weder der Kritik des Geschichts-¹forschers noch der des Psychiaters standhalten."

6. Theological and Philosophical Conclusions.

(1) The Figure of Jesus. We have already quoted Schweitzer as declaring that the Jesus who appeared as Messiah, founded the Kingdom of God on earth, and died to consecrate His work,² never existed. He recognizes, to be sure, a true historical Jesus, for one result of the eschatological conception is to establish the credibility of the Markan account, but He is a purely eschatological Jesus. He belongs to His own age, and will not be modernized. The historic spirit, when it is sincere and relinquishes its apologetic purpose, destroys the modern life of Jesus which it had created, and the true historic Jesus who appears is one who is to us, in our different thought system, a stranger and an enigma.

It is apparent that so far as the ethical Jesus of our

modern religion, the Jesus in whom we can find our humanitarian ideals and base their authority, is concerned, Schweitzer's results are solely destructive. Schweitzer states this conclusion as directly and clearly as it could be put for him. "Es gibt nichts Negativeres," he sets down at the conclusion of his work, "als das Ergebnis der Leben-Jesu-Forschung."

In his intellectual inquiry he appears indifferent to religious interests and to what might be left as a basis for religion. In fact he declares,

Wer als ein Bewunderer des Rechts und der Kraft des wahren Rationalismus die Unbefangenheit der modernen Theologie, welche im Grunde nur ein historisierender Epigonen-Rationalismus ist, verloren hat, freut sich der Ohnmächtigkeit und Kleinheit ihres vorgeblichen historischen Jesus, freut sich aller derer, die an diesem Bilde irre werden, freut sich der Ungerechtigkeit, mit der man es bekämpft, freut sich an seiner Zerstörung mitzuarbeiten.¹

"It seemed," so Oskar Pfister expresses it, "as though the spirit of David Friedrich Strauss had come back to life in the brains of the young Strassburg professor."² In the Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung of the latter there is, in truth, throughout the attack on the conception of Jesus of traditional orthodoxy and of rationalism alike the same clear, calm, inexorable spirit as characterized the Leben Jesu of the former which "macht ihn über Nacht zum berühmten Mann....und vernichtete seine Zukunft."³

Back of this intellectual freedom with reference to the facts of the life of Jesus lies also such an "innere Befreiung des Gemüts und Denkens von gewissen religiösen und dogmatischen Vorstellungen" as Strauss in his preface claimed to be his advantage over his contemporaries. Schweitzer says

of Strauss:

Hegel's Philosophie hatte ihn befreit; sie hatte ihm das Verhältniß von Idee und Wirklichkeit aufgeklärt, ihn zur höheren Erkenntnis der spekulativen Christologie geführt und ihm die Augen für jene geheimnisvolle Durchdringung von Endlichkeit und Unendlichkeit, Gott und Mensch geöffnet.

Die Gottmenschlichkeit, als die höchste Idee des menschlichen Denkens, realisiert sich wirklich in der historischen Persönlichkeit Jesu. Aber während das befangene Denken meint, dass diese Realisierung als Phänomen vollkommen sein muss, weiss das Denken, welches durch wahrhaftige Kritik zur höheren Unbefangenheit eingegangen ist, dass keine Idee sich historisch vollkommen realisieren kann, ihre Wahrheit auch nicht von dem Erweis ihrer vollkommenen natürlichen Darstellung abhängt, sondern dass die Vollendung zu stande kommt durch das, was die Idee in die Geschichte hineinträgt oder durch die Art, wie die Geschichte zur Idee erhoben wird..... die Tatsache, dass Jesus jene Idee dargestellt und in der Menschheit zum Leben erweckt hat, ist wirklich und durch keine Kritik rückgängig zu machen. Sie lebt von dort an bis heute und in alle Ewigkeit.

In dieser Befreiung des Geistes und in dem Bewusstsein, Jesus als Schöpfer der Menschheitsreligion nicht antasten zu können, geht Strauss an die historische Arbeit und schlägt den Verputz herunter, wissend, dass sein Pickel dem Stein nichts anhaben kann.¹

The passage might well apply to Schweitzer himself. In fact Schweitzer might be said to attribute to Strauss at this point what in a positive way belongs only to himself. Schweitzer fills in the dim outline which "hinter dem mythischen Vorhang bewegt," of which, Schweitzer admits, a clear coherent conception "bei ihnen nicht vorausgesetzt werden darf." That Strauss's presentation permits one to do this, Schweitzer even designates as one of its chief merits.

(2) The Significance of Jesus. This really historical Jesus, of course,

kann der modernen Theologie nicht mehr die Dienste leisten, welche sie von dem ihren, halb historischen, halb modernen, in Anspruch nahm.....

er (ist) nicht der Jesus Christus, dem unsere religiöse Zeit nach altgewohnter Weise ihre Anschauungen und Erkenntnisse in den Mund legen kann, wie sie es bei dem ihrigen tat.¹

But, Schweitzer says, the modern Jesus was after all a poor and weak Jesus, too small because we had forced Him into the mold of our standards and psychology, weakening His imperious sayings and making Him of no effect upon our spiritual life. The value of Jesus is not primarily to the community, in provision of general religious conceptions such as the fatherhood of God or brotherhood of man, but in His effect upon the individual, who must reconcile his world-optimism with the world-negating spirit of Jesus. Theology thought to bring our time to the Jesus who is a spiritual power, through the historic Jesus; its merit is that through the true historical picture, it closed this round-about way. Like Jacob of old, it had wrestled with the Lord to make Him serve it, but had been obliged to let Him go. But, Schweitzer says,

segnen tut er die, welche mit ihm gerungen haben, dass sie, ohne ihn mitnehmen zu können wie er ist, als die so Gott von Angesicht gesehen haben und deren Seele genesen ist, ihre Strasse ziehen und mit den Mächten der Welt kämpfen.²

Jesus' significance rests in the fact that He dealt earnestly with the eschatological conception. Through the ethics of repentance and penance He sought by human worth to occasion the Divine establishment of the Kingdom. He strove to unite men in the effective enterprise of wresting the Kingdom to themselves which had been in process since John, and to set in motion the eschatological development. Then, when the Kingdom delayed and the general tribulation was withheld, He sought to

fulfill in Himself the necessary suffering of mankind and to usher in the Kingdom.

In presenting Jesus' thought as eschatological, Schweitzer has no thought of detracting from His significance. The importance of Jesus is not to be sought in the conceptions which He held, according to Schweitzer, but in the spirit which His life manifested, - a spirit which so filled as to shatter the eschatological system in which it found itself. He says,

Jesus ist unserer Welt etwas, weil eine gewaltige geistige Strömung von ihm ausgegangen ist und auch unsere Zeit durchflutet. Diese Tatsache wird durch eine historische Erkenntnis weder erschüttert noch gefestigt. Sie ist der Realgrund des Christentums.¹

"Nicht der historisch erkannte, sondern nur der in den Menschen geistig auferstandene Jesus kann unserer Zeit etwas sein und ihr helfen,"² he declares; and

Das Ewige und Bleibende an Jesus ist von geschichtlicher Erkenntnis durchaus unabhängig und kann nur aus seinem jetzt in der Welt wirkenden Geist heraus begriffen werden. Soviel Geist Jesu, soviel wahre Erkenntnis Jesu.³

(3) Implications for the Philosophical Problems. There are represented here the elements, both negative and positive, which go into the formation of Schweitzer's philosophy. Just as the Kantian idealism had failed to give a deduction of, and sound philosophical foundation for our religious and ethical ideas, so the historical Jesus ceases to be their fountain-head. "Wir moderne Theologen," Schweitzer says, "sind zu stolz auf unsere Geschichtlichkeit....zu zuversichtlich in unserem Glauben an das, was unsere Geschichtstheologie der Welt geistig bringen kann."⁴ History cannot, after all, furnish

the content and authority for our ideals. The modern theology, Schweitzer says, "will ihre Welt-bejahung bei Jesus wiederfinden. Darin liegt ihre Schwäche."¹ The efforts of history to provide the basis of our outlook and ideals are vain. All that it performs is a feat of legerdemain, extracting from the past what it has imported into it from the present. Our ethical outlook is new, and cannot be justified historically; neither, on the other hand, can we bring ourselves to give it up. The difference, however, should not be denied; that is to falsify history and to hobble the free dynamic expression of our own spirit. Our ethical optimism should find its real spring, and should discover the grounds of justification which it carries in itself.

The result of the historical inquiry is emancipation from the dominance of the historical Jesus and relation to His living ethical spirit.² This spirit is that which strives with irrepressible power toward the spiritualization of the present, though in a mood of world-affirmation which is not common with the eschatological viewpoint of Jesus or derived from Him. Jesus comes to us as a stranger, as He did to the young men He called as disciples, Schweitzer concludes, giving the same command to follow Him,

Und denjenigen, welche ihm gehorchen, Weisen und Unweisen, wird er sich offenbaren in dem, was sie in seiner Gemeinschaft wirken, kämpfen und leiden dürfen, und als ein unaussprechliches Geheimnis werden sie erleben, wer er ist... "³

The theological studies have thus not only a negative, but also a positive side. Though history has failed to secure

what was sought from it, Schweitzer has faith in the existence of a sound foundation for our ethical ideals, and he turns in his search to the active moral spirit itself. There is suggested not only the direction of philosophical thought, but even the shadowy outline of the features which belong to the later philosophy of respect for life. The seed of his mystical rationalism is planted.

CHAPTER FOUR

ARTISTIC ACHIEVEMENTS

1. Musical Training.

Schweitzer's interest in music began at an early age.

Within the family circle a love for music existed, and was inspired in him. Of his passion for the organ he says,

Sie lag mir im Blute. Mein Grossvater mütterlicherseits, Pfarrer Schillinger aus Mühlbach, hatte sich viel mit der Orgel und Orgelbau beschäftigt.....Er soll sehr schön improvisiert haben. Auch mein Vater besass diese Gabe. Stundenlang habe ich ihm als Kind zugehört, wenn er abends in der Dämmerung auf dem alten Tafelklavier, das vom Grossvater Schillinger stammte, phantasierte.¹

Instruction, encouragement, and opportunity were also given him early, both in the home and outside it. "Schon vor meiner Schulzeit," he says, "hatte mein Vater begonnen, mich auf einem alten Tafelklavier in Musik zu unterrichten."² In the church at Günsbach, also, while he was still a child, the organist allowed him to use the organ, he tells us, both on account of friendliness and of his usefulness as a substitute, which was such that at the age of nine he took the position in church service.

For Schweitzer, organ-playing was not a social accomplishment to be painfully acquired, nor was a musical composition something to be mechanically reproduced. Music seems to have been to him (like spoken language, though more plastic) a form of spiritual expression to be understood and reexpressed with personal independence. From childhood it provided a fluent and free medium for thought and feeling.

Besides favoring conditions, it appears that he possessed a natural aptitude for music. One element in this was strong esthetic sensibility. Some of the early experiences of music, he relates, stirred his emotions profoundly:

Wenn...der zweistimmige Gesang „Dort drunten in der Mühle sass ich in süsser Ruh“ oder „Wer hat dich, du schöner Wald“ einsetzte, musste ich mich an der Wand halten, um nicht umzufallen. Die Wonne der zweistimmigen Musik lief mir über die Haut und durch den ganzen Körper. Auch als ich die ersten Male Blechmusik hörte, schwanden mir fast die Sinne.¹

Beyond this impressionableness, he had also an active and creative imagination. The facility for expression in music was possessed early, and it was taken, along with speech, as a matter of course. An incident in this connection is related in the memoirs of childhood and youth which is indicative of the sensitiveness and strength of natural social sympathy in him. He says,

Meine Freude war, zu improvisieren und Lieder und Chormelodien mit selbst erfundener Begleitung wiederzugeben. Als nun in der Gesangstunde die Lehrerin fortgesetzt den Choral Note für Note ohne Begleitung anschluss, empfand ich dies als nicht schön und frug sie in der Pause, warum sie ihn nicht richtig mit Begleitung spiele. Im Eifer setzte ich mich an das Harmonium und spielte ihr ihn schlecht und recht mehrstimmig aus dem Kopfe vor....Aber selber tippte sie den Choral auch weiterhin immer nur mit einem Finger. Da ging mir auf, dass ich etwas konnte, was sie nicht konnte, und ich schämte mich, ihr mein Können, das ich für etwas ganz Selbstverständliches angesehen hatte, vorgemacht zu haben.²

It is not to be supposed that there was no serious study and discipline for the sake of artistry, however. At the home of a great-uncle in Mülhausen to which he went at the age of ten in order to attend the Gymnasium of that city, he recounts, "Nach dem Mittagessen musste ich Klavier üben, bis

es Zeit war, wieder in die Schule zu gehen," and again in the evenings "waren....die Schulaufgaben gemacht, so musste ich wieder ans Klavier."¹ That this discipline was not always willingly submitted to is indicated by reference to arguments with which the aunt hustled him to the piano. For the music teacher in Mülhausen, as well as for the teachers in school, he says, "habe ich anfangs wenig Freude gemacht."² This he attributes in part to the fact that in the practice hours he played at sight and improvised instead of applying himself to the assigned piece, but even more to a reluctance to express his feelings in music before the teacher. His statement of this, and description of the incident which aroused him to genuine achievement, is worthy of repetition at length:

Ich brachte es nicht über mich, ihm preiszugeben, was ich in einem schönen Musikstück erlebte. Vielen Musikschülern geht es wohl ebenso. So erzürnte ich ihn mit meinem „hölzernen Spiel“. Als ich ihm in solcher Befangenheit wieder eine noch dazu schlecht geübte Sonate von Mozart heruntergeleiert hatte, schlug er missmutig das kurze Lied ohne Worte in E-Dur von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy vor mir auf. „Eigentlich bist du nicht wert, dass man dir schöne Musik zu spielen gibt. So wirst du mir auch dieses Lied ohne Worte versudeln. Wenn einer halt kein Gefühl hat, so kann ich ihm auch keines geben.“ „Oho,“ dachte ich bei mir selber, „dir will ich doch zeigen, dass ich Gefühl habe.“ Die ganze Woche übte ich eifrig an dem Stück, das ich schon so oft vom Blatt gespielt hatte. Ich probierte sogar, wozu man mich bisher nie gebracht hatte, die besten Fingersätze aus und schrieb sie auf. In der nächsten Stunde, als ich die Fingerübungen und die Etüde glücklich hinter mir hatte, gab ich mir einen Ruck und spielte das Lied ohne Worte so, wie ich's im Herzen spürte. Mein Lehrer sagte nicht viel, sondern schlug mir nur fest auf die Schulter und spielte mir selber ein neues Lied ohne Worte vor. Dann bekam ich ein Stück von Beethoven auf. Nach einigen Stunden wurde ich würdig befunden, mit Bach anfangen zu dürfen. Und wieder einige Stunden später wurde mir eröffnet, nach meiner Konfirmation dürfte ich auf der grossen schönen Orgel der Stephans-

kirche Orgelunterricht nehmen. Damit ging ein im Stillen gehegter Traum in Erfüllung. Denn meine Sehnsucht war von jeher auf die Orgel gerichtet.¹

Schweitzer's training in the field of music is broad and thorough (that of a professional), involving not only technical facility but also wide knowledge of the means of tone production, the history of music, the structure of musical instruments, the principles of musical composition, and the products of musical art, in amazing fineness of detail so far at least as German music is concerned. On almost any of the musical instruments he has some ability, but the organ is the one on which he is most accomplished and for which he has the most love. On its construction as well as playing he is a critic and an authority, and among the books he has written² is one on French and German organ-building and playing.

2. Some Esthetic Theory.

Knowledge of the instrumental means of tone-production, even of principles of music and laws of harmony, and skill in execution are for Schweitzer, master of them as he is, subordinate matters. They relate only to an essential apprenticeship on the materials in which the spirit speaks. It is not a faculty of expression with paint, with words, or with tones, which primarily makes an artist, even though he would be dumb³ without this, Schweitzer says. That which makes an artist is an idea which dominates him and which attains expression to the degree of his mastery of the language which best suits him. Music is not constructed by mechanical application of the laws of harmony, but is an expression of the spirit. The place of

the laws of harmony in relation to it is comparable to that of the laws of good manners in the case of conduct. Sometimes, just as the latter may be disregarded for the dictates of the heart, the former may be overwhelmed by the vital flow of music, or disregarded at the behest of the spirit of music, "der Über allen Gesetzen steht."¹

There is a universal art, Schweitzer asserts, not different arts, except in "the purely external division" determined by the medium of artistic expression.² "In reality the material in which the artist expresses himself is a secondary matter. He is not only a painter, or only a musician, but all in one,"³ he says, and the artistic idea is not first fixed in one form or another, but is capable of expression in any; "Neither is there such a thing as an absolute art....Art in itself is neither painting nor poetry nor music, but an act of creation in which all three cooperate."⁴ The artist is one who seeks to express the world about him, and he chooses that material with which he can best depict it. In the case of some of the great artists - e.g. Michelangelo and Goethe - their genius found satisfying expression in any one of several media; in other cases, artists have struggled to express themselves in a material which was not that best suited to them. Nietzsche, Schweitzer says, in an incidental but suggestive criticism, was one whose form of expression was more properly musical than verbal. The force which governs the structure of his writings, he asserts, is that of musical composition rather than of thought and grammar. He says,

His works are symphonies. The musician does not read them; he hears them, as if he were going through an orchestral score. What he sees are not words and letters, but themes developing and interlacing. In Jenseits von Gut und Böse he even finds those little fugued intermezzi into which Beethoven often divergesMoreover, it is evident....that the poet of Also sprach Zarathustra worked out his idea not in word-logic, but in tone-logic, as musical motives.¹

Keen esthetic sensibility characterized Schweitzer from childhood, and he confesses to several boyhood attempts to represent the impression made upon him by the beauty of nature in verse and drawing, but without success. From then on, he says, "ergab ich mich darein, das Schöne rein beschaulich zu genießen, ohne es zu Kunst zu verarbeiten," and "Nur im Improvisieren von Musik verhielt und verhalte ich mich schöpferisch."²

In the field of music, again, Schweitzer is not precisely an original creator. To composition, he has turned his hand, but not seriously or strenuously. Music has, however, from his boyhood, with its intense but reserved spirit, furnished him an emotional outlet, and in the music of that most difficult of organ masters, Bach, he has found a congenial spiritual expression. To the rendering of it, in turn, he has brought new understanding and beauty. C. M. Widor, the great French organist, describes thus his first acquaintance with Schweitzer and impression of his ability in interpreting Bach:

In the autumn of 1893 a young Alsatian presented himself to me and asked if he could play something on the organ to me. "Play what?" I asked. "Bach, of course," was his reply.

In the following years he returned regularly for longer or shorter periods, in order to "habilitate" himself - as they used to say in Bach's day - in organ playing under my guidance.

One day in 1899, when we were going through the chorale preludes, I confessed to him that a good deal in those compositions was enigmatic to me. "Bach's musical logic in the preludes and fugues," I said, "is quite simple and clear; but it becomes cloudy as soon as he takes up a chorale melody. Why these sometimes almost excessively abrupt antitheses of feeling? Why does he add contrapuntal motives to a melody that have often no relation to the mood of the melody? Why all these incomprehensible things in the plan and working out of these fantasias? The more I study them the less I understand them."

"Naturally," said my pupil, "many things in the chorales must seem obscure to you, for the reason that they are only explicable by the texts pertaining to them."

I showed him the movements that had puzzled me the most; he translated the poems into French for me from memory. The mysteries were all solved. During the next few afternoons we played through the whole of the chorale preludes. While Schweitzer - for he was the pupil - explained them to me one after the other, I made the acquaintance of a Bach of whose existence I had previously had only the dimmest suspicion. In a flash it became clear to me that the cantor of St. Thomas's was much more than an incomparable contrapuntist to whom I had formerly looked up as one gazes up at a colossal statue, and that his work exhibits an unparalleled desire and capacity for expressing poetic ideas and for bringing word and tone into unity.¹

3. Biographer and Interpreter of Bach.

Seldom has the name of a musician been so closely connected with a composer as that of Schweitzer with Bach. This is due chiefly to the almost insurpassable manner in which he has made himself the expositor of Bach in the thorough and well-written two-volume work, Johann Sebastian Bach. Widor gives the history of this biography. It grew out of the incident related above and of his request that the same help in the interpretation of Bach be made available in writing to other French organists. The task, however, was not simple. Widor says,

la petite étude que je lui avais demandée devenait un gros travail d'ensemble. Il fallait écrire tout un chapitre sur l'histoire de la musique religieuse en Allemagne....Il fallait, de plus, laisser entrevoir l'invasion de la musique dramatique dans la liturgie des Eglises Allemandes à cette époque. Il fallait réserver enfin tout un long chapitre aux notes et aux documents biographiques indispensables.¹

Thus the originally projected plan grew by inclusion of material which seemed necessary, through several years of work, into the monumental treatment of Bach for which music-lovers in all countries recognize a great debt of gratitude to Schweitzer. It was first published in French in 1905. In 1908 a considerably enlarged version appeared in German, and from this an English translation, containing some alterations and additions by the author, was made, and published in 1911. Now it has run through four editions in French and in German, and a reprinting in English.

In the presentation of Bach's music to the public and in creation of a demand for it, Schweitzer has done much. With the appearance of his work on Bach, he was made organist of the Paris Bach Society. Then, in 1912 and 1913, he published, with C. M. Widor, a complete collection of Bach's preludes and fugues in four volumes, with an additional volume of sonatas. Three more volumes were planned in the series, but have not yet been published. When Schweitzer went to the tropics, he took along, as a gift of the Paris Bach Society, an organ, which was enclosed in a metal case to protect it from the white ants. In noon siesta time, in evenings, and in the period of inactivity caused by the war, he found time, and, he says, new insight to prepare for publication some of the unknown works of Bach, but it seems that the aged French organ-

ist has been too greatly affected by the emotions of the war to again work in collaboration with his former friend and colleague.

In the years preceding his medical work in Africa, Schweitzer gave Bach concerts in many of the capitals and leading cities of Europe, and a considerable part of the funds for his mission was secured in this way. He says of the aunt who in his boyhood admonished him, "Du weisst nicht wozu dir die Musik einst im Leben sein wird," that "Freilich konnte sie nicht ahnen, dass die Musik mir einst mit dazu helfen würde, die Mittel zur Gründung eines Spitals im Urwald zusammenzubringen."¹ Again, in the years 1917-1923, which were spent in Europe for physical and financial recuperation, he appeared in concerts in Paris, London, Birmingham and other centers, manifesting an artistry which was acclaimed by the critics and which was eloquent of his attachment to music and of his unbounded energy during the strenuous years of medical work.

4. The Role of Music.

Music has never appeared to Schweitzer in the guise of a vocation. For him it has stood alongside the business of life as belonging to its spiritual refreshment and expression. From childhood he found in it esthetic pleasure, emotional release, and creative expression. In the furtherance of his work of mercy it was capable of giving help. In the cultural isolation of the tropics it could give inspiration; and in the weariness from ministering to the sick, it could refresh and encourage.

If the spirit of the phrase "art for art's sake" is that of real art, not of dilettantism as one suspects, Schweitzer is no citizen of the realm. Here, as in every phase of his life, humanity is before his eyes. He thinks, naturally and without apology, of a mission of music to the human spirit. This, in a matter-of-fact way, is his first consideration. The work on Bach, for example, is presented not simply as a contribution to musical knowledge, nor as a help to correct performance, but as an aid and incentive to the extension of a spiritual message and influence.¹

Schweitzer holds a symbolic theory of art, and regards it as a key to the understanding of Bach's artistic creations. The formal work of art - sculpture, painting or composition - he considers only as the token of an idea. What is executed is merely the language of a conception. "All art," he says, "speaks in signs and symbols," and "The part of a work of art that is perceptible by the senses is in reality only the intermediary between two active efforts of the imagination."² The greatness of a work of art is not in its degree of formal perfection, but in the greatness of imagination which it embodies. The works of art, he declares, are but "suggestive symbols, by which the imagination of two artists hold converse together."³ All artistic feeling, that of the onlooker or listener as truly as of the creator or producer, is a spiritual act. Of the artistic attitude toward the world, artistic creation is only a special case. It is a capacity for translating esthetic associations of ideas, or of "stimulating

others to that vivacity of imaginative feeling which we call art, in contradistinction to what we hear and see and experience in our ordinary moments."¹

The particular artistic viewpoint which belonged to Bach and which can be translated to us in his compositions, is, moreover, a profoundly religious one. "Music is an act of worship with Bach," Schweitzer says; "His artistic activity and his personality are both based on his piety."² Further, the spirit is that of mystical religious experience. Schweitzer says,

Bach's real religion was not orthodox Lutheranism, but mysticism. In his innermost consciousness he belongs to the history of German mysticism....nowhere is his speech so moving as in the cantatas in which he discourses on the release from the body of this death. The Epiphany and certain bass cantatas are the revelation of his most intimate religious feelings.³

This representation of Bach is further strengthened and supplemented by C. M. Widor where he says in the preface,

what speaks through his works is pure religious emotionIt is the emotion of the infinite and the exalted, for which words are always an inadequate expression, and that can find proper utterance only in art...His cantatas and Passions tune the soul to a state in which we can grasp the truth and oneness of things, and rise above everything that is paltry, everything that divides us.⁴

These passages indicate the kind of influence which the music of Bach has exercised on the sensitive spirit of Schweitzer. Moreover, it appears probable that the appeal of Bach to Schweitzer, and the latter's sympathetic understanding of the composer, have an explanation in kinship of spirit. Schweitzer himself gives confirmation of this when he says, "Only he who who sinks himself in the emotional world of Bach, who lives and thinks with him....is in a position to perform him proper-

ly.¹ Thus the spiritual revelations which are conveyed in Schweitzer's artistic activity should throw light on the nature of his own "most intimate religious experiences" and philosophical outlook, just as, in turn, the philosophy should give new understanding of the artistic expression.

CHAPTER FIVE

WORK AS MEDICAL MISSIONARY

1. The Plan and Its Inception.

Schweitzer refers the awakening of his interest in missions to his father's Sunday afternoon services in the Günsbach church during his boyhood, which were devoted on the first Sunday of each month to accounts of the life and work of the missionaries. His first concern for the negroes of Africa is attributed to the statue to Admiral Bruat at Colmar, done by Bartholdi, on which there appears the figure of a negro whose tragic expression deeply affected him with a consciousness of "dem Elend des dunkeln Erdteils."¹

The definite idea of going to Africa as a medical missionary, however, came just at the age of thirty, when Schweitzer was already established on the faculty at Strassburg and was beginning to be internationally known both as musician and theologian. When twenty-one years old he had made a resolve, he tells us, to follow the pursuits of theology, philosophy, and music until the age of thirty, and then "einen Weg des unmittelbaren Dienens als Mensch betreten,"² but the nature of this service was undetermined at the time, and the decision to go to Africa as a doctor was made, he says, only "nachdem mich Pläne andersartigen Helfens vorher beschäftigt hatten."³

This plan of Schweitzer for his life had its basis in his keen sympathy with suffering, and in his sense of stewardship in any unequal enjoyment of the benefits of life, two

factors which entered into what he designates as the profound-¹
est experiences of his youth. In the case of the physical
suffering of the negroes of Africa, he felt the conviction
that like Dives we sin against the poor man at our gate in
that we take as a matter of course the advantages of our med-
ical science and do not put ourselves in his place, and let
heart and conscience tell us what to do. There was a work of
humanity which needed to be recognized. So, Schweitzer set
himself the task of medical training, while at the same time
his wife equipped herself as a nurse.

The place, Lambarene on the Ogowe River in Equatorial
Africa, was determined because Alsatian missionaries in the
service of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society told
him of the need for a doctor there, and the Society offered
him both one of their mission houses at the station and per-
mission to build a hospital on their grounds. The money for
the undertaking was secured by Schweitzer himself from the
profits of his books and, as was previously recounted,² of
his concerts. Help also came through contributions by
friends. On Good Friday of 1913, then, having secured his
medical degree at Strassburg early that year and taken a
short special course in tropical diseases at Paris, he set
out for this scene of his work.

2. The First Years in Africa.

Of the conditions and incidents of Schweitzer's life in
Africa we have a good account. The narrative Zwischen Wasser
und Urwald, written from notes and from reports which were

sent every six months to friends and supporters in Alsace and Switzerland, covers the first period, of four and a half years, before he revisited Europe; and two series of letters, Mitteilungen aus Lambarene, Heft 1 and 2, report the period following his return to Africa.

The medical work was at first beset by very serious material handicaps. These were gradually overcome, however, and good fortune in the treatment of the sick soon spread the reputation of the doctor. A two-room hospital of corrugated iron, with a wide thatched roof, was built, and then two other buildings, like large native huts, to serve as waiting-room and ward. In all of this construction the doctor himself, impatient with the slowness and uncertainty of native labor, was obliged to take part, not merely as foreman, but as manual laborer.

One of the strongest impressions which Schweitzer's writings transmit is that of the amazing amount of illness, and of the great need of medical help. "Tglich erdulden Tausende und Tausende," he says, "Grausiges an Schmerz, was rztliche Kunst von ihnen wenden knnte,"¹ and a single doctor is able "Hunder- te von Menschen, die sich sonst verzweifelt in ihr Schicksal ergeben mssten, aus der Gewalt der Qual und des Todes zu befreien."²

The note of intense personal joy and satisfaction in the work also runs through the books. What do all the disagreeable features (the meagerness of means, the exile, the unhealthful conditions) count for, he says, "im Vergleich zu der Freude: hier wirken und helfen zu drfen! In reference to a critical

case which was rushed to him for operation, he says,

Wie meine Gefühle beschreiben!....Weil ich hier binist er wie die, die in demselben Falle vor ihm kamen und nach ihm kommen werden, zu retten, während er anders der Qual verfallen wäre. Ich rede nicht davon, dass ich ihm das Leben retten kann. Sterben müssen wir alle. Aber dass ich die Tage der Qual von ihm nehmen darf, das ist es, was ich als die grosse, immer neue Gnade empfinde.....

So lege ich dem jammernden Menschen die Hand auf die Stirne und sage ihm: "Sei ruhig. In einer Stunde wirst du schlafen, und wenn du wieder erwachst, ist kein Schmerz mehr!"¹

A deep religious interest and feeling also find expression.

In the account of the above case, for example, he continues:

Die Operation ist vorüber. Unter der dunklen Schlafbaracke überwache ich das Aufwachen des Patienten. Kaum ist er bei Besinnung, so schaut er erstaunt umher und wiederholt fort und fort: "Ich habe ja nicht mehr weh, ich habe ja nicht mehr weh!" Seine Hand sucht die meine und will sie nicht mehr loslassen. Dann fange ich an, ihm und denen, die dabeisitzen, zu erzählen, dass es der Herr Jesus ist, der dem Doktor und seiner Frau geboten hat, hier an den Ogowe zu kommen, und dass weisse Menschen in Europe uns die Mittel geben, um hier für die Kranken zu leben..... Wir..Schwarz und Weiss, sitzen untereinander und erleben es: "Ihr aber seid alle Brüder."²

That the simple African is incapable of appreciating the message of Christianity, Schweitzer denies. Although the historical and doctrinal elements are almost impossible for the savage to understand, he is more reflective than is generally supposed, he declares, and has, furthermore, an elemental experience of salvation. Of its meaning for him, Schweitzer says,

Das Christentum ist für ihn das Licht, das in die Finsternis der Angst scheint. Es versichert ihm, dass er nicht der Gewalt von Naturgeistern, Ahnengeistern und Fetischen ausgeliefert ist und dass kein Mensch unheimliche Macht über den andern besitzt, sondern dass in allem Geschehen nur der Wille Gottes waltet.

"Ich lag in schweren Banden,
Du kommst und machst mich los."

Dieses Wort aus Paul Gerhardts Adventslied spricht wie kein anderes aus, was das Christentum für den primitiven Menschen ist. Immer und immer wieder muss ich daran denken, wenn ich auf einer Missionsstation am Gottesdienst teilnehme.¹

A strong interest in the evangelistic side of mission work appears in Schweitzer's writings. Though it is the relief of physical suffering which he has felt as a particular duty, he is not less concerned about the spiritual woes of the native and the salvation which Christian doctrine brings to him. He says,

Im Naturmenschen schlummert ein ethischer Rationalist. Er hat eine natürliche Empfänglichkeit für den Begriff des Guten und was in der Religion damit zusammenklingt.Sowie er mit den höheren sittlichen Begriffen der Religion Jesu bekannt wird, kommt etwas in ihm zur Sprache, das bisher stumm vorhanden gewesen war, und wird etwas entbunden, das bisher gebunden war..Die Erlösung durch Jesus erfährt der Eingeborene also als eine doppelte Befreiung. Aus der angstvollen kommt er zur angstlosen und aus der unethischen zur ethischen Weltanschauung.²

This redemption is conceived in a less theological and more ethical fashion than with many. It is, however, in its essence religious, and is a spiritual salvation which lies in the power of the religion of Christ and constitutes the nature of Christian experience and piety.

That Schweitzer maintains his medical service in a certain degree of independence from the organized work of any religious denomination is not due to a critical attitude toward the missions or toward evangelistic Christianity. This is based in part on general independence of character, dislike for organization and its destruction of direct personal relations,

doctrinal liberality, and an ability to make provision for his work outside of missionary resources. More truly, however, Schweitzer has wished to make his hospital "überkonfessionell und international," because, as he says in a passage which brings out the deepest and most recurrent motive in his thought, "Es war meine Überzeugung und ist es noch heute, dass die humanitären Aufgaben in der Welt dem Menschen als solchem, nicht als dem Angehörigen einer bestimmten Nation oder Konfession näher gebracht werden müssen."¹

Despite the engrossing and exacting nature of his work, cultural interests were not allowed to languish. He says,

Geistige Arbeit muss man haben, um sich in Afrika aufrecht zu erhalten....Beim Lesen eines ernstesten Buches hört man auf, das Ding zu sein, das sich den ganzen Tag in dem Kampf gegen die Unzuverlässigkeit der Eingeborenen und die Zudringlichkeit des Getiers aufreißt, und wird wieder Mensch. Wehe dem, der hier nicht so immer wieder zu sich selbst kommt und neue Kräfte sammelt.²

Darkness came early, and medical treatment by lamplight was not only difficult but involved danger of mosquitoes and fever infection. The hours after the evening meal were given to study of the history of thought on ethics and history of civilization, for which his own supply of books was supplemented through the cooperation of Professor Strohl of the University of Zurich. Then there was also the organ. "Die Stunde zwischen dem Mittagessen und der Wiederaufnahme der Arbeit im Spital," he wrote in one of his letters, "ist der Musik gewidmet, der auch die Sonntagnachmittage gehören." In his music, as well as in philosophical reflection, he attributes to the primeval solitude and isolation a helpful influence; "hier

merke ich," he says, "den Segen des weltfernen Arbeitens. Viele Bachsche Orgelstücke lerne ich einfacher und innerlicher¹ auffassen als früher."

3. Effects of the War.

In leaving Europe, Schweitzer had sound financial provision for two years. Additional contributions kept coming in, and the work was continued for four and a half years. Drugs and supplies were used in large quantities, however; and when the war came, Schweitzer was cut off from the replenishment of materials and funds alike. Furthermore, hardships were brought about along the Ogowe. Trade and industry stopped, and food was scarce. Finally in 1917, already in debt for the continuance of the work, depleted of stores, and with the health of his wife and himself impaired, he was obliged to go back to Europe.

To lay the foundation for return to Africa was difficult. Many of the supporters had been reduced to poverty by the war, and they were divided by national feeling. Lectures and concerts were necessary to discharge debts for the earlier work. In the face of such unfavorable conditions, raised prices meant heavier expense for the work. Two operations were necessary to restore Schweitzer's health, and that of his wife was not such as to make her return safe. However the difficulties were faced and overcome, and in the beginning of 1924, although obliged to leave his wife behind in Europe, Schweitzer again set sail for Lambarene. He was accompanied only by an eighteen-year-old Oxford student of chemistry, who helped

him during the first difficult months and until other assistance came.

4. Restoration of the Mission.

When, after a slow trip along the coast, Schweitzer arrived at Lambarene on Easter Sunday, 1924, he promptly and vigorously began the reestablishment of his hospital. The buildings were in a dilapidated state, particularly their thatched roofs, and the repair work and new construction which was necessary were made difficult because of the effect of the war upon labor and materials. The demands which this work made upon Schweitzer's time and strength were almost overwhelming, and with them went an increase of several fold in the amount of sickness to be treated, spread by the mobilization of natives as troops and carriers. The patients were, furthermore, of a different type than before, being almost-wild natives brought from the interior to work in the forests. With many of them it was impossible to communicate, and it was virtually impossible to maintain discipline among them without constant personal supervision.

Relief from the worst pressure of the work came to Schweitzer, when it was critically needed, through the arrival, in quick succession, of two nurses and two doctors to help him, but even so the burden was heavy. In spite of the aid, and the encouragement which their coming gave, expressions of fatigue, illness, and nervous strain, creep into the recital in a way which is without precedent in the Zwischen Wasser und Urwald. The unwavering optimism and confidence of the former

work are lacking here. Schweitzer writes,

Dass so nach und nach Ordnung in den Spitalbetrieb kommt, könnte uns neuen Mut zur Arbeit geben, wenn die durch Platzmangel, Dysenterie und Hungersnot geschaffenen Verhältnisse nicht so trostlos waren.....

.....
Durch die noch immer zunehmende Dysenterie gestaltet sich die Tätigkeit im Spital immer schwieriger. Wir sind alle erschöpft und entmutigt. Vergebens suchen wir die Verseuchung des Spitals aufzuhalten. Schon habe mehrere Patienten, die wegen anderer Krankheiten kamen, bei uns Dysenterie bekommen....Einige davon konnten wir nicht retten....Vergebens reiben wir uns auf, die Polizei im Spital zu machen, damit die zur Vermeidung der Dysenterie erlassenen Vorschriften einigermaßen befolgt werden. Die Verständnislosigkeit unserer Wilden für derlei Dinge macht alle unsere Bemühungen illusorisch.¹

If, however, in comparison with the story of the first period in Africa, the Mitteilungen may be said to lack romance, confident strength, and artistic quality, these later writings nevertheless possess a striking character. In their concern about nails, the sawing of timbers, the hunting of bamboo, and the recovery of drifted canoes they remind one of Robinson Crusoe. More noteworthy, however, is their resemblance to the letters of Paul; though it is not the practical, resourceful Paul who was "in peril oft on land and sea" of whom we are most reminded, despite the common features here,² but the Paul of great transitions from reproof to rejoicing, from practical matters to spiritual values. The monotonous and wearying concern with daily chores and difficulties is broken by joy over the healing of a case of sleeping sickness taken early in its course, the successful outcome of a difficult operation, or the saving of a badly infected arm. A chief whose shattered hand has been saved forgets the sorely-needed thatches he has promised, but Schweitzer concludes, "trotzdem

behalte ich ihn in lieber Erinnerung."¹ A patient who has proved to be a valuable assistant in building, leaves him in a time of need, but after a passage as crisp as that of Paul about Mark, Schweitzer adds, "Trotz des Schmerzes, den er mir antut, bewahre ich ihm ein gutes Andenken."² When a patient slipped away before a cure was completed, he lamented, "Alle Mühe und alle Ausgaben mit diesem Fall waren also umsonst!" but promptly continued,

Solchen entmutigenden Fällen stehen aber viele andere entgegen, die einen mit Freudigkeit erfüllen können. Im allgemeinen sind die Kranken und ihre Angehörigen wirklich dankbar.....Nur darf ich an tatsächlicher Dankbarkeitsleistung nicht zu viel begehren.³

One wonders at the spirit in which the work is maintained! What is the source of it, and what is its support? Schweitzer is imposed upon in the feeding of the sick and their attendants, and in the care of the aged and hopelessly ill who have no relatives. The native will stand by with complete indifference, and will decline help, if he or his relatives are not concerned, or, when he has learned to read and write, if manual labor is involved. While dysentery rages, the wild transient from the interior will dip water from the river rather than go a few steps farther to the spring, and will cook and eat from the same bowl with the sick, if vigilance is relaxed for the briefest time. He has no idea of value, and will waste and destroy, with utter unconcern, precious medical supplies about whose care he has been strictly admonished. He is without sense of ownership, and steals the fruit and chickens of the mission station without conscience. He cannot be depended upon to present himself at the dispensary for his treat-

ment, but must be hunted and brought there by the arm. In the face of these dispiriting difficulties, of the unceasing stream of illness, of the heedless and irresponsible attitude of the patients, of the lack of gratitude, and of the indifference of the African to the needs of his fellows, what is striking is that effort is sustained. Yet Schweitzer's devotion and joy do not fail. For every case of suffering and woe, no matter what the circumstances, there is fresh sympathy. Toward these wild and undisciplined natives who are so trying, who make their own relief so difficult, and who are so unresponsive, there is unfailing compassion and love. How Schweitzer is affected is indicated by the following passage:

Welch trauriges Schauspiel, wenn solch abgemagerte Leute, die sich durch ihre Züge gleich als Wilde aus dem Innern verraten, mit ihrem armseligen Bündel bei uns abgesetzt werden! Mag man es so und so oft erlebt haben: immer wird man aufs neue durch dieses Elend bewegt. Ein unsägliches Mitleid mit den armen Fremdlingen erfasst einen. Und wie oft ist es hoffnungsloses Mitleid, da beim ersten Blick deutlich ist, dass der Ankömmling hier seinen letzten Atemzug tun wird, fern von den Seinen, die auf seine Rückkehr und auf das Geld, das er mitbringen soll, warten.¹

Schweitzer never loses, in the press of work, anxiety, difficulties, and unresponsiveness, the sense of humanity and of the reality and poignancy of its spiritual experiences.

The work of Albert Schweitzer as a medical missionary among the blacks of Africa is to be regarded as more than a mere biographical fact. It is the logical conclusion of a line of thought carried through from the Religionsphilosophie Kant's, by way of the Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung, to this result. Each step in the line of thought was necessary to reach this end, but together they led to the missionary activity,

as inevitably as the premises of a syllogism to their conclusion. It is not to be supposed that it is simply a humanitarian reaction to a religious disillusionment, or a more or less accidental substitute for a worn-out object of devotion. It represents in a non-theoretical form those conclusions of his studies which for Schweitzer are fixed beyond doubt. Thus it sums up the results of the previous studies, and anticipates the philosophy of civilization which is its theoretical expression. For that philosophy it is both practical expression and datum. In it there is exhibited an independence of Jesus' spirit from His own, or any other, world-view. It is not the world-view which produces the spirit; it had other, and more fundamental grounds. In the intellectual-religious-ethical compound of the human consciousness, the cosmological theory may be independently varied, and is found not to be the condition of the ethico-religious spirit. The spring of the latter is different. The Christian may demonstrate not only what the early church first showed, the possibility of the living spirit of Jesus dissociated from the world-view which it accompanied in Him, but more generally, the absence of vital bond between ethical spirit and any interpretation of the world.

CHAPTER SIX

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CIVILIZATION

1. Its Place in Schweitzer's Work.

It was during the period of recuperation in Europe that Schweitzer's Kulturphilosophie appeared. It was first presented as lectures, in 1922, at the University of Upsala and at Oxford, and then published in both German and English, under the general subject of a philosophy of civilization, in two volumes, entitled Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur (Decay and Restoration of Civilization) and Kultur und Ethik (Civilization and Ethics).

How he had been engaged during the academic period in Strassburg and the medical labors in Africa, with the line of thought which appears in them is recounted in the preface of the English edition and in a letter of the date of Christmas, 1915. He wrote of his daily routine in Africa,

War der Tag nicht gar zu anstrengend, so vermag ich nach dem Abendessen zwei Stunden an meiner Arbeit über Ethik und Kultur in der Geschichte des Denkens der Menschheit zu schaffen....Es ist ein merkwürdiges Arbeiten. Mein Tisch steht an der auf die Veranda hinausführenden Gittertür, damit ich möglichst viel von der leichten Abendbrise erhasche. Die Palmen rauschen leise zu der lauten Musik, die die Grillen und Unken aufführen. Aus dem Urwald tönen hässliche und unheimliche Schreie herüber....In dieser Einsamkeit versuche ich, Gedanken, die mich seit 1900 bewegen, zu gestalten und am Wiederaufbau der Kultur mitzuhelfen. Urwaldeinsamkeit, wie kann ich dir jemals danken für das, was du mir warst!....¹

Hegel has said, in a suggestion which, though only a partial truth, contains a keen historical insight, that "the owl of Minerva flies by night," or that the theoretical formulation of a

philosophy is the latest fruitage of the spirit. The apprehension of a spiritual reality in the form of idea comes only after it has existed as original, internal and creative impulse and has externalized itself as objective fact. The practical function is, thus, an essential part of the conscious process, and only through it is knowledge completed. The impulse comes to a knowledge of itself, or to self-consciousness, and is thus philosophy. An individual or a civilization comes to a conscious knowledge of the principles of its own life, but not before they have been realized in its life, - only afterward. It is, as a fact, in accordance with this historical theory that the spiritual development of Schweitzer has proceeded, and that his activity has terminated in the philosophy of civilization. Without the philosophy, his life would have lacked completeness and unity. In it there appears the principle which interprets the antecedent process, completes it, and achieves its synthesis.

A sketch of the general features of the philosophy is all that will be given here. As a critical analysis and statement of it is planned for a later point in the treatment, it is considered possible to leave the examination of details to that place. All that is desired is to provide an acquaintance with the philosophy of civilization in its main outlines, as it appears among Schweitzer's works, in such a way as to furnish the background for the critical notices which have been given it and for the later critical study.

2. The Decay of Civilization.

1

Schweitzer, in common with Spengler¹ and many other European thinkers, is convinced that modern civilization fails to embody factors of permanent significance for man, and that its decay is in process. Schweitzer takes this as almost self-evident, and considers that the business of thoughtful men is not to prove the fact, but to diagnose the causes. The only reason we can fail to see this clearly and universally, is that we are confused by a striking advance in mechanical power and material prosperity. This is a phenomenon which has never before occurred except in conjunction with an intellectual and moral advance. Our satisfaction with it has led us to overlook the fact that such development is not in itself an advance in civilization, and that in this case it was not accompanied by that ethical spirit which is the basis and content of genuine civilization. Only when our civilization began to crumble for want in general thought of any rational convictions which would serve to maintain ethical conduct, did it become apparent to some that our civilization was bankrupt and in process of collapse.

Schweitzer explicitly rejects the easy-going faith in progress which has associated itself with the theory of evolution. The course of natural processes and the realization of genuine civilization are two distinct and unrelated things for him. This idea of an inexorable evolutionary development is, he says, "den entgeistigten Wirklichkeitsoptimismus..der uns seit Jahrzehnten in der Irre herumföhrt."² We have enjoyed a false confidence, "als ob die in der Welt auftretenden Gegensätze

sich von sich aus miteinander im Sinne eines zweckmässigen Fortschritts auseinandersetzen", ¹ and have shunned the true alternative, that genuine progress in civilization depends upon the power of ethical ideas which are arrived at by reason and supported by the activity of the ethical spirit.

A recognition of the defects and evils of civilization is urgently needed. Any hope for the renewal of civilization depends upon a consciousness of the absolute indefensibility of the material and spiritual conditions under which we live - that is, upon an apprehension of the character of what is and of what ought to be, in their contrast.

The disproportionate attention given to our material progress, and the conditions of life with which that material progress has been associated, have confused us in regard to the true nature of civilization and robbed us of the opportunity and power for reflection about it. While the material progress of society is an element in civilization, it is not ² an unqualified element nor the essential one. The essence of civilization is ethical; it lies in the development of the motive to raise life, in so far as we can determine it, to ³ its highest degree of value. It is this element, Schweitzer believes, which has been decaying in our western world. Our society is characterized by lack of freedom, over-organization, subjugation of the individual mind to group thought, and indifference toward human life and sensibilities. So, even while the wave of material progress has risen to its crest, the essential factor of civilization has been on the decline, and civilization has no longer either creative vigor or endurance.

3. Philosophy's Responsibility.

The essential reason for the plight of our civilization is its lack of a rationally defensible world-view as foundation for the ethical ideals upon whose operation in society its soundness is dependent. During the period of Rationalism the ethical ideals which are necessary to civilization were supported by a living, popular philosophy that interpreted reality in such a way as to find meaning in it for human life and values, and to maintain enthusiasm for civilization. But that naive and dogmatic metaphysic, in spite of the support it received from Kant and Hegel, fell, under the criticism of pure thought, and the popular mind was left without a rational set of ideas which would put conviction and enthusiasm behind ethical purposes and activity.

Philosophy, it is true, undertook the task of replacing the ridiculed metaphysical structure of Rationalism by an interpretation of the world which would be more empirical and in closer accord with the findings of the natural sciences, but in doing so it lost touch with human values and neglected its real duty. Its obligation was to maintain civilization by putting into general circulation a secure philosophical outlook which would engender enthusiasm and activity in the advancement of life. Philosophy further betrayed civilization, Schweitzer asserts, by cherishing the view that such an optimistic and ethical outlook could be based on our interpretation of the world. The failure of pure thought to secure an optimistic and ethical outlook for life in this way is not the fault of philosophy, Schweitzer thinks, but it is a fact which it might

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be expected to have recognized and admitted.

4. Schweitzer's Philosophy of Civilization.

Schweitzer regards the optimistic-ethical world- and life-attitude which has been a constant trait of Occidental theory as its distinctive characteristic. The west presents only this one world-attitude, in distinction from the alternative world-view of the Orient, which is that of resignation and world-negation. Our philosophical systems have all alike had the one aim of giving a rational basis to the ethical attitude, to which we have tenaciously clung even when they were found to be faulty. Temporarily some of them, among these notably Eighteenth Century Rationalism, succeeded in giving support to our ideals, and stimulated civilization, but ultimately each system revealed defects to pure thought and ceased to command the conviction which made it a civilizing power. Thus Schweitzer sees the history of philosophy, which he reviews in the second volume of the Kulturphilosophie, as the tragedy of the Occidental world-view. It is regarded as having left our ethical attitude toward life without rational grounds.

The scientific merit of the methods of modern philosophy of nature is not questioned by Schweitzer, nor the general soundness of its results, but only its relative importance in the comprehensive business of philosophy. Philosophy has been too engrossed with its idea of solving the mysteries of the universe, he thinks, and too confident that when it did this it would find its ethical ideals grounded there. It has been oblivious to the fact that the ethical elements in our civiliz-

ation have been perishing while it has been holding out an empty hope of a scientifically established metaphysics which would lay their foundation in objective reality.

There are several objections to the program philosophy has set. One is, that the demands of optimistic activity cannot brook the delay and uncertainty of a metaphysical foundation which, as empirical, is never final. Another is, that it is not (Socrates to the contrary) the purely rational element of understanding which gives impulse and direction to conduct, but for it there are non-rational grounds. Finally, there is no antecedent assurance that metaphysical inquiry, if it could arrive at a final world-interpretation, would offer the help to human life and value that is sought.

Schweitzer declares:

Meine Lösung des Problems ist die, dass wir uns entschliessen müssen, auf die optimistisch-ethische Deutung der Welt in jeder Weise zu verzichten....Weder die Welt- und Lebensbejahung noch die Ethik ist aus dem, was unsere Erkenntnis über die Welt aussagen kann, zu begründen....Der einzige Fortschritt des Erkennens ist, dass wir die Erscheinungen, die die Welt ausmachen, und ihren Ablauf immer eingehender beschreiben können! Den Sinn des Ganzen zu verstehen - und darauf kommt es der Welt-anschauung an! - ist uns unmöglich.¹

Thus, with general disillusionment about the worth of our mechanical and material progress Schweitzer combines denial that our scientific knowledge is directly or necessarily a step toward the attainment of genuine progress, and that it gives any assurance of unity of the actual and ethical.

To renounce the attempt to interpret the objective world in such a light as to find in it meaning for human life and for its aims does not mean to Schweitzer, however, a renun-

ciation of the optimistic and ethical world attitude.¹ He says of himself,

Ich glaube der erste im abendländischen Denken zu sein, der dieses niederschmetternde Ergebnis des Erkennens anzuerkennen wagt und in bezug auf unser Wissen von der Welt absolut skeptisch ist, ohne damit zugleich auf Welt- und Lebensbejahung und Ethik zu verzichten.²

It is Schweitzer's theory, and a distinctive principle of his philosophy, that the basis of such an attitude is not to be sought in knowledge of the universe, but to be rationally deduced from the facts of ethical volition. His view is, that the "will-to-live", by which he does not mean an instinct of self-preservation but a will to preserve and advance all life, can not only stand by itself, but can support a philosophical system instead of resting upon one. What our civilization needs in order to be living and progressive is respect for life, not founded upon an uncertain interpretation of the universe but upon our will to live and to perfect life, and upon recognition of that will in all life.

The ground of man's hope for a perfection of civilization, and of his enthusiasm for life, cannot be a rational one, according to Schweitzer. The actual world offers no warrant for such a hope and enthusiasm; and they are not justified by any presentation of evidence for them. They spring from the will-to-live itself, and depend upon it.

The actual world does not furnish our ethical ideals, but, to the contrary, they demand that it conform to them. It has been our weakness to look to reality to produce progress independent of human effort to work out ethical ideas by reason

and to incorporate them in reality. We are not to place dependence in some interpretation of the world to give a significant metaphysical position to human values, but to trust directly and immediately in the optimistic-ethical will.

The value of conscious life is accepted without rational reason for it, either religious or philosophical. It is involved in the will-to-live, and, without demonstration to reason, it is accepted by the ethical will as its controlling principle. The respect for life is thus founded not upon beliefs, but upon a volition. It is in itself non-rational, but it is the position, Schweitzer says, to which reason leads us. True rationalism is eventually mysticism. It leads to, and builds from, an experience in which the individual accepts, and identifies himself with the general Will-to-Live.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE CRITICS

1. Criticisms of the Theological Works.

(1) Schweitzer's Contribution, and the Values Claimed. It manifestly cannot fall within the limits of our treatment to criticize in detail, or even to pass a general judgment upon Schweitzer's theological work or theories. Of the scholarly character and the general value to theology of Schweitzer's Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung there can be no question. The critical investigation of the life of Jesus is justly characterized by Schweitzer as "die grösste Tat der deutschen Theologie"¹ and "eines der bedeutendsten Ereignisse in dem gesamten Geistesleben der Menschheit,"² and his careful and monumental survey of this enterprise is a valuable contribution to scholarship. F. C. Burkitt speaks of it, in the preface to the English translation, as a work which offers to the public "as no other book has ever done, the history of the struggle which the best equipped intellects of the modern world have gone through in endeavoring to realize for themselves the historical personality of our Lord," and, in the article "Gospels" in Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, as "the most instructive introduction to the general trend of Gospel criticism during the Nineteenth Century."³ It is a book, Reinhold Niebuhr says, "through which all New Testament criticism was profoundly affected."⁴

That Schweitzer's theological views are fully acceptable

to either Christian feeling or Christian scholarship in general is not to be expected. His conceptions of the life of Jesus and of the course of religious progress are both too individual and vigorous, and too much at odds with our familiar ways of thought and traditional religious values to be either readily favored or to be compromised with. From Schweitzer's side also, as has been indicated, there is said to be no compromise between the modern historical and eschatological life of Jesus. "Der Fortschritt besteht jedesmal,"¹ he says, "in der Einseitigkeit, im Nichtmehrvereinenkönnen." The eschatological life of Jesus gives us a wholly different view of Him, and demands that we orient ourselves toward Him quite differently than in the case of the modern historical Jesus.

The eschatological conception of the life of Jesus which Schweitzer adopts is not, of course, original with him. He gives in his Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung a full account of its development, pointing to its appearance in Reimarus, Ghillany, Johannes Weiss and Wrede.² To him, however, we may attribute a large part in securing the open recognition of the alternative "eschatological or not eschatological,"³ and also some development of the conception, and extension of its use as a principle of interpretation. In distinction from Wrede, in his simultaneous publication, Schweitzer regards the doctrinal, that is, eschatological, element in the life of Jesus as historical rather than literary. He is not content to recognize an eschatological element

merely in Jesus' words, but thinks that apocalyptic expectations are the governing element of His ministry and passion.

Schweitzer urges in behalf of his view that it is first of all valid history. It makes "an end of 'qualifying clause theology' of the 'and yet' the 'on the other hand' and the 'notwithstanding'." It is the result of critical investigation, free, as it may well be with quiet mind, from apologetic purposes. It carries with it, furthermore, he says,

eine fortschreitende Rechtfertigung der evangelischen Ueberlieferung....eine Reihe von Perikopen und Reden, die gefährdet waren, weil sie vom Standpunkt der zum Massstab der Ueberlieferung genommenen modernen Theologie sinnlos erschienen, sind jetzt gerettet.¹

Moreover the figure of Jesus, though it belongs to an alien thought world, is, he thinks, larger, more majestic, and a more potent spiritual force. Modern theology, in turn, is liberated from historical bondage and is able to manifest itself as it is. It can become conscious of its own inmost essence. It is freed "von der falschen....geschichtlichen Rechtfertigung," and can "den ganzen Ideenreichtum entfalten, der bis jetzt durch eine falsche Historizität gebunden war."²

(2) Reception of the Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung.

With such an appraisal of the practical, progressive value of the eschatological viewpoint, as well as its general truth, Kirsopp Lake agrees where, after quoting Schweitzer as having "very truly said" that the historical Jesus will not be one who can any longer perform the service modern theology has been accustomed to secure from its half historical and half modern Jesus, or in whose mouth it can put its views and

knowledge, but must be allowed to return to His own time, he says, "The attempts to use the teaching of Jesus as a final solution of our problems neglects this fact....When, however, the teaching of Jesus is allowed to belong to its own century, and is interpreted in that light, it gains in strength and pointedness and it becomes an inspiration and a guide, for the 'will' of Jesus becomes plain."¹

Most theologians, however, have been loath to exchange for these values claimed by Schweitzer those which they had secured in the rational, universally intelligible Jesus who had been won by modern critical study. The academic theologians in general, particularly in Germany, held to the critical liberal life of Jesus, and, after a few vigorous condemnations of Schweitzer's thorough-going eschatological theory, proceeded with their program as though it had never been presented.

In England, it is true, the eschatological conception at first had a hearty reception. Professor William Sanday in his Life of Christ in Recent Research, 1907, welcomed the Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung as the most helpful of the recent books in that field, and said, "it would be no more than just to describe a full half of these lectures as really based upon Schweitzer's labours. At least they would have taken a different and less satisfactory shape if I had not had Schweitzer's work before me. If I should succeed in giving to my treatment of the subject definiteness and logical coherence of outline it will be very largely due to him."²

In this work Sanday recognized Schweitzer as "the latest

and most thorough-going representative"¹ of the eschatological school, and with reference to the eschatological conception says that "Schweitzer applies it more thoroughly than had ever been done before, even by the school to which he himself belonged."² He is not inclined to agree in all respects with Schweitzer, but thinks that the public ministry of Jesus was probably of greater length than a year, that the political conception of the Messiah was more firmly established than Schweitzer recognizes and Jesus worked to recast the popular anticipation, that in general Schweitzer overstates the case against Jesus as a teacher, and that the journey to the north³ was in all likelihood a flight from opposition. In reference to Schweitzer's eschatological conception he cautions that it is "as great a mistake to try to explain everything in terms of eschatology as to treat the eschatology as a mere appendage," but concludes that, "Speaking broadly and with much reserve as to details, I should be disposed to defend the main outlines⁴ of his arguments."

The defense, however, collapsed rather abruptly and quite completely. This happened when what was apparently the position of established and official scholarship in Germany on the issue was made plain by Ernst von Dobschütz, a Professor Ordinarius of the Theological Faculty at Strassburg, where Schweitzer was Privatdocent.

Von Dobschütz gave first a paper at the Congress on the History of Religion at Oxford in 1908, and then a series of lectures at Oxford in 1909, printed in the Expositor in the early part of 1910 and reprinted the same year under the title

Eschatology of the Gospels, which were in direct opposition to Schweitzer's views. Eschatology had been receiving an overemphasis, he said, which accompanied a general modern interest in what is alien and strange. That Jesus held eschatological expectations in common with his time, he did not deny, but they had not, he said, exercised any considerable influence on Jesus or His disciples. There is no evidence that Jesus dreamed of hastening the "end of things," according to Von Dobschütz, and in Jesus' conception,

the Kingdom of God is not to be brought about by a miraculous act of God¹....Jesus in His own opinion is not only preparing the future Kingdom of God... but He is actually bringing it in²His belief was that this work and His own person could not be overthrown.....that His work should gain universal importance and He be acknowledged by every man³... When we ask what is the kernel of early Christian religious feeling we shall find that there is nothing eschatological about it.⁴.....Many sayings of Jesus and Paul are..only fully intelligible if we recognize that eschatological terms are used by them in a new sense; they discard all external, political, miraculous significance, but take the inward moral meaning as already fulfilled⁵....The Kingdom is at hand, it is present in His person... in Jesus' preaching everything is at once present and future⁶....In the two-sidedness of John's doctrine it is the very attitude of Jesus and Paul which we recognize.⁷

In spite of the very detailed opposition to Schweitzer's views Von Dobschütz does not in the first paper refer to him except as a "recent author." In the later lectures, however, he mentions him by name after elaborately and as indirectly as possible explaining his inferior academic rank. For several pages ⁸ he comments upon the current tendency to see the early Christian writings with early Christian eyes and the prevalence of "these rather strange eschatological views"

which is such "that many of our recent German students will find themselves quite at home and will think this form of interpretation to be the usual, the only natural one." Particularly "there has always been some tendency in this direction in Strassburg," he says, and then, deprecatingly, "So you will easily understand how it came to pass that one of the most clever junior Strassburg men, Dr. Albert Schweitzer, also well known as an ingenious interpreter of Bach's music, happened to put forth his so-called theory of 'consequent eschatology'."

"Now I wonder," he continued ingeniously, "how it happened that this theory, put forth in the form of a history, or rather an historical review, of the research on the life of Christ in the last hundred years 'from Reimarus to Wrede' 1906, met with much more appreciation in England than in Germany." For the puzzle, however, he had some partial explanation, for after calling the roll of Wernle, Jülicher and Holtzmann in the opposition, he complained that Sanday gave the book "a splendid advertisement."¹

However bold the spirit of Sanday may have been under this attack, it might well have made him look with care to his own reputation and to the good name of British scholarship. At any rate, in an article under the title of "The Apocalyptic Element in the Gospels" in the Hibbert Journal for October, 1911, Sanday chose to soften as much as possible his agreement, and shows evident regret for his earlier ill-considered enthusiasm. For the interest in England in the quest of the apocalyptic element in the Gospels, he admits, "the strongest impulse came from Schweitzer's book Von Reimarus zu Wrede,"

and some responsibility for the circulation of the views belonged to him. His retraction is almost, as Lowrie characterizes it, "pathetic," but he is not entirely free from his former endorsement. The objection urged, is not the untruth of the eschatological conception, but a too consistent and logical application of it. Sanday forgets that he had before said, "The conspicuous merit of the writer is that from first to last he holds a single clue firmly in his hand." ¹ There is recognition of the same quality in the author, but a different value put upon its results.

To the question of the soundness of Schweitzer's theory Von Dobschütz in reality contributed nothing. The circumstances of oral delivery no doubt imposed limitations upon the extent and character of his treatment, but it is merely of the nature of unsubstantiated assertion. He gets no whit farther than the force of the arguments *ad hominem*, *ad verucundiam*, and *ad populum* will carry him. No one of the most ardent admirers of Schweitzer would claim that he has struck into the difficult and complex field of the historical life of Christ with a theory that supercedes all previous research in the subject and stands as a single body of truth in which nothing can be called in question. There are good grounds on which one may differ with Schweitzer's interpretation of many details in the ministry of Jesus, or of His whole consciousness, but to minimize the greatness of the work or its originality can only reflect upon the critic.

The merits of Schweitzer's voluminous and boldly sincere

work on the life of Christ and of his masterly treatment of Bach are not those implied by Von Dobschütz' terms "clever junior Strassburg man" and "ingenious interpreter of Bach," and the origin of such works is not aptly described by saying that "it came to pass" that they "happened" to be written. Some concerned and hostile, but not professionally jealous critics have better to say of Schweitzer's work. Jülicher, even though, to quote Sanday, he "is evidently stung....and sits down with no less evident intention of demolishing his opponent,"¹ recognizes Schweitzer as "the best read and most undaunted critic" in the field in which he writes; and Wernle says, "Wir haben keine Geschichte der Leben Jesu Forschung die sich nur annähernd mit Schweitzer's Buch vergleichen liesse."²

On the score of originality, it seems very improbable to suppose that it was a theory so familiar that recent German students would "think this form of interpretation to be the usual, the only natural one" which met such uncompromising hostility from the academic circles in which they were trained, and which one of the theological leaders characterized as a dumb-foundingly original romance.³

Professor Wernle is one of the most severe critics, but he lays his finger with precision and fairness upon what is its distinctive position. He notes the relation of Schweitzer to Johannes Weiss, which the former had himself emphasized, but says, "Über Johannes Weiss hinausgehend, betonte Schweitzer den aktiven, Geschichte schaffenden Charakter der Eschatologie Jesu."⁴

In this connection Professor Wernle has also some comments to make about the title of the work. "Der Titel des Buchs: 'Von Reimarus zu Wrede' ist....falsch," he objects, "er muss heissen: Von Reimarus zu Albert Schweitzer, denn auch Wrede gehört in das ungeheure Leichenfeld der grossen Leben-Jesu-Schlacht, als deren einzig Überlebender Schweitzer dasteht."¹ It is, of course, no demerit in Schweitzer that he has his own distinct viewpoint, or that in holding it he regards it as the most reasonable conception. This is an inevitable esteem that we have for our own opinions, but it makes difficult the writing of an unbiased history. Historians should hold no strong convictions of their own. But, though it is virtually impossible to write history without representing the development of what one regards to be true belief as the line of progress, there is justice in Wernle's criticism of Schweitzer for treating the history of such a field of research as the life of Jesus from a partisan point of view. The work, he complains, in spite of the tribute which we quoted above, is "mehr Kritik als Geschichte....Kritik von dem fertigen eschatologischen Standort des Verfassers aus...von da aus wird etwas anderes als eine einseitige Geschichte der Leben Jesu Forschung gar nicht möglich sein."² The soundness of this criticism, so far as it applies to method, Schweitzer seems to have admitted in the different plan of his Geschichte der paulinischen Forschung.

Concerning the book as a whole, then, Wernle praises the extensiveness of its material, which is such that "wenig

Leser nicht mit Dankbarkeit vieles ihnen Neue darin finden
 werden,"¹ and the form, of which he says, "die Sprache ist
 glänzend, für mich schon zu bilderreich, der Stoff meister-
 haft geordnet mit nur seltenen Vergewaltigungen. Nirgends
 ein Verweilen bei Nebendingen; das Zentrale und Neue wird
 überall mit Sicherheit erfasst,"² but he objects to its lack
 of impartial objectivity. He gives an exceptionally concise
 and fair summary of Schweitzer's conception of the life of
 Jesus, taken from the Messianitäts- und Leidensgeheimnis, and
 takes exception to the introduction of eschatological deter-
 minations into the life of Jesus, the notion that Jesus con-
 ceived of forcing the Kingdom, the Interims-Ethik, and the
 trust in the Synoptic tradition. He agrees that Schweitzer
 has much justification for his criticism of the psychological
 constructions of the Liberal-Jesus-theology from Keim to O.
 Holtzmann, but points out places in which Schweitzer's views
 themselves also involve alterations in the text and construct-
 ions which go beyond it: e.g. in Jesus' ideas in the incident
 about John the Baptist, the interpretation of the phrase about
 the violent who force the Kingdom, and the purpose of Jesus at
 Jerusalem. On the point of relation to the sources, however,
 beyond thus countering Schweitzer's attack, his chief critic-
 ism is of the latter's general acceptance of the reliability
 of the Synoptic tradition. Here, where Schweitzer had regard-
 ed Wrede as holding common views with himself because of the
 emphasis on eschatology, Wernle classes him as an opponent on
 the basis of the latter's criticism of the sources. "Der

einzig sichere Ausgangspunkt müsste sein," he declares, dass wir ein direktes Wissen über Jesus überhaupt nicht besitzen, dass uns bekannt bloss Glaube und Überlieferung der Urgemeinde 30-40 Jahre nach seinem Tod sind;¹ and with regard to this point he charges Schweitzer's work with lacking "das ABC in Kenntnis der traditionsgeschichtlichen Gesetze."² The practical interest of the theologian in the peaceful and undisturbed prosecution of his own outlook, however, appears at the end of the treatment in a manner that is slightly humorous. Since Schweitzer had ventured to differ from the established view, there was nothing to be expected from a second work except provocation of his discomfiture; he might have left history to decide between the views, and been quiet, rather than bringing scandal upon the field of critical investigation by a show of dissension.

Of these closing remarks we are somewhat reminded by the heated and sarcastic tone of Jülicher's Neue Linien in der Kritik der evangelischen Überlieferung. Schweitzer's "schrille Schrei: „Es gibt nichts Negativeres als das Ergebnis der Leben-Jesu-Forschung," Jülicher says, "könnte verstanden werden als Schmerzensschrei," but "Nein, jener Ruf ist bei Schweitzer ein Jubelruf." The exasperating thing, apparently, is that he will not recognize the desirability of the preservation of the liberal picture and strive to keep, as nearly as possible, its original lineaments. "Er ("der reine Historiker Schweitzer") macht kein Hehl daraus, dass er sich aller derer freut, die an dem Bilde des historischen Jesus der modernen

Theologie irre werden, dass er sich freut, an seiner Zerstörung mitzuarbeiten, sich sogar der Ungerechtigkeit freut, mit der man es bekämpft....weil der Platz dadurch frei wird für die Wahrheit," he complains, - all to serve the one idea that "man könne mit geschichtlicher Erkenntnis ein neues lebenskräftiges Christentum aufbauen."¹

For the decision of the question of an eschatological interpretation, again, there is nothing contributed by Jülicher's work. "Ich verzichte hier darauf," he says at the beginning, "Einzelheiten in dieser Konstruktion der Kritik zu unterziehen. Nur als Erzeugnis einer lodernden Phantasie und eines starken Willens erweckt sie Interesse."² Were the theory in reality a mere vagary, there is much in its reception which is difficult to understand. One would expect that its inadequacy would be manifest, or else that it could be readily and convincingly shown by the expert. The definitely argued position of a man of such established position and abilities as Schweitzer, however, cannot be so cavalierly dismissed. All that is true in this criticism is that Schweitzer's choice and evaluation of works on the historical life of Jesus is made from the viewpoint of belief in the eschatological theory. It is a "super-cillious" review, in the terms of Lowrie, translator of the Messianitäts- und Leidensgeheimnis, and according to Sanday an example of "rather conspicuous injustice." While the critic is honest, Sanday says, he is a "party man" and "perhaps the first motive which prompted him to take up the pen was the sharp attack delivered by Schweitzer against the headquarters of theological Liberalism."³

H. J. Holtzmann, although he made no such attack upon Schweitzer, also came forward in defense of the modern historical conception of Jesus. The Messianische Bewusstsein Jesu, 1907, and two articles on "Die Marcus Kontroverse in ihrer heutigen Gestalt" written in the same year for the Archiv für Religionswissenschaft, aim, he says, at a reversal¹ of the death sentence which the Von Reimarus zu Wrede believed had been given to the modern theological research in the life of Jesus by the simultaneous appearance of Wrede's Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien and Schweitzer's Messianitäts- und Leidensgeheimnis.

Holtzmann recognizes the propriety of much of the criticism of psychological reconstructions of the life of Jesus. He says,

Psychologische Vermutung, dilettantenhaftes Phantasieren und abenteuerliches Herumraten spielen in der ganzen, von A. Schweitzer zu genussreichster Darstellung gebrachten Literatur eine fast so verhängnisvolle Rolle wie dogmatisch motivierte Harmonistik und Vergewaltigung der Quellen.²

He objects, however, to Schweitzer's sweeping view of the whole modern-historical construction as only a sharply retrograde movement on the ground that it depends on the help of modern psychology and is arbitrary in its use of history. The consistently eschatological view, with its rule that the historical is what is not understandable in a natural way, leads, he holds, to equally unhistorical constructions.

Along familiar lines Holtzmann reaffirms that the consciousness of Jesus was Messianic, but with an ethical interpretation of the office. In this he represents the firmly established and conservative position of the forces of Christian theology at

large. In it they were momentarily startled by the sharp frontal attack of Schweitzer, but from it they have had no idea of retreating.

A striking criticism of Schweitzer's theory from a different point of view is given by Professor F. G. Peabody.¹ He believes that "the most important contribution of this generation to Biblical interpretation has been made, beyond question, through the appreciation and analysis of New Testament eschatology," and that it is "likely to remain a permanent factor in critical research," but he thinks that the prevailing tone of the ethical teaching does not show the quality of indifference to the world's affairs or of complete preoccupation with a supernatural category, and that it does not fit in with the plot of an eschatological drama. He thus proposes that the ethical element in Jesus, which seems the most solidly founded, and, even more definitely, the habitual attitude of Jesus toward nature and life, are corrective of the extreme eschatological view.

The weight of Jesus' ethics is not, however, so definitely against Schweitzer's theory as Professor Peabody assumes. It is the ethical earnestness of Jesus which is the impulse of his eschatology, according to Schweitzer; and Professor Evans is able to describe the ethics as pessimistic, with its only hope a transcendent one (the apocalyptic, catastrophic coming of the Kingdom), and with its distinctive characteristic a spirit of detachment from lesser values in relation to the one great end of the Kingdom.²

As a matter of fact, Professor Peabody's criticism begs

the question. The universal ethical elements in Jesus are the most soundly established only through the subjective fact that they are what our ethical sense accepts as valid and authoritative. What the argument amounts to is, that, when we have accepted the rationalistic representation of the consciousness and ministry of Jesus as directed to a developing ethical Kingdom, the eschatological conception is not in harmony with our view.

(3) Neglect of the Geschichte der paulinischen Forschung. The appearance of Schweitzer's book on the history of Pauline investigation, in 1911, was not an event comparable to that of the publication of the earlier work on the Leben-Jesu-Forschung. Reasons for this may be found in the more immediate concern which Christianity has in the conception of the teaching and life of Jesus (together with the radical nature of Schweitzer's suggestions relative to it), and in the already mentioned inferiority of the critical research whose history is recorded. Again, Schweitzer's "konsequente Eschatologie" was already known, and a position toward it had been taken in theological circles. Further, in the present work the constructive study of Paulinism in accordance with the theory, which might have struck fire, is not presented with the history, though its features, as the previous exposition shows, may be found by search and by the assembling of assertions.

The Geschichte der paulinischen Forschung, then, made little stir in theological circles. Except as a collection of an ex-

tensive and scattered body of material, no significance was attached to it. It may be said, however, that the work cannot be either neglected or lightly dismissed by a theological scholarship which is both honest and thorough in the construction and validation of its results. Either the evidence which Schweitzer presents must be conclusively overthrown, or it must be recognized that in the course and development of early Christianity there is not only agreement with, but also confirmation of Schweitzer's conception of the life and ministry of Jesus. The result of the work, if it stands, would be not only to confirm the eschatological view of Jesus but also to demand a completely revolutionized view of Pauline doctrine as containing a less spiritual and ethical but more material theory of redemption governed by eschatological presuppositions.

(4) Judgment of the "konsequente Eschatologie". What is most original in Schweitzer and what most vitally concerns theology, however, centers in the life of Jesus. The theologians who deal with Schweitzer, Dobschütz excepted, recognize that in the suggestion that eschatological expectations not only entered into the thought of Jesus, but also played an important, in fact the determinative part in His message and ministry, Schweitzer introduces something new into the field of critical study of the life of Jesus.

It is precisely on this theory of "konsequente Eschatologie" of Schweitzer's, it must further be recognized, that opposition in regard to eschatology centers. Even though it was at one time, in the heyday of rationalistic

lives of Jesus, the fashion to reject or weaken all the eschatological passages in the sayings of Jesus, their historicity is now better established. "The eschatologists proved beyond a doubt," W. D. Mackenzie says in Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, "that the eschatological sayings of Jesus are of assured authenticity" and that "they are not occasional utterances....foreign¹ to his main principles." Modern theologians are admitting, with no great reluctance, that Jesus' thought and expression were colored by eschatology; what they will not accept is that Jesus' ministry was guided by these ideas, and that our conception of a developing ethical and spiritual kingdom did not belong to Him. For Schweitzer these are the main facts which emerge from the research.

That Schweitzer is too consistent and logical in his application of the eschatological principle is a criticism made by several of the theologians. His own observation regarding Strauss and his mythical theory, "das war sein Recht. Wer entdeckt ein wahres Prinzip, ohne damit die Wahrheit zu vergewaltigen?"² could apply also to himself.

In the case of a number of incidents and sayings in the life of Jesus it would appear that he carries the theory too far by his unvarying reference to the one principle of explanation. There might be mentioned as such cases the explanation of Jesus' wonder at the disbelief of the people of Nazareth, which he refers to the nearness of the Kingdom, his interpretation of Jesus' reply to the question of John the Baptist,

the theory of the feeding of the multitude, the interpretation of the confession of Peter, the view of Jesus' purpose at Jerusalem, and the explanation of the nature of Judas' disclosure, in all of which Schweitzer's interpretations are so different from the customary. To many of his interpretations one might reply, as both Wernle and Holtzmann remark, in his own so-oft-repeated phrase, "Davon steht aber nichts im Text."

The strongest impression to the reader of Schweitzer's writings, however, is that of how naturally and adequately the theory fits and interprets practically all of the life of Jesus, how well it explains His "hard sayings," and how simply it takes care of some of the stubborn features of any rationalistic view. The theory includes all that the former did, and some things which always remained foreign to it. It amazes one with its comprehensiveness and coherence. These qualities are too pronounced in the relation of the theory to the sources to credit them, with Jülicher, wholly to the "bewunderungswürdig....Kunst, mit der unser Autor sein seltsames Gespinst aus Fäden alter Überlieferung komponiert."¹

It is not necessary to the theory, of course, to maintain that every incident in the recorded life of Jesus is explained by His eschatological expectations. Schweitzer remarks that features in the life of Jesus are to be attributed outside of the eschatological considerations to His traits of sympathy and ethical earnestness. In his exegesis, however, he seems to forget this and to go farther in the application of this single principle than the theory requires or the

material justifies. This is not unnatural, and in fact it is wholly desirable from every point of view that Schweitzer should present the interpretation in terms of his eschatological conception of every feature in the life and words of Jesus which permits of it. It is for the author of a new idea to show how far it will possibly serve as a positive principle of explanation; others may later test the definite points and the general range of the agreement with the data that has been claimed.

Schweitzer believes that the eschatological theory makes intelligible the great body of features in the ministry of Jesus, and that it offers solution of the stubborn problems of critical research. That it does both of these with considerable plausibility has to be admitted, and under its influence the theology of the schools has gone a long way in the acceptance of eschatological features in the gospels. Its life of Jesus, no less than that of the critical theology of the past century, is an interpretation which has good foundation in the sources. Whether either the consistently eschatological life of Jesus of Schweitzer, or the liberal life of Jesus of rationalistic theology, can be excluded, on the one hand, or established, on the other, through detailed work on the sources, could be settled only by extensive critical work of unbiased specialists. There is apparent so much: first, that the theory has made it possible for the critical theology to be dogmatic and has required it to validate its results; and secondly, that for Schweitzer himself the "convictions he has

either learned from, or been confirmed in, by his study of the historical Jesus are....nothing less than a releasing or¹ redeeming Gospel."

The determination whether Schweitzer's theory is actually an advance in the direction of correct historical knowledge of Jesus is, however, not of primary importance for our purposes. What is pertinent to this investigation is rather the nature of his conclusions, and their bearing upon his whole philosophical outlook.

The history of Christianity will bear witness that the conception of Jesus has always been a function of two factors: the historical sources, and the prevalent thought systems of the time. Schweitzer believes that he bases the life of Jesus, with historic truthfulness, upon the former and cuts it loose from the latter (which is in this case ethical humanism of a theological sort).

Whereas the usual picture of Jesus represents not alone what is historically given, but what is natural and reasonable, according to the point of view of the age, Schweitzer's portrait of Him is one largely unintelligible to us. This Jesus does not belong to a common realm of thought with us, and seems to be without meaning for our consciousness.

This was as true for Schweitzer as for others. The first harvest of the eschatological conception was disillusionment. It meant withdrawal of one of the accepted pillars of our ethical ideas, and it was the foundation of these that formed the central interest of Schweitzer, yet he found through further reflection that history might show that the consciousness of

Jesus was eschatological, that our ethical outlook did not belong to Him, and still that both the transcendent claim of the spirit of Jesus and the authority of our ethical ideals remain unshaken.

A historical religious foundation for ethics is lacking, even as theoretical foundation in Critical Idealism had also been. But, just as in the philosophy of Kant the ethical will had shown itself to be the real source of the ethical postulates, so here the active moral will of Jesus presents itself as the positive spiritual, and spiritualizing, element in His world and ours. The eschatology - or, at any rate, its supernaturalism - is an accidental and extraneous feature which we cannot accept. The world-negation is transcended, but the religious spirit which distinguishes itself from the world and seeks to spiritualize it is of abiding significance and validity.

2. Concerning the Missionary Activity.

When Schweitzer's Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung appeared there were those who saw in it nothing more than the startling declarations that "Es gibt nichts Negativeres als das Ergebnis der Leben-Jesu-Forschung," and that "Der Jesus von Nazareth, der als Messias auftrat, die Sittlichkeit des Gottesreiches verkündete, das Himmelreich auf Erden gründete und starb, um seinem Werke die Weihe zu geben, hat nie existiert." To them he was an "arch intellectualist" under whose wholly unfeeling criticism every element of religious value disappeared. These persons "who think of Dr. Schweitzer only

as a left wing higher critic should read of his work in Lambarene," is Micklem's comment.¹ The ones who have such acquaintance with his missionary enterprise have been brought first to a pause and then to sharp reversal of judgment. The attitude has in general been one of mystification how Schweitzer combines with his views of Jesus such genuine Christian spirit and zeal. The latter, at any rate, have been evident and convincing, and whatever was unfamiliar in the theory has been let pass on their certification. A fellow missionary writing in the International Review of Missions says,

it is clear from his present volumes on civilization, and from his recent earnest and beautiful lectures on Christianity and the Religions of the World, that he still adheres to the central result of his earlier investigations, namely, that a mistaken conviction of the imminence of the end of the existing world-order was a dominating factor in the work and thought of Christ,

and though

There must be many Christians to whom this will seem a degree of unorthodoxy almost amounting to blasphemyHe has counted everything but loss that he may be true to his vision of the Christ and that he may be a minister and a witness of the things in which he has seen our Lord.²

"No man who shall do a mighty work in my name shall be able quickly to speak evil of Me," he reminds us that Jesus said of one who had healed in His name.

The critical theologians of Germany who think bitterly of Schweitzer as a colleague who, from within their ranks, would destroy the results of their patient research and the structure of their laborious apologetic should be aware that this striking example of Christian practice has been the one thing

which has most strongly shaken the popular conviction of critical scholarship's lack of religion. The average Christian echos the opinion of W. D. Mackenzie, that "the radical school has put forth no higher proof that the grace of God is within reach of its view of Jesus."¹

There have not been lacking, of course, some who interpret Schweitzer's course as a flight from the field of theology, which no longer held promise of advancement for him, or which had ceased to be attractive to him. Of this Werner gives refutation by features from the life of Schweitzer. He declares,

Das sind Missdeutungen, mit denen man ihm schwer Unrecht tut. Er selbst erzählt ja in seinen Jugenderinnerungen, wie er als 21 jähriger Student beschloss, bis zu seinem dreissigsten Jahre dem Predigtamt, der Wissenschaft und der Musik zu leben. Dann, wenn er hierin geleistet, was er vorhatte, wollte er den Weg des unmittelbaren Dienens als Mensch betreten. Dieser Entschluss hatte ganz andere Gründe als den, der ihm von solchen untergeschoben wird, die ihn nicht kennen. Und auch als er dann diesen Weg wirklich ging, flüchtete er in Wahrheit keineswegs aus der Theologie. Wie schlicht erzählt er in seinem Buche „Zwischen Wasser und Urwald“ davon, mit welcher Freude er auch noch als Arzt den Neger in der Kirche der Missionsstation zu Lambarene predige! Und in all seiner aufreibenden Arbeit für den Wiederaufbau seines ärztlichen Missionswerkes nach dem Krieg hat er auch noch Zeit gemacht, um ausgerechnet in einem englischen Seminar für Quäker-Missionare Vorträge zu halten über die beste Verteidigung der christlichen Grundwahrheiten gegenüber den heute so anspruchsvoll und Überlegen auftretenden Religionen des Ostens! Ist dies „Flucht aus der Theologie“? Möglicherweise könnte manchem unserer Theologen, der von Albert Schweitzers „Flucht aus der Theologie“ redet, durch die Lektüre dieser Schweitzer'schen Vorträge der eigene, oft etwas gesunkene Mut neu gestärkt werden, der Mut, ein überzeugter christlicher Theologe gerade heute zu sein und zu bleiben!³

Even more decisive in the establishment of this conclusion is the evidence from the growth of Schweitzer's course out of his personal traits and experiences, of which more will be

said later, and from the organic unity of this course with his whole theology and philosophy. Hogg gives testimony for this latter point, though without reference to such a view of Schweitzer's missionary work. He says,

In a very outstanding degree this man's thought and his life are one....no discerning reader of his recent books can fail to perceive that his self-dedication to medical work among the neglected is the morally fitting expression of his whole outlook on life and God and duty. It was religious as well as humanitarian devotion that impelled him.¹

The theory of a "Flucht aus der Theologie" has a superficial plausibility, but it is only such as rests upon lack of familiarity with Schweitzer and with the inner logic of his life. The criticism regards the medical-missionary activity as a break and change in the life of Schweitzer, whereas it is a step in a unitary progress. It is not a flight from theology or from religion, but an expression of theological belief and of religious faith. It is not an abandonment of Christ or of Christianity, but an unusually complete determination of the whole life by Christ and an uncompromising commitment of it to the Christian principle.

3. Concerning Schweitzer's Music.

The unity of Schweitzer's character in its various manifestations is impressive at every point. As theologian, the philosophical spirit and outlook are a constant background; as philosopher, the ethical interest and religious attitude are made central; and as musician, philosophy and religion are not left behind, but only secure another (the artistic) expression. Of a concert of Schweitzer's in Binghamton in 1923 a musical

critic wrote that it was "not merely a display of brilliant technique but an act of worship and a sacrament."¹ Again,

Widor says of Schweitzer's work on Bach,

I rank it among the works the significance of which consists in the fact that while they are founded on a thoroughly professional knowledge, they treat their subject from the standpoint not of a single art but of art and science in general. Schweitzer is a philosopher through and through....To read Schweitzer's Bach is not only to get to know the composer and his work, but to penetrate also into the essence of music in general - the 'art per se'.²

4. Criticisms of the Philosophy.

To the task of philosophy Schweitzer comes with some unique qualifications. These are not primarily in his academic training in philosophy, which is good though not unusual, but in the coordinate high development of the several phases of the human spirit - intellectual, esthetic and practical. We have already had occasion to note in him a rigorous intellectualism, a keen esthetic sensibility and a practical energy which are unusual in combination. It is not common for these characteristics to be joined in a single personality; and in this time, when strict specialization is as a rule so necessary for real achievement, it is rare to find an individual with so broad and comprehensive an outlook. Dr. Hermann von Müller gives an excellent statement of this completeness of spirit in Schweitzer where he says,

In ihm verkörpert sich noch jene Vielseitigkeit geistiger Herrschaft und Leistung, die dem Blick umfassende Weite gibt....Und endlich hat Schweitzer das, was er lehrt, durch sein persönliches Leben vorgelebt und damit ein Vorbild der Einheit und Folgerichtigkeit von Wort und Tat, von Gesinnung und Handlung gegeben...³

These are not, however, the usual credentials of a professional philosopher, and Schweitzer has never been that. Moreover he has written not in a technical manner, but for the general public. In professional circles, then, his philosophy has received little notice. "Die grossen Persönlichkeiten, die Träger grosser Ideen," Dr. Von Müller says in his article on Schweitzer, "sind selten. Die Zeit ruft nach ihnen - und hört doch oftmals nicht, wenn sie zu ihr sprechen."¹

The paucity of notice is probably due in great measure, as was remarked, to Schweitzer's position outside the academic field, and to the tendency in German scholarship, as observed by Mackenzie,² to be well acquainted with everything which goes on in its particular circle but oblivious of what is outside. Another contributing factor is that Schweitzer was already too well known as a theologian and musician. We are so accustomed to specialization in ability and knowledge in the run of scholars that we but grudgingly, if at all, allow an individual eminence in a third or fourth field. We must recognize, however, in the case of Schweitzer, not only that we are dealing with a personality of unusual vigor and versatility, but also, as cannot too often be said, that the varied activities are not mere diverse pursuits, but constitute a unitary spiritual expression. The variety of detail is governed by a single and inflexible personality of which they are the manifestations, and all the diversity is subordinate to a single principle of life. As Oskar Pfister says, "Albert Schweitzer is like the rainbow, which gleams in every color, and yet maintains a magnificently complete unity."³

Most of the critical notices which the philosophy has received have not been in the professional journals, and have not in general been of a technical nature. The majority have given the philosophy only a popular review, or, on the other hand, have either misconstrued Schweitzer's meanings or failed to note the distinctive features of his thought. It serves as a slight but suggestive indication of the philosophical misunderstandings that Hogg refers to Bertrand Russell as holding¹ a viewpoint sympathetic to that of Schweitzer, while Reinhold Niebuhr, under the title "Can Albert Schweitzer save us from Bertrand Russell?", hails Schweitzer's Christianity and the Religions of the World as "the best answer to Russell's What I Believe."²

Niebuhr, in this last mentioned article, gives a striking review of Schweitzer's philosophy, but one that is essentially unsound. It is one of the most appreciative of the reviews, but its estimation rests upon a false representation. Niebuhr values Schweitzer's philosophy as a possible answer of religion to such cynicism as that of Bertrand Russell, but misunderstands and underrates the answer. He says,

Albert Schweitzer in his memorable book Civilization and Ethics maintains that the ethical life is rooted in optimism and that the decay of ethics in our day is due to the defeat which the optimistic will-to-live has suffered because it was supported by an untenable optimistic metaphysics. In other words, the universe is not as sympathetic to the human spirit as traditional religion has assumed, and when ethics is rooted in this assumption it must finally suffer shipwreck.

Niebuhr's misunderstanding of Schweitzer is a very easy and natural one; but, even in what is so apparently a faithful representation of Schweitzer as the above statement, there are

several serious errors. In the first place, there is a subtle transformation of Schweitzer's judgment that the unfortunate state of civilization and ethics today, as compared with that which they occupied in the period of Eighteenth Century Rationalism, is due to the theoretical weakness of the optimistic metaphysics upon which they rested, into a criticism of the optimistic metaphysics qua optimistic. This is the very reverse of what Schweitzer says. The fault of this philosophy in Schweitzer's eyes was that it proved untenable, not that it was an optimistic metaphysics. Through this misreading, Niebuhr arrives at such a statement as the second sentence, "In other words, the universe is not as sympathetic to the human spirit as traditional religion has assumed." This is to put forward a positive metaphysical view which does not appear in Schweitzer; and it would be impossible to find warrant in his writings for such a declaration. Schweitzer does not definitely deny that the universe is sympathetic, but only the right to assume it, or the possibility of proof of it on theoretical grounds through a philosophy of nature or an epistemology.

Niebuhr is nearer to the apprehension of the element in Schweitzer's thought which has misled him - namely, the positive religious spirit - where he says in conclusion, "When ethics is rooted in this assumption (of the ethicality of nature) it must finally suffer shipwreck." The ethicality of nature may be a fact, according to Schweitzer; it is, in truth, a fact of which he is ready to make assertion, but the principles of its ethical operation, he holds, are unclear to us.

Neither the foundation of our ethics nor its principles are given in what we can observe of nature's workings, but these are found in the ethical will of the human spirit, which may even condemn and oppose what it sees in nature.

Truth and error, accordingly, keep close company in the criticism when Niebuhr says "Religious assurance is made entirely dependent upon mystical and moral experience and the problem of evil is eliminated as a peril to religious faith." On the first point he is not entirely wrong, but only half right; not merely religious faith is dependent upon moral experience, but also philosophical belief rests upon it, mystically interpreted (though not mystically apprehended). On the second part, he is half right and half wrong. He is half wrong here, because among the distinctive features of Schweitzer's thought are a keen consciousness of evil and an intellectual rigor that will not permit an easy and spurious solution of the problem it offers. He is half right, because Schweitzer does eliminate the problem of evil. This is not, however, as Niebuhr supposes, through a frank adoption of dualism, but through an act of self-assertion of the ethical will.

"The universe is simply too blind to the needs of man and too ruthless with personal and spiritual values to warrant the theory that a good God is in essential control of all its forces," Schweitzer thinks, as Niebuhr represents him, and accordingly it must be distinguished from the moral and religious God as alien to Him in nature. The way in which the review misrepresents the author receives interesting illust-

ration here. The statement must be accepted as a correct representation in the meaning that the world with its features of disvalue would not establish beyond all uncertainty the belief in a single and moral Being as its explanatory principle, and is not to be regarded as having given rise to the idea; but it is entirely untrue to Schweitzer's thought in the meaning which Niebuhr gives it, that the aspects of the universe are such as to be wholly incompatible with the assumption "that a good God is in essential control of all its forces."

It is only as the result of such confusion that Niebuhr can say,

In his little book (Christianity and the Religions of the World) Schweitzer maintains that Christianity is the final religion because it opposes the religions of absolute optimism and of absolute pessimism with a naive dualism which permits of both pessimism and optimism, pessimism in regard to the world and optimism in regard to the life of man. Metaphysics, in Schweitzer's view, is the bane of religion. Metaphysical systems which have been prompted largely by the problem of knowledge and not by any ethical or religious problem have been made to serve apologetic purposes. The absolute at which they arrive was supposed to give rational sanction to the theism of religion; but philosophical absolutism has been a questionable ally of religion. It has greatly aggravated the problem of evil and caused the very reactions of which Mr. Russell is typical. To make God responsible for the universe is to rob him of his goodness. The facts of life are simply too confused to warrant faith in a God who is at once good and omnipotent.

The justification for Mr. Niebuhr to hold any of the positive theory above as his own philosophy is not contested here - and what is Schweitzer's and what is Niebuhr's are not clearly distinguished. The setting and form suggest, however, that this is a summary of Schweitzer's thought, and while it would be correct to represent it as affirming that the facts of life,

if thereby experience of the objective world is meant, are too confused to be the warrant of such a faith, it is utterly untrue to represent it, as Niebuhr does, as offering a limited and transcendent God opposed to an unethical natural principle.

If Schweitzer's philosophy possesses moral and religious potency, as Niebuhr asserts, it is not on the grounds to which he refers it - namely, that it adopts the "naive dualism" and "emphasis upon transcendence" which it found to be the secret of the spiritual power of Hebrew theism, instead of following the example of liberal theology, which in discarding the devil "has attempted the impossible task of safeguarding the character of God even while it involved him more completely with the universe," and in attempting to absorb the discoveries of modern science has adopted new insistence on the immanence of God, working in and through the processes of the natural world.

Schweitzer, it is true, has attributed the spiritual power of Hebrew religion to these factors in it, but has not regarded such philosophical views as final factors in religion or morality. It is a case of petitio principii in the form of Complex Question when Niebuhr asks, "Is Schweitzer not right in insisting that religion can maintain its spiritual power in our day only by returning to the naive dualism of prophetic religion?" He would need first to show, as he cannot, that Schweitzer urges such a course. Niebuhr's "resulting picture of the world" as "one in which personality is in conflict with nature" or, as he later more specifically says, with its inertia, is one which bears few points of resemblance with that of Schweitzer. Further, between Niebuhr's conception of

spiritual victory, which "may be gained only by complete transcendence" and by the soul's "preserving its peace and happiness" despite the worst outrages against it "by the blind cruelty of nature," and the thought of Schweitzer, there is little kinship.

Several factors contribute to the misunderstanding. There is, first, the factor which we spoke of above as Schweitzer's "positive religious spirit." Secondly, Niebuhr in attributing such a dualism to Schweitzer is drawing what seems to him to be the inevitable conclusion of Schweitzer's positions. He completely misses, in its reference to the natural universe at least, Schweitzer's doctrine of the ethical basis of knowledge, which is the only thing that saves him from that conclusion. The point, however, will have to be discussed more fully in another connection.¹

No more correct, either, is the contradictory assertion which Niebuhr makes in the same passage, that "Metaphysics, in Schweitzer's view, is the bane of religion."² He makes the common, but uncritical error of confusing rejection of a certain type of metaphysics with rejection of metaphysics altogether. The whole text for the assertion has reference to metaphysical systems prompted by problems of knowledge rather than problems of morality, and to philosophical absolutism as the sanction of religion.

These last mentioned attacks on post-Kantian idealism are the most disturbing feature to Dr. A. G. Hogg, mentioned above. He says,

That Idealism has fallen in hopeless ruins is one of the premises of Dr. Schweitzer's own proffered philosophical construction. With this premise I am entirely

unable to agree....I must confess to holding that, whatever disrepute Idealism may suffer in quarters that are temporarily prominent, its main contributions to philosophy have been too solid to be permanently departed from.¹

From the standpoint of a Christian and a fellow missionary he thoroughly approves of the fruit which Schweitzer's philosophical system bears, but not of the plant itself. "For the ethical attitude at which this is Dr. Schweitzer's way of arriving I feel profound reverence," he states, "But for the terms and conceptions in which he has formulated it I have no manner of use; and at his way of reaching it I rub my eyes in bewilderment."

That to which he takes exception so strongly is the fact that "Dr. Schweitzer will have nothing to do with any attempt to establish peaceful relations between philosophy and science by distinguishing the types of validity at which they respectively aim," and that he surrenders the philosophy on which he counts for support of religion. It is his understanding that Schweitzer's views constitute a "rejection of idealism," since Schweitzer very clearly discards his type and its reading of nature. However he senses something wrong with this as a judgment upon the final nature of Schweitzer's philosophy when he says that his "sniff of contempt, as at an admittedly exploded fallacy" is "in spite of the fact that his own 'life view' is a kind of voluntaristic idealism." This "life view", however, in Hogg's opinion, "rests upon so flimsy a sub-structure of argument that seemingly it must collapse unless² somehow propped up by the epistemology which he despises."

Schweitzer's judgment of the failure of transcendental philosophy is, to Hogg's mind, without sufficient justification. He says,

I have been driven, I confess, to the reluctant conclusion that in some way which I do not understand, Dr. Schweitzer must be temperamentally unfitted to do justice to the post-Kantian idealism....Over and over again he refers to what he calls 'epistemological idealism,' but never once does he examine it. A sniff of contempt, as at an exploded fallacy, and his attention turns to some other alternative.¹

Of course what has thus, in some way not understood by Hogg, "unfitted" Schweitzer to do justice to epistemological idealism is his study of it in the Religionsphilosophie Kant's. The Kulturphilosophie takes the conclusions of that work for granted and proceeds directly from its results. If Hogg is totally unaware of this background, he cannot well be in a position to understand the determining considerations, which he then classifies as "temperamental." It is true that, in his relation to this system, Schweitzer has not played the games of the epistemologists and cosmologists to the end under their leadership; that of which he has satisfied himself is, that from its side it provides no explanation of the sphere of morality. It is amusing to find Hogg charging Schweitzer with such a misunderstanding of the relation of phenomena and noumena as to suppose them to be two distinct sets of entities, when it is through the correction of that common misunderstanding of critical idealism that Schweitzer shows its moral indifference. The failure with which Schweitzer charges post-Kantian idealism, along with other systems, is not theoretical

inaccuracy, but lack of inherent relation to morality. An idealistic philosophy of life is not developed from epistemology, he holds, and, in the test of historical use, epistemological idealism has shown itself incapable of supporting the ideals upon which civilization rests.

Hogg believes that the activist type of morality involves "optimistic faith in Nature," and that "doubt of Nature threatens to rob it of enthusiasm," but recognizes in Schweitzer's Philosophy of Civilization, despite its surrender of the hope of finding such a purpose, "a work which not only is a marvel of erudition and industry but breathes throughout an apostolic fervor and conviction."¹ It is, however, a fervor to which (from a Hegelian viewpoint) he has no title. "For the unitary teleology of the objective world," Hogg says, "he substitutes an infinity of diminutive teleologies. In some obscure manner he persuades himself that if Nature has no unitary ethical will, at any rate each structurally individuated existent possesses a will to perfection (for no less than this is what he means by will-to-live)."² Schweitzer appears convinced that service of these, "no matter how useless, is profoundly worthwhile," Hogg thinks, but generally there is needed faith in a unitary purposiveness in nature and an assurance that active service of ideals will secure their actualization. "The new teleology," which Schweitzer seeks to substitute, "is too microscopically pulverized," he asserts.

The full answer to such a criticism must be the work of the later analysis of Schweitzer's philosophy, but one may reply directly, that, except where absolute fixity of philosophical

viewpoint has occurred, there is no obscurity in the suggestion that the ethical will of persons furnishes a clear instance of moral purposiveness, whatever the case in regard to nature, and that such an assertion in no way commits Schweitzer to a judgment against the cosmic nature or security of moral ideals. "His outlook is dominated by a great cosmico-ethical intuition," Hogg then complains, "which he expects others to share as soon as he has expressed it." This is essentially true, and yet in Schweitzer's system there is nothing undemocratic or esoteric. Its life- and world-view are the result of the application of the universal rational faculty to common experience. Beyond the apprenticeship of disillusionment with the function and service of cosmological and epistemological systems, which Schweitzer seeks to share with his readers, they assume only the fact of ethical will in the philosopher, without which, in Schweitzer's view, he would be lacking in the faculty for true philosophical apprehension of reality.

That Schweitzer finds the basis of his philosophy in immediate experience is recognized by W. Montgomery in an article¹ in the Hibbert Journal for July 1925. He says,

As Descartes, driven back to the fortress of the self as the basis for reality, began with his famous Cogito ergo sum, so Schweitzer, too, proposes to go back to the ultimate content of consciousness. But what he is concerned with there is not self-consciousness in its most abstract intellectual form, but our consciousness, as the ultimate vital thing in us, of the will-to-live.²

In this statement, however, he fails to do justice to the full qualification of the basic consciousness in Schweitzer's thought; and later, to the rationalistic side of the system.

In the transition from this subjective beginning to an obligation to serve the will-to-live universally he finds the greatest difficulty for Schweitzer's philosophy. He says,

It cannot claim to be demonstrative, for....he (Schweitzer) deliberately confesses that the transition is a mystical act. But when we call in Mysticism, we renounce the attempt to be demonstrative and our theory can be convincing only to those who accept Mysticism as a method, and who find the results to be of self-evidencing value. Only those whose mental attitude is that of what may be called - using the term in a wide sense - a Neo-Platonic mysticism will be likely to accept Schweitzer's theory wholly, or to find its basis more irrefragable than that of the older theories.¹

This is to misunderstand, however. When Montgomery says that the obligation to serve the will-to-live universally "cannot claim to be demonstrative" he overlooks the fact that Schweitzer claims for it just that. It is an ethic, the latter says, "conceived as intellectually necessary."² It may not, to be sure, claim to be demonstrative in the sense of having a foundation which is completely and purely rational, or theoretic. The older rationalism, which proceeded more geometrico from innate ideas, or from principles supposed to be rationally self-evident, has been wholly discredited. If, however, by demonstration there is meant necessity for reflective thought, working on the material of immediate experience, Schweitzer's philosophy does lay claim (which is subject, of course, to examination) to be demonstrative. So far is it from the truth, that "only to those who accept Mysticism as a method" will it prove convincing, that any philosophical system which is based on experience must, in common, begin with elements which are non-rational. The mysticism which

Schweitzer "deliberately confesses" is not primarily in the transition from the conscious will-to-live to the general principle of respect for life, but in the fact of this non-rational beginning; in so far as mysticism is involved in the transition it is a matter of reflective interpretation, and is subject to rational criticism. This is what was meant when it was said that the basic experience is mystically interpreted, not so apprehended. There is in Schweitzer nothing of what is commonly understood from the expression "Mysticism as a method."

Keeping clear of any reference to inclination toward pluralisms or monisms, it may be said that Schweitzer does not belong to the class of "tender-minded." In the field of men's most sensitive religious feelings he was the intellectualist "who seemed to place under a kind of soul microscope every emotion that hindered his studies until it vanished like a snow-flake in a warm room."¹ Recourse to feeling for that of which reason can give no assurance is foreign to his disposition.

Equally alien to Schweitzer is that attitude which Dr. Von Müller's representation suggests as belonging to his outlook. Von Müller gives one of the most comprehensive and sympathetic reviews of Schweitzer's work as a whole.² He is familiar with his activity in all its forms, and liberal in his praise of Schweitzer's personality and genius. He seems to think, however, that Schweitzer voices the need of a philosophy which would combine the ethical and religious interest of civilization with the ideas of true reason, but resigns as vain the effort to find it, offering his principle of unmediated

respect for life as a practical substitute. Accordingly he summarizes Schweitzer's views in the Kulturphilosophie thus,

Eine Weltanschauung muss zur Herrschaft kommen, die in Anknüpfung an den wertvollen Kern des Rationalismus die Ideen wahrer Vernunft begründet - der Vernunft, die nicht dürrer Verstand, sondern der Inbegriff aller Funktionen des Geistes in ihrem lebendigen Zusammenwirken ist. Nur eine solche Weltanschauung kann dem Optimismus und der Ethik eine feste Grundlage geben und so die Zukunft der Kultur sicherstellen.

Wird es der Zukunft gelingen, diese ungeheure Aufgabe zu lösen, an der sich vergangene Generationen umsonst gemüht haben? Schweitzer weist die Versuchung zur Resignation von sich. Selbst wenn es dem Denken nicht gelingen sollte, den Sinn der Welt erkennend zu verstehen, muss die Weltanschauung den Sinn des Lebens aus dem Willen zum Leben, der in uns ist, zu begreifen suchen.....Den Sinn der Welt zu erkennen, bleibt unerreichbar. Aber der Sinn des Lebens liegt in ihm selbst...¹

However strong the practical and humanitarian bent of Schweitzer's character, one of the most certain features in it is his virtual inability to make truce with an unsettled problem.

What Schweitzer suggests is not the relinquishment of metaphysics, but a revolution of method in which the universe is interpreted by life not life by the universe.

Von Müller is nearer the truth when he says that the incompatibility of theoretical knowledge and ethical will ("der Dualismus von erkennender Weltanschauung und willentlicher Lebensbejahung") "bleibt ihm unlösbar. Daher stellt er die Lebensanschauung über die Weltanschauung. Die Weltanschauung muss aus der Lebensanschauung erwachsen, nicht umgekehrt." The fact of the matter is, then, not that the dualism of theoretical apprehension of the world and affirmation of life is "unerlösbar" in Schweitzer's view, but that they manifest a diversity which makes a definite problem for reflection. Von

Müller, in his representation "Den Sinn der Welt zu erkennen, bleibt unerreichbar," stands in company with the critics in general, who take the element of respect for life as the heart of Schweitzer's ethics merely, and recognize in it no more general philosophical import.

One of the most discriminating treatments of Schweitzer's philosophy is by Professor R. H. Grützmacher.¹ He recognizes that the ethical will holds metaphysical implications for Schweitzer, where he says, in review of the Kulturphilosophie,

Eine einheitliche in sich geschlossene Weltanschauung ist nicht möglich, folglich kann sich unsere Lebensanschauung auf jene nicht gründen, sie muss auf sich selbst gestellt sein - aber diese soll sich doch wieder „aus in der Welt abgelesenen Erkenntnissen bilden“ und mit dem „Welterkennen auseinandersetzen“ (203). Schweitzer führt mithin Kants Primat der praktischen Vernunft und die Tendenzen des Pragmatismus durch, auf der anderen Seite macht er aber doch wieder die Lebensanschauung zum Gegenstande und zur Quelle theoretischen Denkens.²

This is, however, Grützmacher very well points out "eine prinzipiell nicht eindeutige und geklärte Position." He explains,

Erlebter Grundbegriff ist - Nietzsche-Schopenhauerischer „Wille zum Leben,“ dessen Wesen zunächst dahin definiert wird „dass er sich ausleben will“ (210). Dieser Wille wird dann ethisiert und zwar durch die „Synthese“ der beiden ethischen Grundbegriffe: Hingebung und Selbst-vervollkommenung (217). Diese Ethik wird näher Kap. xx ausgeführt und zuletzt in die Formel gekleidet: Hingebung an Leben aus Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben (236).³

The indefiniteness of this principle is twofold. First, there is the fact that unfortunately Schweitzer

macht....nirgends einen Versuch, den Begriff des Lebens wenigstens in der Masse zu definieren, dass man versteht, ob Leben für ihn ein rein biologisches Prinzip ist oder etwas Höheres.⁴

Secondly,

Schweitzer bleibt wie Kant im Prinzip an einem Formalismus hängen, der dann nur durch die Empirie mit konkretem Inhalt erfüllt wird. Wenn es heisst, es sei die Aufgabe ein „Menschenleben auf seinen höchsten Wert zu bringen“ (240) so ist man vergebens gespannt, zu erfahren worin dieser höchste Wert besteht und wie er sich begründet.¹

Finally, in Grützmacher's judgment, beyond the inspiration of his ethical spirit, Schweitzer has little solid philosophical contribution to make. He concludes,

Kurz auch der „neue Weg“ Schweitzers leidet unter allen Mängeln, unter denen jede philosophische Ethik leidet und den Schopenhauer einmal in das auch von Schweitzer zitierte Wort zusammenfasst: „Moral predigen ist leicht, Moral begründen schwer.“ Schweitzer predigt als eine sittlich starke Persönlichkeit in diesem letzten Teil Kulturphilosophie, Heft 2 lebensvolle Moral, die im einzelnen äusserst tiefe ethische Gedanken wie z.B. über die Verzeihung (245) oder über die Kirche (273) äussert, aber eine „neue Moral“ hat er weder dem Inhalte noch der Begründung nach gebracht.²

These criticisms of Grützmacher's are made with better understanding and surer objective ground than are found among the critics in general. The criticisms of Schweitzer for indefiniteness in the reference of his principle of respect for life, and for formalism, are entirely justified. It is an a-priori general form of morality that Schweitzer offers. There remains, however, the question whether the final judgment is wholly correct. Schweitzer does not seek to give a content of morality which could be called new, but a new foundation for the positive ideals in our civilization. Even in this last, of course, he does not succeed, if, thinking in the way which Schweitzer rejects, one means by a rational foundation a basis that is purely theoretical. In the degree in which Schweitzer succeeds in justifying the autonomy of the moral will he secures

a foundation which, though not wholly novel to thought, would be a new element for the accredited and effective philosophy of life.

We have yet to examine this foundation critically, but the measure of its soundness is the measure of the value of Schweitzer's philosophy. That Schweitzer regards this problem as the fundamental question for thought is considered by Werner, in his book Das Weltanschauungsproblem bei Karl Barth und Albert Schweitzer, as one of the chief merits of the latter in contrast to Barth, who treats all thought as ultimately concerned with the religious question of man's relation to a transcendent God. Whereas Barth makes optimism, which is not justified by factual observation or reflection, rest on faith in God's redemption of the world in a new creation (an eschatological faith), Schweitzer, the "eschatologist," accepts it on the direct ground that the will-to-live is a not less objective, and a more immediate fact of experience than that which one has of physical nature, and is stronger than the intellectual doubt. He has a place for ethics at all, because his pessimism is not absolute, but is undermined by this direction of the will toward the ideal.

In contrast to Grützmacher's criticism, it is Werner's view that, through this difference from Barth's method of referring ethics to a will of God, which, in the pessimistic judgment of the world, can be known only imperfectly, Schweitzer's ethics is definite and absolute, and that "das denknöthige sittliche Prinzip" which it contains is "nicht einmal nur ein bloss formales, sondern es hat einen sehr konkreten Inhalt!"¹ In that

respect, in fact, he says,

lässt Schweitzer die ganze Masse der philosophischen und theologischen Ethiker die seit Kant immer nur im reinen Sollen, in dem ganz inhaltlosen formalen Pflichtbegriff die primäre ethische Norm finden wollten (sie machten aus der Not eine Tugend!) weit hinter sich!¹

The contradiction, however, is not so irreconcilable as it would seem upon the face of it. Grützmacher is correct that the duty „Menschenleben auf seinen höchsten Wert zu bringen" is one whose content is yet to be determined, and it is still true that morality is not left without content as in Kant's morality of respect for rightness.

With regard to the rational necessity of the fundamental ethical principle, it is his judgment, that its assertion² "hält....offenbar doch wahrscheinlich jeder Kritik stand!"³ So much, at least, is evident, that, as Schweitzer says, everything which in the customary ethical judgment of human conduct is considered good refers to the material or spiritual preservation or advancement of human life and to the effort to bring it to its highest value.

Werner also recognizes a metaphysical reference of the will-to-live in Schweitzer's thought. The philosophy of civilization is, in his view, no anti-metaphysical humanitarianism. The fact that in the reflective will-to-live as it is experienced by man, an ethical principle which opposes the natural tendencies of that will appears as a rational necessity "will nun auch in seiner ganzen Bedeutung erfasst und gewürdigt sein. Es handelt sich hier nicht minder um eine "objektive Tatsache" als bei all dem, was das pessimistische

Welterkennen vom Weltgeschehen von aussen her zu erfassen vermag.¹ The question is, "Welcher Charakter ist dem universellen Willen zum Leben zuzuschreiben, wenn es dazu kommt, dass er sich im denkend gewordenen menschlichen Willen zum Leben, der doch nur eine der unzähligen Erscheinungen dieses universellen Willens zum Leben ist, als ethischer Wille erlebt?"² It is a question which brings us face to face with the puzzle of the morally contradictory appearance of the world's manifestations. This is so frankly recognized that it seemed to Niebuhr, as we saw, to be the acceptance of a naive dualism, but Werner says, to the contrary, that in Schweitzer's principle of universal respect for life, the problem "wieso das ethische Geschehen als aus dem Weltgeiste kommend und auf die Welt gerichtet, dennoch von dem Weltgeschehen verschieden ist"³ is "soweit es überhaupt lösbar ist - gelöst."⁴ When the reflective will-to-live confronts the above question,

dann lehnt er es als eine leichtfertige Voreiligkeit ab, aus dem pessimistischen Welterkennen ohne weiteres endgültige Schlussfolgerungen zu ziehen über das Wesen des Weltgrundes. Er konstatiert die unleugbaren Tatsachen des pessimistischen Welterkens, lässt sie als unlösbare Rätsel stehen und bescheidet sich dabei, sich an die andere objektive Tatsache zu halten, dass in ihm selber Überzeugungen, Ideale der Selbstverwirklichung, der Lebensvollendung auftreten, die „über die Erkenntnisse hinausgehen, die unsere Anschauung von der Welt ausmachen“ (K II, 205), und die insofern durchaus den Charakter einer „höheren Offenbarung des Willens zum Leben in mir“ (K II, 243) tragen.⁵

This treatment by Schweitzer of the ethical impulses as "höhere Offenbarung" in a keenly sensed dualism of evil and good is strongly characteristic of him. It is a prominent feature both of life and theory, and in each it gains support from the other. His reference in the memoirs of his childhood

to his sensibility to the suffering of life, and to his feeling that the values of life are not to be taken for granted or as merely personal, as the two strongest impressions of his childhood has already been noted; and it is significant to hear him defending the idealism of youth, and its sense of values, against the disillusionments of experience, as not only better but truer.

How close the relation of Schweitzer's personality and philosophy are will have to be more closely examined later, but some critics approach his philosophy from the standpoint of interest in his personality, and regard it as the real (and individual) principle of the system. Oskar Pfister, Zurich pastor, University of Zurich lecturer, and writer in the field of psycho-analysis, finds in him an interesting subject, and in the memoirs material indicative of repressions and feelings of inferiority. An early childhood impression that a reflection of the church organist, which appeared during the singing and disappeared while his father preached, was the devil, the fear that prominences on his forehead might be horns like those of Moses, unhappiness from the suffering of his parents on account of poverty, the reserved nature of his mother, and a supposedly "joyless period in Mülhausen," he says "helped to create those inner repressions which caused his unheard of versatility, expressing itself in the keen scientific investigator, the artist and the missionary."

Against an employment of the single principle of explanation of some psycho-analysts, it needs to be said that there

are other and more significant grounds for genius than "Minderwertigkeitsgefühl." The childhood incidents mentioned may be matched out of the early fancy of any normal child of active mind, and the sharing of family anxiety for financial means tends in the strong to a perfection rather than imperfection of character. Schweitzer's boyhood was on the whole happy, and his family life with parents and sister was ideal. His father, he said, was the best of comrades; and, although he gives evidence for Pfister's mention of reserve in his mother's character and his own in the statement that he can count the times in which there was any expression of affection between them, he adds briefly but expressively "doch verstehen wir uns." His relations with other boys were active and on equal terms. In sports he took delight in matching his strength, and was annoyed by indifferent competition. In the affairs of life he is practical and capable.

The above considerations need, however, scarcely be urged against Pfister, who in his psychological treatment shows marked reserve; all the features which he has mentioned, he concludes, leave the real secret of Schweitzer's personality as a whole untouched. One wonders, nevertheless, what interpretation a radical psycho-analyst might make of the inner consciousness of Schweitzer from such features as his resolve to enter upon a life of direct human service at the age of thirty; his selection of a ministry of healing; his account of the treatment of the sick, reminiscent of Gospel narrative, where his hand is laid on their heads and there is "kein

Schmerz mehr;"¹ his repeated inception of his work at the Easter time, even his several months of slow travel along the north coast of Africa and return to Lambarene at that season; and, in the light of his interpretation of Jesus' "Leidensgeheimnis," his expression of his chief satisfaction in the terms "dass ich die Tage der Qual von ihm nehmen darf."² Such a reflection, however, one may pass by with a reference to Schweitzer's gentle reminder to our age (with its lack of consideration of the individual) that there is a privacy of the mind which is no less inviolable than that of the body,³ and with indication of Schweitzer's sociability, the balanced development of his character, and the abounding vigor and healthiness of his practical activity.

Professor Oskar Kraus in his reprint in book form of an article which appeared first in the Jahrbuch für Charakterologie⁴ under the title "Albert Schweitzer, zur Charakterologie der ethischen Persönlichkeit und der philosophischen Mystik," and which is interested primarily in the philosophy as an expression of personality, questions whether an author "der.... der Persönlichkeit Schweitzer's auf „psychoanalytischem“ oder „individualpsychologischem“ Wege nachzuspüren versucht, methodisch richtig verfährt." He commends Pfister that he avoids the attempt to find the secret in the demonstration of an inferiority complex, and says,

Der Adler'sche, gewiss fruchtbare Begriff des „Minderwertigkeitsgefühls“ muss jedenfalls sehr weit gefasst werden, um in solchen Fällen noch erklärende Dienste zu leisten: so weit, dass darunter jedes Bewusstsein der eigenen Unvollkommenheit fällt, ein Bewusstsein, ohne das ein sittliches Streben überhaupt unmöglich ist, und das andererseits, um in der Weise wie bei Schweitzer

wirksam zu sein, eine seelische Struktur voraussetzt, für die das Minderwertigkeitsgefühl allein nicht als Erklärung dienen kann, da durchaus nicht jeder, der von solchem Gefühl erfüllt ist, auch solche Entschlüsse aufweist. - Auch von einer "tiefen Verknächtung durch konstitutionelle Angst" zu reden, scheint mir zu weitgehend, ja verkehrt....er mag unter dem Gefühl des Grausens und der Angst viel gelitten und dadurch zum Denken und zu seiner Weltanschauung den Weg gefunden haben; aber die Determination erfolgt in der Richtung der mutigen Tat. Ist es daher sinngemäss, von Verknächtung zu reden? Wenn irgendwo, ist vielmehr das Wort Freiheit am Platze; Freiheit nicht von Determination schlechtweg, aber von Determination zu ängstlichen Entschlüssen.¹

It is in what Schweitzer accomplishes through the impression of his personality and of his ethical will that he makes his greatest contribution, Kraus thinks. His music, theology and philosophy are "interessant und wertvoll," but such accomplishments are less rare than the former. "Die Menschheit ist reich an Männern, die Grosses leisten in den einzelnen Gebieten und Fachgruppen menschlichen Wissens und Könnens," he says; "Aber sie war und ist arm an grossen voranleuchtenden, selbstlosen Charakteren, an ethischen Willensmännern. Solch ein Mann ist Albert Schweitzer."²

The philosophy, Kraus regards as rather the expression of a practical religious spirit than of philosophical reflection. Schweitzer, he thinks, minimizes the difference between religious and philosophical thought, where there is genetically a great distinction. Religion grows out of anxiety and necessity and has no time to wait, whereas philosophy grows out of wonder and has patience as its greatest virtue. "Schweitzer's Lebens- und Weltanschauung ist ein Produkt seelischer Bedrängnis," Kraus says, "und trägt daher nicht wissenschaftlichen, sondern religiösen Charakter."³

The distinction which Kraus points out here is one that is not to be overlooked, and yet the antithesis of the last sentence above cannot be so sharply drawn. The attitude of philosophy cannot be one of indifference; and a comprehensive philosophy cannot leave value or evaluation out of account. One of the chief handicaps of philosophical investigation has been the fact that it has been intimidated into neglecting this factor in its problem. We shall find it to be a chief merit of Schweitzer that, schooled not to fear the charge of sentimentality or tender-mindedness, he gives the ethical evaluations and impulses a high place. In his evaluation of Schweitzer, Kraus offsets his opinion of the philosophy with the assertion, "Das Wissen ist nichts; dass heisst das blosse Wissen, der blosse Intellektualismus....Der ethische Wille¹ dagegen ist die wohltätigste Kraft der Weltgeschichte." Even as a philosopher, then, it cannot be a demerit of Schweitzer that he takes serious account of what experience has shown to be "die wohltätigste Kraft der Weltgeschichte."

PART TWO

ANALYSIS OF SCHWEITZER'S PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER EIGHT

APPEAL FROM POSITIVISM

1. Positivistic Features.

Little agreement exists among the critics in the interpretation of Schweitzer's philosophy. There is, for example, almost equal certainty on one hand that his view is naive dualism, and on the other that he rejects the attempt to arrive at a metaphysical view as a hopeless and useless effort.

Basis for the positivistic interpretation is not lacking. One of the strongest general impressions that may be derived from a reading of the Kulturphilosophie is that of antimetaphysical bias. This impression, moreover, is not merely a general one for which no evidence can be found on closer examination, but the interpretation can be supported by statements of Schweitzer's from which appeal is apparently useless.

Nothing it would seem could be clearer than the positivism of some of Schweitzer's pronouncements. The whole course of western philosophy has been unsuccessful in its search for a securely based world-view, he says, and has brought us only to a position of "Weltanschauungslosigkeit."¹ Even so the vain search is persisted in. He says,

Die Überlegung, dass der Sinn des Menschenlebens im Sinn der Welt begreifbar sein müsse, ist dem Denken so selbstverständlich, dass es sich selbst durch das fortgesetzte Fehlschlagen der dahin gehenden Unternehmungen nicht beirren lässt. Es meint nur, die Sache nicht richtig angegriffen zu haben....Bei Kant, in der spekulativen Philosophie und in mancher bis fast in unsere Zeit hineinreichenden „spiritualistischen“ Popularphilosophie bewahrt es die Hoffnung, durch irgendeine Zusammenlegung des erkenntnistheoretischen

mit dem ethischen Idealismus zum Ziele zu kommen.... Aber auch dies ist eitel....Was unser Denken als Erkenntnis ausgeben will, ist immer nur eine ungerechtfertigte Deutung der Welt.¹

In this situation, he says,

Meine Lösung des Problems ist die, dass wir uns entschliessen müssen, auf die optimistisch-ethische Deutung der Welt in jeder Weise zu verzichten....In der Welt ist für uns nichts von einer sinnvollen Evolution, in der unser Wirken eine Bedeutung bekommt zu entdecken. Auch Ethisches tritt in keiner Weise in dem Weltgeschehen zutage. Der einzige Fortschritt des Erkennens ist, dass wir die Erscheinungen, die die Welt ausmachen, und ihren Ablauf immer eingehender beschreiben können! Den Sinn des Ganzen zu verstehen - und darauf kommt es der Weltanschauung an! - ist uns unmöglich.²

"Das neue Vernunftdenken" Schweitzer says of his proposed system, "jagt also nicht dem Phantom nach, über den Sinn der Welt wissend zu werden."³ In contrast with it, "Alle Weltanschauung, die nicht von der Resignation des Erkennens ausgeht, ist gekünstelt und erdichtet."⁴ Of his position in this he boasts only that,

Ich glaube der erste im abendländischen Denken zu sein, der dieses niederschmetternde Ergebnis des Erkennens anzuerkennen wagt und in bezug auf unser Wissen von der Welt absolut skeptisch ist, ohne damit zugleich auf Welt- und Lebensbejahung und Ethik zu verzichten.⁵

2. Scepticism Limited to Scientific Positivism.

The positivistic interpretation of the Kulturphilosophie is, however, even in view of the above statements, unacceptable, in the light of the chief motives of the work, namely, the need and duty to secure a positive world-theory with permanent foundation in thought.⁶ It is wholly incompatible with Schweitzer's declaration that,

What I desire above all things - and this is the crux of the whole affair - is that we should all recognize

fully that our present entire lack of any theory of the universe is the ultimate source of all the catastrophes and misery of our times and that we should toil in concert for a theory of the universe and of life, in order that thus we may arrive at a mental disposition which shall make us really and truly civilized men.¹

What Schweitzer means by "Weltanschauung" needs to be examined to clear up the contradiction. There are two senses of the term in his usage. The meaning in one set of instances is defined by Schweitzer thus,

Der Inbegriff der Gedanken, die die Gesellschaft und der Einzelne über Wesen und Zweck der Welt und über Stellung und Bestimmung der Menschheit und des Menschen in ihr in sich bewegen. Was bedeuten die Gesellschaft, in der ich lebe, und ich selber in der Welt? Was wollen wir in ihr? Was erhoffen wir von ihr? Was schulden wir ihr?²

For the sum of the answers to these questions the term "world-view" is used in the meaning of a "theory of the universe," and the urgent necessity for reflection is the chief message of Schweitzer. The answer given by the majority to these questions, that is, their Weltanschauung, he says, decides the spirit in which they and their age live. Nowhere does he suggest the possibility of dispensing with such a theory of the universe.

As we have seen, however, there are places where Schweitzer speaks of the impossibility of securing a Weltanschauung, and proposes resigning the attempt. Where this is the case, the term is used to refer to an understanding of the world in the sense of physical nature, and furthermore to a wholly intellectual knowledge of it.

Toward the knowledge of nature, Schweitzer's position must

be carefully defined. He does not deny the possibility, usefulness or accuracy of a scientific description of nature. The sciences of nature, however, do not, he believes, find its meaning, which is after all our chief intellectual interest. Moreover from no scrutiny of its facts, or reflection about them, can a significance of life be found, and permanently established.

We must not, however, understand Schweitzer to deny that meaning belongs to nature or that it can be attributed to it. As brute fact, and as a system of natural events, it baffles our attempt to find meaning for life in it, but the possibility of possession of such meaning is not excluded. Furthermore, Schweitzer does not deny finally the possibility of knowing it, only of knowing it by the way in which philosophy and natural science have insistently attempted in the past to understand it. It is only in a mistaken approach and method that there is no hope of apprehending the metaphysical nature and significance of the world. Schweitzer has, in reality, all the confidence of the Enlightenment in the ability of reason to discover truth if reflection is only comprehensive and thorough.

3. The Need of a Philosophical Theory.

The vital connection between our theory of the universe and civilization is, after his "moral conception of civilization," the second fact which Schweitzer wishes to bring to general consciousness, according to his statement in the preface of The Decay and Restoration of Civilization.¹ He

criticizes the period in which we are living for its lack of regard of this relation, and for its common supposition that humanity will progress satisfactorily without any theory of the universe at all. He declares that "all human progress depends on progress in its theory of the universe, decadence is conditioned by a similar decadence in this theory. Our loss of real civilization is due to our lack of a theory of the universe."¹ He proclaims himself, furthermore, as champion of "the paradoxical truth" that "only as we succeed in finding a strong and worthy theory of the universe, and find in it strong and worthy convictions, shall we again become capable of producing a new civilization."

The need of finding meaning in the universe is stated by Schweitzer no less emphatically than by his idealistic critic Hogg, where he says,

Only when we are able to attribute a real meaning to the world and to life shall we be able also to give ourselves to such action as will produce results of real value. As long as we look on our existence in the world as meaningless, there is no point whatever in desiring to effect anything in the world. We become workers for that universal spiritual and material progress which we call civilization only in so far as we affirm that the world and life possess some sort of meaning, or, which is the same thing, only in so far as we think optimistically.²

He, in fact, expects that in his insistence that it is the prevalent theory of the universe which determines the character of an age, and that an affirmative and ethical philosophy is a condition of civilization, he will be charged with placing too high a value on a philosophical theory.³

4. The Possibility of a Philosophical Theory.

That Schweitzer believes a theory of the universe justified by reflection is possible, is indicated by the facts that he regards its attainment as the first and essential condition for saving civilization from ruin and disintegration,¹ and that, in spite of the serious difficulties in the way, he believes such an achievement is possible. An actual part of the life of the ethical spirit, he declares, is belief in the possibility of the renewal of civilization. He is conscious of the enticing voices which say that living for the day is the one thing which can make life tolerable and that we must find rest in resignation, but dismisses them with all the force of his vigorous character. He holds that the spirit, as a deciding court of appeal, is able to secure a suitable theory of the universe, and to provide a substantial basis in the midst of events for making civilization a reality.

The notion that one can get along without any metaphysics, Schweitzer dismisses as fallacious. Though the individual may not know the source of his ideas, yet "gehen alle Gedanken, die der Einzelnen sowohl wie die der Gesellschaft, zuletzt² irgendwie auf Weltanschauung zurück." There are musicians, he says, who have produced all of the tones which pervade the age in which we live, and the individual who is without a thought-out theory of his own is one who is in tune more or less with all these tones. It has been one of the weaknesses of our day, he declares, that we persuaded ourselves it was possible to get through without any theory of the universe,

and "nahmen....für unser und der Gesellschaft Leben die
 Zufallsideen des Wirklichkeitssinns entgegen."¹ However we
 have long had experience "zur Genüge, dass die Weltanschauung
 der Weltanschauungslosigkeit von allen die wertloseste ist
 und nicht nur Ruin des geistigen Lebens, sondern Ruin über-
 haupt bedeutet."² The production of a reflective theory of
 the universe is, he says, "die grosse Aufgabe des Geistes."³

CHAPTER NINE

SCHWEITZER'S NEW RATIONALISM

1. Rejection of Empiricism.

(1) Empiricism Cannot Support Active Optimism. A theory of the universe which supports civilization is not secured from experience in the general sense of that term, Schweitzer holds. If, in the first place, empirical observation of the world about us were our only, or primary source of knowledge, we would be brought almost unavoidably to a pessimistic view¹ of the essential nature of life and world. World- and life-affirmation and optimism are our original attitudes, and it is experience which in so many cases robs us of these, or, at least, in any reflective man, brings them in question. When we begin to reflect on experience of the world the optimism which was naively ours begins to disappear, and it is for this reason that culture is so apt to be accompanied by apathy and loss of vital enthusiasm for the promotion of life.

Only pessimism, apparently, is justified on the basis of scientific observation; or, at least, the world as known in objective experience gives no sound basis or effective incentive for active devotion to the advancement of life. The world too strongly suggests that life is futile and impermanent, and that our service of it is uncertain and of transient meaning, to itself evoke supreme devotion and self-sacrifice in its behalf. Thus whatever value scientific observation may have for material progress when it is the instrument of an energetic spirit of affirmation of life, it cannot give birth to that

spirit or keep it alive.

(2) It Does not Discover Meaning. Objective experience may not prove that life is meaningless, but it does not find clear signs to indicate what the purpose of the world is, or even that it has any unitary purpose. It enables us with ever greater accuracy to describe and to anticipate the processes of nature, but it never finds the meaning of the whole. Accordingly, in spite of all that it makes possible in the way of mechanical achievements, it is philosophically fruitless.

(3) It is a Lack of Organization of Thought. Our pride in the scientific method is in its ultimate character the glorification of a degeneracy of the power of reason, and of the lack of organization of thought. What we boast of as our sense of reality is a shortsightedness in reference to facts, and a determination of our belief and conduct by every fresh and unassimilated impression. We merely "aus einer Tatsache die nächstliegend andere hervorgehen lassen, und so fort und fort."¹ By this method life ceases to be guided by any principle at all, or to have any unity or coherence. We vaunt ourselves that life has been brought into harmony with reality, but the situation is that, "Wir kamen dazu, statt im Denken Vernunftideale mit Beziehung auf die Wirklichkeit zu schaffen, die Ideale der Wirklichkeit zu entnehmen."²

(4) Vacates the Field for Lowered Ideals. Since, Schweitzer says, "Allein den aus Erfahrung abgeleiteten Ideen trauten wir die Anwendbarkeit auf die Wirklichkeit zu,"³ we actually let lowered ideals dominate our spiritual life and the whole world.

Schweitzer is consistently an idealist and rationalist. Mind, he asserts, exercises an activity upon data, and it is its ideas, ideals, and general character which are expressed in action. As he says,

Immer gehen die Einflüsse der Ereignisse, um sich in uns zu neuen Ereignissen umzusetzen, durch das Medium unserer Mentalität hindurch und werden in diesem verarbeitet. Diese Mentalität hat eine gegebene Bestimmtheit. In dieser schafft sie die Werte, die unser Verhältnis zu den Tatsachen beherrschen.¹

Our practical common sense does not allow genuine and unprejudiced reality to have its way, as we suppose, but control by simple, raw, disorganized experience succeeds that by reasoned ideas, and "Die menschliche Psyche dient dann nur als verschlechternder Transformator." The character of mentality is normally constituted by the reasoned ideas which our reflection upon reality brings into existence, he says, but

Fallen sie aus, so entsteht keine Leere, durch die die Ereignisse an sich auf uns wirken. In dem Mentalitätsmedium dominieren jetzt die Meinungen und die Gefühle, die durch die Vernunftideen bisher geregelt und niedergehalten worden waren....So werden die grossen Überzeugungen, wo sie zerstört sind, durch kleine ersetzt, die deren Funktionen im schlechteren übernehmen.

Mit dem Aufgeben der ethischen Vernunftideale, wie es in unserem Wirklichkeitssinne vorliegt,....ist der moderne Mensch nicht der kühle Beobachter und Rechner, als der er sich vorkommt. Er steht unter der Wirkung der Gesinnungen und Leidenschaften, die ihm von den Tatsachen entgegengebracht werden....In vernunftlosester Weise reagieren wir auf die Tatsachen...."Endlich festen Boden unter den Füssen!" rufen wir, und versinken in den Ereignissen.²

(5) Lacks Finality. Against empiricism Schweitzer also urges some of the same criticisms as are used by Bergson. Empirical knowledge, however long continued is always incomplete.³ Its conclusions lack finality, and are indecisive.

An optimistic world view which will not leave civilization in constant danger of destruction of its fundamental attitude by later experience or by more rigorous realism, is not to be sought for by the method of empiricism.

(6) It is an External Knowledge About Reality. Mere views of the thing do not give us the thing itself. Intellect always looks at a thing from outside, whereas genuine knowledge passes over into experience. No mere multiplication of observations, or ability in accurate description of phenomena, gives knowledge comparable to that imparted in sympathetic understanding of the meaning in a single phenomenon. "Uns über die Wissenschaft des äusserlichen Konstatierens und Berechnens hinausführend," Bergson shows, Schweitzer says, "dass das wahre Wissen vom Sein durch eine Art Intuition zustandekommt."¹ Knowledge does not relate us to the world externally by showing the scheme of phenomena, but from within outwards (von innen heraus) in the way that we experience² (miterleben) the nature of all that surrounds us.

2. Faith in Reason.

(1) Rationalistic Disposition. Schweitzer is rationalistic both in temperament and conviction. In early childhood he was puzzled by the inconsistency of Jesus' economic status and the story of the Magi's gifts. He wondered that the Wise Men did not later concern themselves about Jesus, or the shepherds become His followers. Before his first year in school he remarked the fact that in a very wet summer it had rained for as long a time as in the case of the Biblical flood and yet

the water was not in the houses much less over the tops of the mountains, and he was satisfied only when an explanation was given which reconciled the disparity for thought.¹ A disturbing feature of his confirmation preparation was the impossibility of satisfying his questions, because it was the attitude of the pastor "dass vor dem Glauben alles Nachdenken verstummen müsse." Schweitzer had for this minister, he tells us, the greatest respect, but he says,

Ich aber war überzeugt, und ich bin es noch, dass die Wahrheit der Grundgedanken des Christentums sich gerade im Nachdenken zu bewähren habe. Das Denken, sagte ich mir, ist uns gegeben, dass wir darin alle,² auch die erhabensten Gedanken der Religion begreifen².

With some regret Schweitzer looks back to a period of his life, from about fourteen to sixteen years of age, when he insisted on forcing everyone into argument over any disputable question and on uncovering all the errors of conventional belief. While confessing that he was as unbearable as only a partly educated youth could be, this was still no mere self-assertiveness, he says, but "ein leidenschaftliches Bedürfnis zu denken und mit andern Menschen nach dem Wahren und Zweckmässigen zu suchen."³ The disposition, he still professes and defends. He declares,

Eigentlich bin ich geblieben, was ich damals wurde. Klar habe ich gefühlt, dass wenn ich von meinem Enthusiasmus für das im Denken erkannte Wahre und Zweckmässige abliesse, ich damit mich selber aufgeben würde.⁴

He professes that he is in reality as unbearable as ever, except that he has subjected himself to the social necessity of joining in conversations which are nothing more than that, and of listening to unreflective opinion without disputing it. He

confesses, however, that he suffers over the unused opportunities for men to know each other as striving, suffering, thinking persons, and that he questions "wie weit man mit dieser Wohlerzogenheit gehen darf, ohne Schaden an der Wahrhaftigkeit zu nehmen."¹

(2) Rationalism in Religion. Schweitzer's theological writings and his general attitude in religion show this rationalistic disposition. In the treatment of the life and consciousness of Jesus the established features for religious feeling were disregarded in the process of intellectual reconstruction. His attitude in the field of religious thought was well and concisely expressed in his lectures on Christianity and the religions of the world when, in the introduction, he said to his missionary hearers,

Erwarten Sie von mir nicht Apologie, das heisst Verteidigung des Christentums, wie sie leider nur zu oft geübt wird, und die darin besteht, dass man behauptet, das Christentum enthalte Wahrheiten, die über allem Denken stünden und sich daher mit dem Denken nicht auseinander zu setzen hätten. Dies kommt mir vor, als zöge man sich auf eine Bergfestung zurück, die wohl uneinnehmbar ist, von der aus man aber auch keine Macht ausüben kann.

Von Jugend an habe ich die Überzeugung gehabt, dass alle religiöse Wahrheit sich zuletzt auch als denknützliche Wahrheit begreifen lassen müsse. Darum, meine ich, soll das Christentum in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Denken und mit anderen Religionen kein Privileg für sich in Anspruch nehmen, sondern mitten in dem Kampfe der Ideen stehen und einzig auf die Macht der in ihm enthaltenen Wahrheit vertrauen.²

(3) Rationalism in Philosophy. For philosophy Schweitzer's principles are not different. A philosophy upon which civilization can be built, he says, must, in the first place "denkende Weltanschauung sein. Nur was aus dem Denken geboren, sich an

das Denken wendet, kann eine geistige Macht für die ganze Menschheit werden."¹ Our age, he thinks, has a kind of artistic prejudice against a reflective theory of the universe, and stands in closer kinship to the Romantic movement than it realizes. It is inclined to regard the Romantic criticism of the Aufklärung as valid for all ages against any theory that would found itself solely on thought; but nevertheless, Schweitzer declares, Rationalism, with its generally prevalent belief in thought and its reverence for truth, was "bei allen Unvollkommenheiten die grösste und wertvollste Allgemeinerscheinung im Geistesleben der Menschheit."² He admits the incomplete and unsatisfactory character of the period's intellectual productions, but claims, on the other hand, that "das damals aufgestellte Prinzip, Weltanschauung auf Denken und nur auf Denken zu gründen, ist das wahre."³

In the light of the reputation which Rationalism bears in present-day philosophy it is the mark of courage, or even rashness, to praise it. Schweitzer does not hesitate to take the additional step of designating his thought as rationalistic. He goes farther. Rationalism he declares, is the constant element of all positive philosophical activity. It is, he says,

mehr als eine zu Ausgang des achtzehnten und zu Beginn des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts erledigte Denkbewegung. Er ist eine notwendige Erscheinung jegliches normalen Geisteslebens. Aller wirkliche Fortschritt in der Welt ist im letzten Grunde durch Rationalismus gewirkt.⁴

Effective philosophy must, in fact, return to it. He asserts,

die Einsicht wird schon kommen, dass wir wieder da einsetzen müssen, wo das achtzehnte Jahrhundert stehen blieb. Was zwischen damals und jetzt liegt, ist ein Intermezzo des Denkens, ein Intermezzo mit ausserordent-

lich interessanten und reichen Momenten, aber doch nur ein verhängnisvolles Intermezzo.¹

3. Distinction from Traditional Rationalism.

While we read the above statements of Schweitzer's, however, we must keep in mind that the rationalism to which it is asserted we must return is thought of not in terms of its intellectual productions but of its confidence in reflection. Except in this respect, Schweitzer's thought has little affinity with the historical Rationalism which he praises. It is, both in its method of procedure and its content, different from the traditional Rationalism, and is to be distinguished as "the new rationalism."²

There are two features which distinctly mark off Schweitzer's "new rationalism" from the old. One is its broad non-intellectualistic conception of reason; the other is its mystical element.

(1) Non-intellectualistic Conception of Reason. However strongly Schweitzer urges the necessity of a world-view which is based on thought alone, he cannot be interpreted as anything other than anti-intellectualistic. In the first place, he insists that philosophy must not be abstract but elemental, bringing man into vital working relation with practical life. Then, it cannot be founded upon purely cognitive features; knowledge, as we have before noted him saying, does not furnish the spirit its attitude to life and world. Finally, its attitude is not one that can be theoretically demonstrated, or which lies wholly within the realm of the rational.

The assertions of Schweitzer's which are interpreted by some of his critics as positivism, or as pessimism, are in large measure statements of a doctrine of the inadequacy of mere intellect to achieve valid or helpful knowledge of reality. If, with this in mind, we examine the passages of Schweitzer's works which sound the most sceptical, or the most pessimistic, we shall find that it is intellectually that it is impossible to know reality, and that it is intellect (or objective observation, perhaps) which finds no meaning for life in the world. Thus it is said to be a "letzte Einsicht des Erkennens"¹ that the objective world is an enigmatic phenomenon, and it is any world view "die nicht von der Resignation des Erkennens ausgeht"² which is declared to be artificial and fictitious.

There is, in Schweitzer, a real element of positivism, but it relates to our scientific knowledge of the world and not to an ultimate philosophical view.³ There are (although they do not grow out of scientific knowledge of the world or out of purely theoretical processes) convictions about the nature of reality which may be considered valid. "Resignation in bezug auf das Erkennen der Welt ist für mich nicht der rettungslose Fall in einen Skeptizismus,"⁴ Schweitzer declares. What he does mean to affirm is that our valid conceptions are not those based solely or primarily on pure intellect, but on reason within which intellect and will have entered into proper relation with each other. Knowledge of ultimate reality is not impossible, but impossible to intellect which disregards the will in us, and to will which is unthinking.

In Schweitzer's theory, will plays a much more important part in the process of knowing than is commonly accorded to it. If we were to adhere to a distinction of intellectualistic and voluntaristic theories of knowledge, Schweitzer's would have to be classed as voluntaristic. In the development of his system, will occupies in more than one respect a place as the primary condition of knowledge. Its preeminence is definitely asserted by Schweitzer when he says, "Das letzte Wissen, nach dem wir trachten, ist das Wissen vom Leben. Unser Erkennen erschaut das Leben von aussen, unser Wille von innen."¹

It would be a serious mistake, however, to suppose that Schweitzer's anti-intellectualism means any relaxation of rigorous thought, or that his deference to will means subordination of intellect to wish. The accommodation between will and intellect which should be secured in thought, he says, "In naiver Weise verläuft..., wenn der Wille von dem Erkennen verlangt, dass es ihn eine Welt sehen lasse, die den Impulsen, die er in sich trägt, entspricht, und wenn das Erkennen Versuche macht, solches Verlangen zu befriedigen."² For such a method Schweitzer has nothing but scorn. Much of his contemptuous treatment of transcendental idealism is leveled against its tendency to such cavalier subordination of reason to will. Even of Kant he makes the criticism that, by him,

wird dann die bisher naiv geübte Vergewaltigung des Erkennens methodisch betrieben. Seine Lehre von den "Postulaten der praktischen Vernunft" bedeutet nichts anderes, als dass der Wille sich das entscheidende Wort in den letzten Aussagen der Weltanschauung anmassst. Nur weiss Kant es geschickt so einzurichten, dass der Wille dem Erkennen seine Suprematie nicht aufdrängt, sondern sie von ihm angeboten bekommt und

sie dann in exquisit parlamentarischen Formen ausübt. Er tut, als wäre er von der theoretischen Vernunft berufen worden, an sich möglichen Wahrheiten die Wirklichkeit denknotwendiger Wahrheiten zu verleihen.¹

In the case of Fichte, he declares, "diktiert der Wille, ohne weiter für Diplomatenk²ünste Sorge zu tragen, der Erkenntnis seine Weltanschauung." For any distinction of a religious world view, alongside a scientific one, which is accepted on other grounds than justification to thought, he has no use. Pragmatism, in which "In halb naiver, halb zynischer Weise gesteht sich der Wille....ein, dass die Erkenntnisse der Weltanschauung von ihm selber hervorgebracht werden,"³ belongs to the same class. The only result has been a fatal influence upon the mentality of our time of "Die Erschütterung des Sinnes für Wahrhaftigkeit, die mit der nicht mehr naiv, sondern halb bewusst und hinterlistig geübten Interpretation der Welt gegeben ist."⁴

It is not in subordination of the intellectual apprehension of the natural world to its demands that the proper role of will consists. Will should not arbitrarily determine the conclusions of thought; but thought should be reflection upon the experience of will in ourselves. Intellect looks at life from without, it was said, will from within; and "our ultimate knowledge is necessarily our thinking experience of life, but this does not lie outside the sphere of reason, but within reason itself."⁵ In other words, will does not dictate the results of an intellectual process which has left it out of view, but is a factor which is represented in the conclusion - a conclusion which is then that of reason in its full scope.

When intellect arrives by purely theoretical considerations at a theory which violates the will-to-live, spirit is divided against itself and involved in inner contradiction. Reason is rightly the process of attaining truth through the vital co-operation, and satisfaction, of all the faculties of the spirit. Will without thought is not reason, but will that has reflected about its relation to itself and the objective world is reason. Schweitzer says,

Setzt das Wollen das Erkennen einfach beiseite, so kommt es in unklares Phantasieren. Das Erkennen aber, das sich, wie der vergangene Rationalismus, nicht eingestehen will, dass es, um das Leben zu begreifen, zuletzt in denkendes Erleben übergehen muss, verzichtet auf tiefe und elementar begründete Weltanschauung.¹

Neither will nor intellect is independently valid, but reason consists in the organic co-operation of the two. Only that conclusion can be called the product of reason in which intellect and will have thought out their relations, and in which the unity of the spirit is represented.

The barren intellectualism of the older rationalism is, accordingly, not involved in the "new rationalism" of Schweitzer. With better psychological knowledge than it possessed Schweitzer refers our beliefs (when most validly founded) not to a faculty of pure intellection, but to the organic whole of the human spirit, which is richer in content and operation than mere cognition. The whole spiritual function is reason in its concreteness, and reason's work is broader than what was designated by the term "rational" in the old sense.

It is within the frame of such a comprehensive conception

of reason that Schweitzer can regard his system as based on thought alone, and rationalistic, while at the same time he recognizes that it is incapable of theoretical demonstration, and that it contains irrational factors. On both these points Schweitzer freely calls his system irrational. World- and life-affirmation, he thinks, are not, as a matter of fact, justified by objective observation. The value of life, and the worth of activity and sacrifice on its behalf, are not things which are established on purely theoretical grounds. They come, not from an understanding of the meaning of the world, but from an inner necessity of our own being.

(2) A Mystical Element. To know reality, intellect, as was said, must bring itself into relation to will. It cannot remain an external observer, but must become an element of thinking experience. There must be reflection upon our experience, if we are to attain a world view upon which coherent, effective life can be built; and, in fact, Schweitzer says, in rationalistic style, "Die Erneuerung unserer Weltanschauung, kann nur aus einem unerbittlich wahrhaftigen und rücksichtslos mutigen Denken kommen."¹ A qualification which makes it capable of its task however, is that "Dieses Denken erst ist reif zu erleben, wie das Rationale, wenn es sich zu Ende denkt, mit Notwendigkeit in das Irrationale übergeht."²

Our experience must not remain unreflective, but the experience which is to be thought out to the end is that of will-to-live in me. The intellect finds the objective world enigmatic and opaque - an ununderstandable series of phenomena. But, if it will not crudely attempt to meet the demands of

will, and thus do violence to understanding in the interpretation of the world, but will follow the other, or correct method, in which it offers to will only what it understands, this will be the one piece of knowledge, - that I am will-to-live.

The will-to-live is not something which is created in me by reflection, or which is based on theoretical considerations. It is thus an irrational element in knowledge, but it is also the most immediate and certain factor in my consciousness. It is the form in which life experiences itself.

Life- and world-negation are never thorough-going; and systems which incorporate them involve an inner contradiction. Such philosophies are among the most realistic and critical of all philosophies, but they are inherently inconsistent.

The attitude of world- and life-affirmation is necessary to thought when consciousness becomes reflective of itself, and when intellect and will are brought into proper relation. I am myself will-to-live, and when reflection is thorough it arrives at this fact. This is the material upon which reflection must work; it is the experience which must be thought out to the end, and which, when so thought out, leads to the affirmative and optimistic world- and life-view. The life- and world-affirmative view is intellect's consistency with inner and immediate experience.

We described above, Schweitzer's comprehensive conception of reason, but in the mere form that knowledge is the product of all the faculties of the spirit working together in co-

operation, the view is common coin today. There is in Schweitzer, however, something decidedly unique in the way in which ethical will takes its place in the concourse of faculties. To admit it, is not a novelty, of course, since the appearance of Kant's conception of practical reason and doctrine of its primacy, but in Kant the role of moral will was secondary and supplementary to purely theoretical knowledge, and involved such a dictation of will to intellect as Schweitzer condemns. Schweitzer's thought is that I find in myself will which affirms itself and the world. It is an ethical will, which, not on theoretical grounds, but out of its own nature affirms the phenomena of life about it. What it sanctions as good is what preserves or promotes life, what it condemns is what destroys or restricts life.

The principle of nature is something which I cannot theoretically understand, but which I can experience in myself. Reality shows itself in me as will to the realization and enrichment of life, the logical implication of which is valuation of life (or reverence for life). It gives me in will a way of knowing - or in fact of experiencing - the nature of all reality. Just as, according to Schweitzer, Jesus is not known at all through an acquaintance with the facts of his life, but is known perfectly through sharing His ethical will, so, in his view, the world about us becomes clear and meaningful through the experience in ourselves of its active will for the realization of life despite how much, or how little, we know or understand of its factual forms. Scientific knowledge, of course,

can tell us with exactness much about the manifestations in which life issues, can extend our recognition of life's presence and working, and can enable us to make use of its activity, but the unlearned man who is moved to reflective apprehension of this universal reality is wiser than the man who has studied a thousand phenomena of the will-to-live, and who can describe any of them in detail, but does not apprehend¹ their meaning.

4. The Ethical Conditions of Knowledge.

The sole condition of knowledge is the will toward the realization of life, which as reflective and rational recognizes and respects other will-to-live. This will is not acquired on the basis of experience or theory, but represents the nature of reality. All that philosophy can do is to bring out more clearly and strongly for men, something which is an immediate and common experience of all, which when recognized² exercises a growing conviction and control over life.

It is the fact of ethical will for the advancement of life in me which makes it possible to know sympathetically other reality as such will. By my ethical nature, furthermore, I am required to recognize and respect all other reality as active will toward life. A difficulty, however, is that in the world I cannot recognize the manifold will which is at work there as I do in myself, namely, as life-affirmative will. The will-to-live, as it is seen in the world, appears to be in conflict with itself, and destructive. I may, however, regard the knowledge which I have by experience, from within, as more

valid knowledge of will than that which I have by observation from without. Moreover, where we cannot reconcile the impressions which we have of reality we must choose, and moral determination enters in. Our will is optimistic and ethical, and the volition given in our will-to-live is superior to our knowledge of the world and is to be preferred to it.¹

It is plain that the method is not demonstrative. It involves an autocracy of ethics. Ethically-characterized experience is datum, and ethical evaluation establishes it as favored, or superior datum. Not less than Kant, Schweitzer attributes primacy to ethically-interested reason, but in a way that is his own and that makes the ethical element far more central.

As far as logic is concerned there are several leaps in the argument, and Schweitzer accepts the legitimacy of a leap to the shore, as the only way of getting there. First, however, it should be clear that this does not mean willingness to make rationally unwarranted assumptions in order to arrive at a satisfying view. The beginning of all spiritual life, Schweitzer says, is faith in truth, and it would be better to launch into reflection which gave only an imperfect view than to maintain one without conviction because of its supposed intrinsic value. In thought's enterprise the result is not to be prejudiced. The method which involves ethical evaluation, however, is that which must be followed if we are to have any knowledge at all. Knowledge is dependent upon faith in the validity of our ethical impulses and evaluations and in their conformity to reality.

The attitude of world- and life-negation is one in which intellect is at variance with some of the most fundamental experiences of life. The attitude of life- and world-affirmation, on the other hand; is one which is necessary for thought when it is true to experience. It is not logically necessary, in the sense that each step has rational grounds, for there is a leap of faith in the positive evaluation of life; but it is necessary for thought, in the sense that it is the only conclusion in which the spirit has inner consistency, - that is, vitally necessary for the integrity of reason. The clearest and most consistent ideas of reality are those given in the will-to-live; truth would be found in letting them be valid as our highest knowledge. Agreement with the will-to-live is the test of truth; the highest truth is the worth of sentient life given in the experience of life; "Ethisch werden heisst wahrhaft denkend werden."

5. Schweitzer's Methodology.

(1) Reversal of Philosophical Approach. Schweitzer's method involves, first of all, a reversal of the course which philosophy has commonly attempted to pursue. What it has continually essayed has been to discover theoretically a meaning in the natural world which would make life supremely and permanently significant. Indian philosophy acknowledged the impossibility of doing this, and in consequence adopted a pessimistic world-attitude and an ethics of apathy and resignation. Western philosophy has persisted courageously, and with great ingenuity, in the quest, but with only temporary semblances of success. All that it has succeeded in doing has

been either to find its ethical ideals in the world at the expense of its intellectual vigor and sincerity, or to weaken its ethics down to the place where the natural dominated the ideal, instead of the ideal governing the natural. Schweitzer proposes that, like Indian philosophy, we give up the faith in finding significance for life through an understanding of the objective world, but without following it into its passivism.

The mistake in method of all philosophical thought, Schweitzer holds, has been to suppose that the way to a world-view must necessarily be through metaphysics. It has followed the method of making world-view the parent of life-view. The new approach must be to find in life-view - that is, the will which actively and ethically affirms life - the way to world-view. An actively optimistic attitude to life and world does not rest on a metaphysical interpretation of the world, Schweitzer thinks; but an interpretation of the world - that is, a metaphysics - is only possible in reference to the will to affirm life.

(2) A Beginning with Immediate Consciousness. The starting point for philosophical activity, according to Schweitzer, is not sensory experience. It is not impression from without, but self-experience. Reflection must concern itself with the most immediate consciousness, he asserts, which is one's own experience of being will-to-live. "Mein Wissen von der Welt ist ein Wissen von aussen," Schweitzer says, "und bleibt immer unvollständig. Das Wissen aus meinem Willen zum Leben ist aber unmittelbar und geht auf die geheimnisvollen Regungen

des Lebens, wie es an sich ist, zurück." ¹ He declares,

Wahre Philosophie muss von der unmittelbarsten und umfassendsten Tatsache des Bewusstseins ausgehen. Diese lautet: "Ich bin Leben, das leben will, inmitten von Leben, das leben will." Dies ist nicht ein ausgeklügelter Satz. Tag für Tag, Stunde für Stunde wandle ich in ihm.²

As with Cartesian thought, the beginning is from consciousness, or immediate experience. This is something which cannot be demonstrated, but is directly experienced. It contains a knowledge which is not the result of reflection but its beginning point. In neither system is the primary knowledge the content of a particular experience or number of experiences; it is a universal character of all consciousness or of all experience.

The similarity to the method of Descartes, however, is not extended. Apart from the important point of beginning with experience of our own life rather than of the world, the similarity is slight. In the case of Descartes the "I exist" was of value as an established axiom; it was the proposition that counted for the further extension of knowledge. With Schweitzer, that "I am will-to-live" is not of primary interest as a proposition, but as an experience that carries in it life- and world-affirmation and sympathetic understanding of all other reality.

The world attitude which supports active service of life does not derive from seeing what such and such phenomena signify in the totality of the world, but from the will-to-live itself. The will-to-live when it becomes conscious of itself, knows that it is not dependent on anything external to itself.

The aspiration to raise oneself and all existence to the highest material and spiritual degree of value is innate in it. The self-experience with which Schweitzer begins is not intellectual or abstract. It has about it the concreteness and vital reality of life as a whole.

In Schweitzer's philosophy the content of the world-view is not, so much as is the case in Cartesian philosophy, something demonstrated, but something experienced. We have found reason to classify Schweitzer's method as rationalistic, but it is mystical rationalism - or, possibly, rational mysticism. Schweitzer says, "Von meiner Jugend an war es mir gewiss, dass¹ alles Denken, wenn es sich zu Ende denkt, in Mystik ende." All reflection which is thorough and sincere, he holds, leads beyond rational reflection to a profound subjective experience. He declares,

Alle wertvolle Überzeugung ist irrational und hat enthusiastischen Charakter, weil sie nicht aus dem Erkennen der Welt kommen kann, sondern aus dem denkenden Erleben des Willens zum Leben aufsteigt, in dem wir über alles Welterkennen hinausschreiten.²

What reflection finds as the clearest and most significant datum is the experience of an impulse in me which is the source of my most valuable and certain ideas, and thus rational thought ends in mysticism. Knowledge passes over into experience. My conception of the essential nature of phenomena is by analogy with the will-to-live which exists in me. And so, Schweitzer says,

wird mir das Wissen von der Welt zum Erleben der Welt. Das zum Erleben werdende Erkennen lässt mich der Welt gegenüber nicht als rein erkennendes Subjekt verharren, sondern drängt mir ein innerliches Verhalten zu ihr

auf....Indem es mich denkend und staunend macht, führt es mich immer höher hinan auf die Höhen der Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben. Hier lässt es meine Hand los....Nun muss mein Wille zum Leben seinen Weg in der Welt allein suchen.

Nicht dadurch, dass es mir kundtut, was diese und jene Erscheinungen von Leben in dem Weltganzen bedeuten, bringt mich das Erkennen in ein Verhältnis zur Welt. In inneren, nicht in äusseren Kreisen wandelt es mit mir. Von innen heraus setzt es mich zur Welt in Beziehung, indem es meinen Willen zum Leben alles, was ihn umgibt, als Willen zum Leben miterleben lässt.¹

(3) Nature of the Mystical Element. If we analyze Schweitzer's outlook for its mystical features we find them in the following points. First, he takes as primary fact not the world of objects, but the experience of life itself, and allows this to be the key to the meaning of reality. All merely intellectual knowledge of the world is transcended in two ways - we acquire knowledge, where pure intellect would remain in ignorance; and we do not merely recognize what the character of reality is, but we directly experience it. Further, my apprehension that all else is will-to-live does not remain a theory, but can be designated as experience. The nature of my consciousness is will-to-live, by which I sympathetically know from within, or intuitively, the nature of other forms of reality. It is, then, in this inner comprehension of the principle of their being that I know them, not by progressive observation of manifestations, and inference from these. I comprehend them because of a common nature, which I experience in myself; but not by knower and known losing their distinctness. Finally, in the will-to-live there is revealed to me a universal Will-to-Live, but toward it the relation in knowledge is essentially similar: the universal Will is object for knowledge and is

understood, but with no loss of individuality or otherness. The only way in which the individual existent may be one with the universal Will is in an ethical unity. Through understanding the universal Will, the individual can bring its will into ethical harmony with other will-to-live. Further, it can make the purpose of other will-to-live its own. By cooperation with other striving it comes to know experimentally the will-to-live in others which is like its own. Thus, from another angle, it becomes evident that to be ethical is to think truly.

This last idea suggests that part of what passes as mysticism in Schweitzer is the sound, experimental side of pragmatism. Knowledge itself is not complete until it is tried in action. Knowledge is not the function of pure intellect, but of the unitary spirit of man. Will in the form of action carries out a cognitive function, and theory does not become knowledge until it has become so through it. Action on the principle of affirmation of life brings confirmation of the optimistic world-view, and thus knowledge becomes experience. If one obeys life's inherent impulse, he learns what the nature of life really is - namely, that it is will to realize the fullest perfection of life. It is, Schweitzer said in the Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung, those who follow Jesus who learn who He is. Similarly, it is his view, the will-to-live makes demands on us while we do not yet know what life is, but some persons - not the "Little-faiths, true followers of Peter," who "cry out and sink in the sea of ideas," but "the followers of Paul, who believe in the Spirit"¹ - follow it in the ethical venture of faith, and then as an ineffable secret

they experience what life is.

(4) Rejection of the Method of Mysticism. For the usual method of mysticism, or of Romanticism, Schweitzer has no use. It is his conviction, as we have seen, that "das....Prinzip, Weltanschauung auf Denken und nur auf Denken zu gründen, ist das wahre."¹ True thought is not barren and lifeless, but elemental and enthusiastic. "Sie ist nicht dürrer Verstand, der die vielgestaltigen Regungen unseres Seelenlebens nicht aufkommen lässt," Schweitzer says, "sondern der Inbegriff aller Funktionen unseres Geistes in ihrem lebendigen Zusammenwirken."² On the other hand, "Die Begeisterung, die aus dem Denken kommt, verhält sich zu der, die aus wirren Gefühlen entsteht, wie der Wind der ragenden Höhen zu dem, der zwischen Hügeln weht"....it is a "grosse und tiefe Leidenschaft der grossen und tiefen Ideale."³ The life-affirmative will is not a peculiar revelation, and Schweitzer contemptuously dismisses "Persönlichkeiten, die über besondere psychische Erlebnisse zu verfügen glauben und behaupten, damit hinter das Wesen der Erscheinungen zu schauen."⁴ Mystical and romantic systems Schweitzer calls "anspruchsvolle phantastische Metaphysik."⁵

(5) Philosophy the Product of Rational Reflection. Though Schweitzer reverses the relations of metaphysical theory and attitude to life, making the latter the parent of the former, and finds that our attitude to life is given in our immediate experience, he does not represent that the meaning of life is secured without reflection. It is in our will-to-live, when it has become reflective about itself, that the world-view of

reverence for life is given.

The question might be raised, why if world- and life-affirmation is inherent in our nature, it should be necessary, as Schweitzer insists, to have a thought-out theory of the universe. The answer is, that naive life- and world-affirmation becomes confused by the multiplicity and diversity of phenomena, so that the spiritual impulse is weakened and needs the support of a rational world-view based on itself. There is need to exchange the first crude world- and life-affirmation¹ for a thought-out form of the same, which is conscious of its right to existence over against the doubts suggested by objective observation and by merely intellectual reflection. Further, simple life- and world-affirmation is not fully spiritual or ethical until it is reflective. It is apt to seek merely to live itself out in conflict with other will-to-live. It is reflection which suggests that it is only one form of will-to-live in the midst of other will-to-live, and which derives as the first implication of the will-to-live the valuation of life, or respect for life. Moreover, the innate impulse to reach the perfection which is implicit in our nature, which is another way of saying the affirmative attitude to life, involves this understanding of the world, in which will and intellect are reconciled. "Alles, was Mensch ist," Schweitzer says, "ist bestimmt, in eigener, denkender Weltanschauung wahrhaftige Persönlichkeit zu werden."²

Our theory of the universe, according to Schweitzer, must be both rational and mystical. It is "Unser grosser Irrtum,"

he says, "dass wir meinen, ohne Mystik zu einer ethischen, das Denken befriedigenden Welt- und Lebensanschauung gelangen zu können."¹ This must, however, be a reflective theory, which thinks itself through to the basic experience of life. Schweitzer says,

Aber warum annehmen, dass der Weg des Denkens vor der Mystik ende? Wohl hat das bisherige Vernunft-Denken immer Halt gemacht, wenn es in die Nähe der Mystik kam. Es wollte nur so weit gehen, als es alles in glatter Logik ausbreiten konnte. Die Mystik ihrerseits setzte, wo sie es nur konnte, das Vernunft-Denken herab, um ja die Idee nicht aufkommen zu lassen, als müsse sie ihm irgendwo Rechenschaft leisten. Und dennoch gehören die 2 beiden, die nichts voneinander wissen wollen, zusammen.

6. The Method's Competence.

The result of the employment of the method of mystical rationalism - that is, the method which goes beyond the knowledge possible in a purely theoretical study of the natural world through the subject's reflection on its own nature and acceptance of the validity of its inherent dispositions - is the possibility of knowledge of the world. Schweitzer asserts,

Die unbefangene Welt- und Lebensbejahung, die in mir ist, weil ich ja Wille zum Leben bin, braucht also nicht mit sich selbst in Konflikt zu treten, wenn mein Wille zum Leben denkend wird und den Sinn der Welt nicht versteht. Trotz des negativen Resultats des Erkennens habe ich Welt- und Lebensbejahung festzuhalten und zu vertiefenDaraufhin gebe ich meinem Leben und allem Willem zum Leben, der mich umgibt, einen Wert, halte mich zum Wirken an und schaffe Werte.²

Schweitzer regards the method both as successful, and as justified and made necessary by consistent thought. He affirms that ethical world- and life-affirmation, although they are subjective and non-rational, are nevertheless the end at which rational reflection, carried out to its conclusion, arrives by

logical necessity. By the method, then, a world view which fulfills the condition of being a product of thought is achieved. In the conclusion of the preface of the Kultur und Ethik, Schweitzer asserts,

So habe ich in diesem Buche die Tragödie des bisherigen Suchens nach Weltanschauung geschrieben und selber einen neuen Weg zur Weltanschauung beschritten. Wo das abendländische Denken zu keinem Ziele gelangte, weil es sich nicht resolut in die Wüste des Skeptizismus des Erkennens der Welt hineinwagte, durchwandere ich diese Wüste ruhigen Mutes. Sie ist ja nur ein schmaler Streifen, der der ewig grünenden Oase elementarer, aus dem Denken über den Willen zum Leben kommender Weltanschauung vorgelagert ist.¹

CHAPTER TEN

THE ETHIC OF ETHICAL PERSONALITY

1. The Place of Ethics.

Various thinkers have entered the field of philosophical speculation under the urge of different problems: - to satisfy religious thought, to secure and justify universal laws in science, or to found morality. Schweitzer belongs to the last group. The essential problem of thought for him is the nature and basis of the moral principle; and it is the pressure of this question which is the motive power of his philosophical activity.

There are also notable differences between philosophers in respect to the field within which their systems develop. In Kant, epistemological problems take the foremost place, and their solution determines his whole philosophy. In Hegel, philosophy is developed from an analysis of logical process. In Büchner, Haeckel, and Spencer, natural science provides the concepts and principles; and in Comte, sociology furnishes the content. In Schweitzer, it is ethical experience, or the sphere of purpose and behavior, whose consideration forms the chief business of philosophical thought and whose analysis secures the content of philosophical knowledge.

It would be easy, in fact, to take Schweitzer's philosophical writings, on the face of them, as contributions to a limited department of philosophy, that of ethics, alone. The large second part of Schweitzer's Kulturphilosophie carries the title Kultur und Ethik, and in the historical survey which forms a

considerable portion of it, Schweitzer treats the historical systems so decidedly from the standpoint of their bearing upon our active ethical relation to the world that it would be possible to consider it as primarily a history of ethical theory. In Schweitzer's own positive contribution, similarly, so closely does it maintain its community with ethics in the whole cycle of its development, that one can speak with equal appropriateness of Schweitzer's Philosophy of Civilization or Ethics of Civilization, of his Philosophy of Respect for Life or of his Ethics of Respect for Life. So, although to regard Schweitzer's philosophical speculation in the sense suggested above, as a mere isolated ethical discussion, would be essentially as unsound as to place Hegel's Logic among the manuals which teach the student methods of correct thinking, it is evident that one cannot proceed far in the discussion of Schweitzer's philosophy without an exposition of his ethical theories.

2. Attack on Materialism.

Reaction against materialistic and utilitarian attitudes and principles is one of the strongest features of Schweitzer's thought. Particularly in the Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, he flays the current satisfaction with material achievements and the assumption that they form an absolutely positive advance in civilization. "Ob etwas mehr oder weniger von materiellen Errungenschaften zu verzeichnen ist, ist für die Kultur nicht entscheidend," is his summarization.¹ Schweitzer has no principles of an ascetic sort. He recognizes

material progress as an element in civilization, and regards the establishment of as favorable conditions of living as possible as being desirable both for its own sake and for its contribution to the spiritual and moral perfecting of individuals.¹ He does not, however, consider these as of the essence of civilization. Often, in fact, through their dominance over the spirit of man, he declares, they even make real civilization difficult, if not virtually impossible.

Material power may have either positive or negative significance in relation to civilization, Schweitzer asserts; and he characterizes the assumption that civilization is directly advanced in scientific and technical achievements, with little or no relation to ethics, as an external and superficial conception. He offers his own position as artist, scholar and physician as evidence of his ability to appreciate the esthetic, historical and scientific elements in our civilization, but declares,

Entering on the question as to what is the real essential nature of civilization I come to the pronouncement that this is ultimately ethical....I have come to the conviction that the aesthetic and the historical elements, and the magnificent extension of our material knowledge and power do not themselves form the essence of civilization, but that this depends on the mental disposition of the individuals and nations who exist in the world. All other things are merely accompanying circumstances of civilization which have nothing to do with its real essence.²

The danger for our civilization, Schweitzer thinks, lies in its unbalanced development of material and spiritual values, and in its unsound sense of their relative significance. "Wir überschätzen deren materielle Errungenschaften,"

he declares, "und haben die Bedeutung des Geistigen nicht mehr in erforderlicher Weise gegenwärtig."¹ But stern matters of fact teach "dass die Kultur, die sich nur nach der materiellen und nicht auch in entsprechendem Masse nach der geistigen Seite hin entwickelt....der Katastrophe zutreibt."²

3. Idealism.

The highest values, in Schweitzer's estimation, and, in truth, the only unequivocal and ultimate values which he recognizes, are spiritual ones. Material achievements and progress are valuable only in reference to their effects upon the human spirit. The real content of civilization is in a mental attitude of men - namely, a predisposition to act affirmatively toward the world and life, and to be ethical. The nature of it consists, Schweitzer says, "darin, dass die Einzelnen die Ideale der Vervollkommnung des Menschen und der Besserung der sozialen und politischen Zustände der Völker und der Menschheit denken und in ihrer Gesinnung durch solche Ideale in lebendiger und stetiger Weise bestimmt sind."³

Civilization has a two-fold nature, according to Schweitzer; it is the supremacy of reason over nature, and of reason over the dispositions of men. Both of these factors are spiritual, but progress in civilization is realized more truly in the achievement of the latter. This supremacy of reason over human dispositions means, "dass die Einzelnen und die Kollektivitäten ihr Wollen durch das materielle und geistige Wohl des Ganzen und der Vielen bestimmt sein lassen, das heisst ethisch sind. Der ethische Fortschritt ist also das Wesent-

liche und das Eindeutige....in der Kulturentwicklung."¹

Civilization is measured in terms not of its artistic, scientific, or material treasures but of the amount and vigor of its ethical will. The moral spirit is the only true value, and the condition of all others.

4. The Nature of Morality.

The nature of the ethical spirit, and of ethical activity, is that it is dominated by the attitude of affirmation of life, and that it devotes itself to preserve and to advance life. Schweitzer repeatedly defines the good, duty, and ethics in these terms. His most fundamental principle of morality, he says, is "dass das Gute in dem Erhalten, Fördern, und Steigern von Leben besteht und dass Vernichten, Schädigen und Hemmen von Leben böse ist."² Ethics, accordingly, "ist nichts anderes als Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben."³ Again, ethics "besteht darin, dass ich die Nötigung erlebe, allem Willen zum Leben die gleiche Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben entgegenzubringen wie dem eigenen. Damit ist das denknotwendige Grundprinzip des Sittlichen gegeben. Gut ist, Leben erhalten und Leben fördern; böse ist, Leben vernichten und Leben hemmen."⁴

Such a principle, Schweitzer thinks, actually operates in all our ethics. He says,

Tatsächlich lässt sich alles, was in der gewöhnlichen ethischen Bewertung des Verhaltens der Menschen zueinander als gut gilt, zurückführen auf materielle und geistige Erhaltung oder Förderung von Menschenleben und auf das Bestreben, es auf seinen höchsten Wert zu bringen. Umgekehrt ist alles, was in dem Verhalten der Menschen zueinander als böse gilt, seinem letzten Wesen nach materielles oder geistiges Vernichten oder Hemmen

von Menschenleben und Versäumnis in dem Bestreben, es auf seinen höchsten Wert zu bringen. Weit auseinanderliegende, untereinander scheinbar gar nicht zusammenhängende Einzelbestimmungen von Gut und Böse fügen sich wie zusammengehörige Stücke ineinander, sobald sie in dieser allgemeinsten Bestimmung von Gut und Böse erfasst und vertieft werden.¹

Since it flows from the fundamental nature of vital will, or life, its presence is, in large measure, unavoidable. The defect is, that it is not consciously recognized as the general and absolute principle of morality, and that its operation is limited and thwarted by considerations which are in their nature not ethical.

5. The Extent of Ethical Relations.

The extent of reference of the ethical principle of respect for life is for Schweitzer unlimited. He not only means to deepen current views of good and evil, he says, but to expand and extend them. The limitation of ethical principle to the relations of man to man, he criticises as one of the chief weaknesses of our western Christian ethics. Its lack of feeling of fellowship and of community with sub-human life (fostered by our religious interest in the soul, our intellectualistic conceptions and Descartes' mechanistic interpretation of animals) strikes him as something inhuman and unnatural.

In place of the artificial recognition which humanity to animals receives in some modern systems, where it figures as a training of the human disposition, or as an element of one's own personal worth, Schweitzer proposes to instate a direct and immediate sense of oneness with all life, and of sympathy with its fate. The really ethical man, he says, goes out of

his way to avoid injuring anything living; he

hat acht, dass er kein Insekt zertritt. Wenn er im Sommer nachts bei der Lampe arbeitet, hält er lieber das Fenster geschlossen und atmet dumpfe Luft, als dass er Insekt um Insekt mit versengten Flügeln auf seinen Tisch fallen sieht.

Geht er nach dem Regen auf der Strasse und erblickt den Regenwurm, der sich darauf verirrt hat....befördert (er) ihn von dem todbringenden Steinigen hinunter ins Gras. Kommt er an einem Insekt vorbei, das in einen Tümpel gefallen ist, so nimmt er sich die Zeit, ihm ein Blatt oder einen Halm zur Rettung hinzuhalten.¹

Not even at the border of animal life, Schweitzer thinks, does man's responsibility toward life end. The ethical man does not ask how far any form of life is capable of feeling, but to him life as such is sacred; "Er reisst kein Blatt vom Baume ab, bricht keine Blume."² Even the inorganic world receives from him a similar respect, and "he shatters no ice-crystal that sparkles in the sun."³ It is, in fact, the view of Schweitzer that every reality is a phenomenon of will-to-live. This is not an attitude theoretically founded through external observation, but one in which we apprehend all that exists through our own experience. To be consistent with the principle of evaluation-of-life which is implied in our will-to-live, and to think through to the end the knowledge which we derive from self-experience, demands, then, that we do not wantonly destroy anything.

Schweitzer recognizes that it is impossible in the natural world to live out life without destroying countless other lives. This is an inescapable necessity of existence, and constitutes that which makes the meaninglessness for life of the universe, when objectively considered. The principle which appears in my ethical will cannot be seen in it externally

- or in me in that way. I am, however, and am to remain, ethical will, and am to show myself as such so far as possible.

Reverence for life is to appear in conduct wherever it can, unchecked by the fear of being laughed at as sentimental. Though one cannot escape from the necessities of the natural world, one must not destroy any life heedlessly or unnecessarily. Schweitzer says,

Der Landmann, der auf seiner Wiese tausend Blumen zur Nahrung für seine Kühe hingemäht hat, soll sich hüten, auf dem Heimweg in geistlosem Zeitvertreib eine Blume am Rande der Landstrasse zu köpfen, denn damit vergeht er sich an Leben, ohne unter der Gewalt der Notwendigkeit zu stehen.¹

Even where the violation of life is recognized as an act of practical necessity, Schweitzer declares, in what is a significant and more novel feature of his ethical thought, man must not seek freedom from responsibility for such an act. Respect for life is an absolute ethical principle, and it cannot be infringed without guilt. To make such a course of action the ethical one by any rational doctrine is to dull our ethical sense. We cannot avoid offense, but in such circumstances "Das gute Gewissen ist eine Erfindung des Teufels."² A guilt which cannot be avoided is part of the fact of evil, but must not be escaped by betraying the ethical will.

6. Universal Perfectionism.

For the attitude of the ethical will toward all other will-to-live the term sympathy has been used above. The notion which it represents is, however, for Schweitzer, "zu eng, um als Inbegriff des Ethischen zu gelten."³ Its connotation is too passive. He states,

Es bezeichnet ja nur die Teilnahme mit dem leidenden Willen zum Leben. Zur Ethik gehört aber das Miterleben aller Zustände und aller Aspirationen des Willens zum Leben, auch seiner Lust, auch seiner Sehnsucht, sich auszuleben, auch seines Dranges nach Vervollkommenung.¹

Schweitzer attempts a characterization of it by the phrase "Hingebung an Leben...die durch Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben motiviert ist."² What ought to be clear is that it involves active effort for the furtherance and promotion of life. It does not mean merely refraining from destroying life, nor taking care to maintain its existence, but enhancing it in every respect. To be ethical is to give oneself to all life in the effort to realize the fullest worth of which it is capable, it is to develop in all reality the degree of perfection which is implicit in it.

7. Irrationality of the Ethical Will.

(1) Obligation of Irrational Self-Sacrifice. It is, of course, evident that such a principle of respect for life and of active devotion to its furtherance cannot be followed without personal sacrifice. "Die Lebensbejahung strengt sich an, Lebensverneinung in sich aufzunehmen," Schweitzer says, "um anderen Lebewesen in Hingebung zu dienen und sie, eventuell durch Selbstaufopferung, vor Schädigung oder Vernichtung zu bewahren."³ This is the work of reflective thought. In becoming reflective the will-to-live becomes ethical. The principle of respect for life is the first result of thought directed upon the will-to-live. Thought sees that to fully realize what is implicit in the will-to-live, and to make it perfect, simple life-affirmation must include in itself an element of life-negation.

Some life-negation is, in Schweitzer's view, a necessary feature of all ethical life. It is not ethical in itself, but is the form of world-affirmation where thought has stirred up the will-to-live to recognize and enter into community with the life-affirmation which exists in the manifold life about it and which stands in analogy to the life-affirmation within itself.

This world-affirmation and its corollary of voluntary life-negation does not have logical limits. "Wohl kommt sie aus dem Denken," Schweitzer says; "Aber sie lässt sich nicht logisch durchführen."¹ The repeated attempts to explain the essential nature of self-sacrifice in such a way as to bring it within the scope of rational canons, he asserts, always "geht...auf Kosten der Natürlichkeit und Lebendigkeit der Ethik."² Self-sacrifice is not a rational element, but the expression of the subjective enthusiasm for life. How far it shall go cannot be established by rules, but is determined by the strength of its inner impulse of respect for life. Where life-affirmation and negation come into conflict and demand objective rules, it is a sign of the waning of the ethical will.

Whoever adopts fully the principle of respect for life - that is, launches out toward a true ethic - Schweitzer says, "muss darauf gefasst sein, in den Strudeln des Irrationalen herumgewirbelt zu werden."³ The principle of reverence for life does not allow him to reflect about the life for which he gives himself, to what extent it can feel, or to what extent it deserves sympathy. It does not permit him to rest in the thought that the more capable advances at the expense of the less capable, but it presents life as such as sacred. It leads

one to do what seems foolishness, or is actually foolishness in so far as the renunciation for the sake of others has really no useful effect, but still this is right. "Nur in der Masse, als wir alle im Sinne des gewöhnlichen Rechnens weniger vernünftig werden," Schweitzer says, "wirkt sich ethische Gesinnung unter uns aus und lässt Probleme lösbar werden, die bisher unlösbar waren."¹

(2) Disregard of Utility. The anti-utilitarian nature of Schweitzer's ethics stands out clearly in the above features. Ethical conduct is irrational, and is not measured by the anticipation of the usefulness of its effects. The utilitarian principle is not the principle of ethics, but a substitute for it. Where calculation of utility takes place, it is a victory of the theoretical world-view over the attitude derived from the inner experience of life and means the silencing of the ethical spirit.

To be ethical is to surrender oneself wholly to the behest of the subjective will-to-live, unweakened by considerations derived from theoretical knowledge. The ethic of reverence for life does not contain a relative principle, but what respect for life commands has its own meaning, even when foolish. It is, in fact, its non-conformity with practical ends which reveals in it the operation of the spiritual principle, and its "Torheit" which shows that "wir höhere Verantwortungen in uns bewegen."²

(3) Source in Intuition. Schweitzer, in fact, regards ethics as irrational throughout, and not merely on the side of the necessary element of self-sacrifice which it contains.

Ethical conduct, in his view, is not that action which is seen to be necessary for certain practical ends, and it is not decided by anticipation of its consequences or by its hopes of success.

Morality does not arise as prudent accomodation to the world, according to Schweitzer, but out of inner constraint.¹ It is not the product of knowledge about the world, but grows out of the reflective experience of the will-to-live. "Ethik entsteht dadurch," he says, "dass ich die Weltbejahung, die mit der Lebensbejahung in meinem Willen zum Leben nat rlich gegeben ist, zu Ende denke und zu verwirklichen versuche."²

Thus, for Schweitzer, the fundamental principle of morality is innate in subjective will, and not learned by experience. "Ohne den Sinn der Welt zu verstehen," he expresses it, "wirke ich Werte schaffend und Ethik  bend in der Welt und auf die Welt ein."³ To live ethically is not to derive the principle of one's action from the world, but to live out the principle that is inherent in one's native and underived will-to-live.

8. Individualism.

(1) The Autonomy and Individuality of Moral Acts. Moral acts are regarded by Schweitzer as wholly autonomous and individual. Their form is not determined by any authority, but grows out of the individual's inner will. "Die Ethik der ethischen Pers nlichkeit," Schweitzer says, "ist pers nlich, unreglementierbar und absolut."⁴ In neither its reference nor its intensity is action in accordance with the disposition controlled by any objective canons, but only (as in art) by⁵

the enthusiasm and force of the subjective spirit. "Wir können dieses Wirken auch nicht objektiv reglementieren," Schweitzer declares, "sondern müssen die Gestaltung und Ausdehnung desselben ganz dem Einzelnen anheimgestellt sein lassen."¹ Ethical decisions must be personal matters, Schweitzer says;

Nur subjektive Entscheide kann der Mensch in den ethischen Konflikten treffen. Niemand kann für ihn bestimmen, wo jedesmal die äusserste Grenze der Möglichkeit des Verharrens in der Erhaltung und Förderung von Leben liegt. Er allein hat es zu beurteilen, indem er sich dabei von der aufs höchste gesteigerten Verantwortung gegen das andere Leben leiten lässt.²

Moreover, the conflict must be faced again and again. In the personal decisions there are no general principles about the extent of regard for life or of sacrifice, but the disposition of respect for life calls on us to make an individual adjustment with it in each individual case.³

(2) Theory of Property. Schweitzer's ethics is, as we have seen above, individualistic in spirit. He explains its attitude toward property in conformity with that viewpoint, although he combines it strangely with a socialistic interpretation of the nature of property. The ethics of reverence for life, he says, "Besitz beurteilt...als von dem Einzelnen souverän verwaltetes Gut der Gesellschaft."⁴ The same idea appears in other words in the statement that "Erworbenes oder Ererbtes nicht durch irgendwelche Massnahmen der Gesellschaft, sondern nur durch absolut freie Entschliessung des Einzelnen in den Dienst der Allgemeinheit gestellt werden soll."⁵

(3) The Subjective Source of Morality. The individualistic view regarding property, even though it has intimate relation

to Schweitzer's practical plans for support of his mission, is not an isolated position, as has been shown above. Neither is the individualism an accidental factor. Rather, it is an inherent feature in Schweitzer's philosophical outlook.

Schweitzer does not regard society, but the individual, as the source of morality. Ethic arises in the individual's respect for life, and this is the highest authority for conduct and belief. It is not to be dictated to by objective knowledge or by social attitudes. It must be true to itself, and action should follow its decision alone, since active enthusiasm for life and ethics are derived solely from it. Each person must decide on his own duty according to his inner, reflective, life-affirming disposition. "Nach der Verantwortung, die ich in mir erlebe," Schweitzer says, "muss ich entscheiden, was ich von meinem Leben, meinem Besitze, meinem Rechte, meinem Glück, meiner Zeit, meiner Ruhe hingeben muss und was ich davon behalten darf."¹

The individual's sense of responsibility is the only authority, and there can be no autocratic rule. The promotion of ethical progress depends solely upon enhancing the individual's sense of responsibility, and upon freeing the inherent principle of respect for life from the domination of an ethics derived by intellect from the world.

(4) Relation of Individual and Social Ethics. In view of the prevalent theories of the social basis of ethics, Schweitzer's conception of the relation of personal and communal morality seems strikingly novel.² It is his view that the collapse of

civilization which is occurring, has as a cause the fact that we have left the determination of morality to society, and have subjected our inherent ethical wills to its judgments. We have lost our personal moral judgment in that of the mass, have suppressed our scruples in order to judge goodness and badness eye to eye with it, and in our theory of the general good have become capable of excusing everything that is meaningless, cruel and unjust. Schweitzer asserts,

Wenn unter den modernen Menschen so wenige mit intaktem menschlichem und sittlichem Empfinden anzutreffen sind, so ist es nicht zum wenigsten, weil sie fortwährend ihre persönliche Sittlichkeit auf dem Altar des Vaterlandes opferten, statt in Spannung mit der Kollektivität zu bleiben und Kraft zu sein, die die Kollektivität zur Vollendung antreibt.¹

The fault found with social morality is, that in it men tend to act in accordance with objective principles rather than with the spirit of humaneness. This is done in obedience to a feeling of supra-personal responsibility, and is justified by an ethical theory which sanctions non-egoistic motives. Schweitzer replies to this that to sacrifice or injure life is unethical whether it is done egoistically or unegoistically. He insists that any other purposiveness than that for the maintenance and enhancement of life, out of reverence for life, is not ethical, and seeks to check the attempts to combine in a relative ethic the really ethical purposiveness with purposiveness of any other sort. "Ethik," he declares, "geht nur so weit, als die Humanität, das heisst die Rücksicht auf die Existenz und auf das Glück des einzelnen Menschenwesens geht."²

To reckon as ethical any violations of this principle, because

they are based on unegoistic considerations, he says, is a bridge over which the ethical passes into the unethical, and is a menace to the mental atmosphere which is desirable for the community. Schweitzer declares,

Zu sehr handeln wir....als Menschen, die es ohne Anstrengung fertig bringen, gegebenen Falles nicht mehr Menschen, sondern nur noch Vollstrecker allgemeiner Interessen zu sein. Darum ist unter uns kein Vertrauen mehr zu einer durch Menschlichkeit erleuchteten Gerechtigkeit....Alle fühlen wir uns einer kalten, sich in Prinzipien versteifenden, unpersönlichen und gewöhnlich noch unintelligenten Opportunitätsmentalität ausgeliefert, die um kleinste Interessen zu verwirklichen, grösster Inhumanität und grösster Torheit fähig ist. Alle Probleme werden in unzweckmässigem Machtkampfe ausgetragen, weil keine Gesinnung vorhanden ist, die sie lösbar macht.¹

If the moral judgment of the individual, growing out of reverence for all other will-to-live, which is the product in reflection of his own will-to-live, is subordinated to this utilitarian and social ethics, there is reversal of the proper relations. Schweitzer says,

Wo die Kollektivitäten stärker auf den Einzelnen einwirken, als er auf sie zurückwirkt, entsteht Niedergang, weil damit die Grösse, auf die alles ankommt, die geistige und sittliche Wertigkeit des Einzelnen, notwendigerweise beeinträchtigt wird. Es tritt dann eine Entgeistigung und Entsittlichung der Gesellschaft ein, durch die sie unfähig wird, die sich ihr stellenden Probleme zu verstehen und zu lösen. Früher oder später verfällt sie also der Katastrophe.²

(5) An Ethic of Ethical Persons. Schweitzer's moral theory is well characterized in his words, "die Ethik der ethischen Persönlichkeit."³ It places persons over against abstract and material interests as the objects of ethical action, in the first place, - with indefinite extension of the range of what is spiritually interpreted. Then, it is the ethics of thinking and free men, not acting under the dictation of objective

canons, but out of their inherent ethical disposition. The ethics of respect for life is not that of law, or of society, but of the natural and vital impulse of the individual.

What one most immediately experiences as his own nature, according to Schweitzer, is will-to-live - that is, an irrational enthusiasm for life and devotion to its service. The principles of this innate will are in striking contrast to those commonly attributed to will-to-live. Its impulses are not toward ruthless employment of power and cruel supremacy, but toward respect for life. It is not merely self preservation, but giving of life for the preservation of other life. The fundamental nature of life, in Schweitzer's view, is nothing less than spiritual and ethically purposive will.

9. Relation to Metaphysics.

We have long searched to find evidence of the ethical nature of the world, driven by a conviction of the dependence of our ethical impulse upon the knowledge of its meaning for life, and have often done injury to our intellectual sincerity in order to establish our ethical interpretation. The make-shifts have very largely fallen away, however, and what is revealed in all our maneuvers is the fact that our affirmative attitude toward life has not grown out of a theoretical interpretation of the world. "Die Lebensanschauung soufflierte," Schweitzer says, "und die Weltanschauung rezitierte. Dass die Lebensanschauung aus der Weltanschauung komme, war also nur eine Fiktion."¹

The life-view was independent all the time, and grew out of

a primarily ethical will. By the conscious recognition of this, however, ethics is not merely liberated from correlation with principles derived from the actual world, and allowed to show its own inner principles derived from itself, but it becomes metaphysical. The problem of thought is to think out the meaning of the will-to-live in relation to itself and to the world, and "alle in der Ethik waltende Hingebung als Erscheinung eines innerlichen, geistigen Verhältnisses zur Welt zu begreifen."¹ Our relation to the world, we discover, where it is not brought into confusion by a poverty-stricken sense of actuality, is determined by the principle of reverence for life. The acceptance of this relation is not only ethics, but to be ethical is to think truly. In the ethical will in me, and in the attitude which it takes to phenomena, I may find the truth about the nature of reality.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

SCHWEITZER'S SPIRITUALISM

1. Idealistic Disposition.

That Schweitzer is idealistic in his social and ethical theory has been noted before, and this practical idealism is over and over again made evident. He repeatedly designates the spiritual and moral perfection of the individual and of society as the purpose of ethics and as the goal of all progress.¹ Further, he asserts that "Der Trieb, Fortschritte auf allen Gebieten und in jeder Hinsicht zu erstreben, kommt dem Menschen aus optimistischer Weltanschauung, die die Welt und das Leben als etwas an sich Wertvolles bejaht."²

Such a metaphysical outlook is not, of course, a theoretical conclusion from the facts of the natural world, and it goes beyond the knowledge which they either give or affirm. It is derived from the will in its effort to fulfill life and in its disposition to respect other life. The attempt in which western thought has persisted up to the present time, to find a meaning in the world which would make it possible to regard the goal of man and of humanity as real and significant, was foredoomed to failure, Schweitzer thinks. The reversal of method which he suggests, derives world-view from life-view. It regards the worth of life and of activity for its fulfillment, which are given in the will-to-live, as true and valid for reality. They belong to the most immediate and undeniable experience of life. Intellect, moreover, cannot reject them

without bringing spirit into an inner contradiction from which it cannot escape. The task of reflective thought, then, is to think out the meaning of this will-to-live in relation to itself and to the world. In this way only, he thinks, may the shattered sword of idealism "neu geschmiedet werden."¹

2. Theory of the Natural World.

(1) Subordination of Philosophy of Nature. In view of Schweitzer's method it is natural that he does not have much to say about the features of the natural world. This is, in fact, almost inevitable in his system. He says, "Das Entscheidende für unsere Lebensanschauung ist nicht unsere Erkenntnis der Welt, sondern die Bestimmtheit des Wollens, das in unserem Willen zum Leben gegeben ist."² Accordingly, his new rationalism leaves the questions of the objective world undecided and gives its attention to the effort to secure clarity about the will-to-live in us.

Scientific activity as such is not disparaged or interfered with, but it is made to understand that its progress realizes only the result "dass wir die Erscheinungen, die die Welt ausmachen, und ihren Ablauf immer eingehender beschreiben können."³ It does not find meaning for life and the world, but its failure to do this, through its method and in abstraction from the subjective experience of ethical will, is not decisive for our world- and life-view. The empirical scientific knowledge of the world is philosophically fruitless. It describes phenomena with accuracy of detail, but does not penetrate into their nature. For it, the objective world, in so

far as its purposiveness and general import are concerned, remains an enigma.

It would be utterly inconsistent with this positivistic interpretation of science, and with his subjective method, for Schweitzer to deal with the data and principles of the special sciences in the development of his metaphysics. It is, accordingly, not to be expected that discussions of space, time, perception, matter, etc. would enter. Moreover, in view of Schweitzer's absorbing interest in ethics, and of his doctrine that our convictions of the value of life do not rest on objective observation of the world, he has no motive to concern himself greatly with a philosophy of nature. To devote much consideration to a philosophy of nature, furthermore, would involve great danger of obscuring his principle that our world view consists of ideas derived from the will-to-live, not from knowledge of the world, since it might be made to appear that our affirmative life- and world-view depended after all upon an idealistic interpretation of the world.

(2) World and Spirit Are Not Distinct Metaphysical Principles. It is possible for Schweitzer, by his philosophical method, as we have just seen, to leave the questions of the natural world largely out of account, and he probably acts wisely in doing so. There are, however, some dangers in this, which he does not escape. In denying that our optimistic and ethical attitude grows out of an idealistic interpretation of the world, Schweitzer gives occasion to be understood as denying the idealistic interpretation. He is then understood as having no metaphysics,

or as having a dualistic one - with a spiritual ethical principle, revealed in man's moral impulses, over against a dark enigmatic principle of nature.

Niebuhr, as we saw before, found it possible, because of these features of Schweitzer's thought, to attribute a naive dualism to him.¹ The interpretation was answered in a negative way at the time by showing the unwarranted steps in thought through which it was reached. More positively, it may be said that Schweitzer, however strongly he insists that the world on the one hand does not show ethical significance, and that the self on the other hand is directly known as ethical will, does not think of the world as a different metaphysical or moral principle from that of subjective spirit.

The denial of an ultimate metaphysical dualism in Schweitzer's philosophy might be contested. In the conclusion of a criticism of attempts of former rationalism to understand the objective world and ourselves as forming a harmony, he declares that "unser Denken bei einem Dualismus anlangt, mit dem es nie fertig werden kann."² Again, in a chapter which he entitles "Der Neue Weg," he challenges the inevitable connection between world-view and life-view, questions whether when world-view can no longer be kept afloat life-view must be dragged down with it, and proposes that we cut the tow rope and attempt to navigate our view of life independently.³ He refers also to his course as "Verzicht auf Weltanschauung im alten Sinne, das heisst auf einheitliche, in sich geschlossene Weltanschauung."⁴

If Schweitzer's professions of dualism are examined more

closely, however, and in their setting, it will be seen that the dualism from which no escape is possible is one of appearances or of types of apprehension, and that it does not, in his thought, belong to ultimate reality. Hitherto the attempt has been to make our knowledge of the human spirit and of the natural world show the same face. Schweitzer disapproves of that attempt, because it either softens the ethical lines in the human spirit or does injury to our intellectual sincerity in the description of the world. He admits a duality of appearances (appearances which will not harmonize with one another), but where he urges that each must be allowed its independent right, it is "daraufhin zu einer aufrichtigen Auseinandersetzung zwischen beiden kommen zu lassen."¹ Further, he criticizes the world-view of dualistic realisms as crude, because of its failure to secure a connection between ethics and a philosophy of nature. Reality, it is true, shows itself differently in me and in the phenomena of the objective world, he says, but "Um sich als denknotwendige Orientierung des Willens zum Leben zu begreifen und sich zur ethischen Weltanschauung auszudenken, muss sich Ethik mit Naturphilosophie auseinandersetzen."²

Since the subjective and objective phenomena will not harmonize one must choose which of them one considers to be the valid representation of reality. In this situation despair of intellectual knowledge proves to be not a thing which leads to scepticism, but "die Wahrhaftigkeitsleistung, die wir wagen müssen, um von da aus zu der wertvollen Weltanschauung, die

uns vorschwebt zu gelangen."¹ The life view cannot be established on such a closed system of inner and outer experience as was aspired to, but must be founded on itself. It becomes, then, further, the duty of life-view to give a world-view; it must "aus in der Welt abgelesenen Erkenntnissen bilden." We must accept the understanding of reality which is given in our inner experience of our own life as our clearest and most certain knowledge of it. We cannot observe phenomena and find their meaning, but through our experience of reality in ourselves we can comprehend their nature. It is in the light of our self-experience alone that they acquire meaning. Thus, as Schweitzer says,

Das Entscheidende für unsere Lebensanschauung ist nicht unsere Erkenntnis der Welt, sondern die Bestimmtheit des Wollens, das in unserem Willen zum Leben gegeben ist. In der Natur tritt uns der unendliche Geist als rätselhaft schöpferische Kraft entgegen. In unserem Willen zum Leben erlebt er sich in uns als welt- und lebenbejahendes und als ethisches Wollen.²

(3) The World is Enigmatic in its Features, but Known in its Ultimate Character. Schweitzer does not profess to enable us to understand the world completely. After all our philosophy, it remains enigmatic in its manifold features. On the other hand, its ultimate metaphysical nature is known. In fact, we do not merely know what the nature of reality is, but we experience its character in our inner life. That the metaphysical nature of reality is material is already excluded from the circle of Schweitzer's thought by his discussion of questions of civilization and ethics. He recognizes no materialistic determination of events, but thinks always in terms

of ideas which determine reality. It is his view that no material factors produce spiritual value, but that spiritual elements, on the contrary, influence the moulding of reality, and produce facts in support of themselves. It is in the field of social affairs that Schweitzer discusses this relation of spiritual and actual, and not, for several readily understandable reasons, in that of abstract metaphysics, but there is no boundary at which he could consistently limit his view that "der Materialismus unserer Zeit kehrt das Verhältnis zwischen dem Geistigen und dem Wirklichen um."¹ It thinks, he says, that spiritual value can result from the working of facts, but "In Wahrheit funktioniert das Verhältnis nur in dem umgekehrten Sinne."²

The spiritual is always, however, in Schweitzer's thought, in intimate relation with personal life. He speaks of ideas and ideals as governing ages and determining the course of history. These are not, however, Platonic ideas, but are always those of some person. In the first place, "es die Persönlichkeiten sind, von denen die Zeit ihre Ideen empfangen hat,"³ and in the second, they become effective only in so far as they are adopted, and work vitally in persons.

In Schweitzer's view, it is, as we have seen, through self-experience that the nature of reality becomes known. The consciousness which is primarily experience, however, is not conceived, in Descartes' intellectualistic fashion, as cognitive, or in such terms as "I think." The basic reality, as I experience it in myself, is not primarily apprehensive, but

active (as Leibniz represented), and more specifically designated is will (as Schopenhauer said). It is will-to-live.

"Ich ja Wille zum Leben bin,"¹ Schweitzer says; and in the experience of reality as it exists in me, I experience the nature of the world, which is also will-to-live. Through my own will-to-live as it becomes reflective I know and respect all phenomena as manifestations of will-to-live. The world-view of reverence for life regards the world as "die viel-gestaltigen Erscheinungen des Willens zum Leben."²

This view is not an intellectual one, arising from observation of the world, but is derived from the ethical will itself. It is an ethical mysticism, Schweitzer says, but at the same time, as we noted him saying before, it is the non-rational and subjective attitude at which rational reflection arrives by a logical necessity when it is carried through to the end.

3. Voluntaristic Spiritualism.

(1) Will-to-Live as World-Ground. Schweitzer's view of ultimate reality is one which definitely takes self-experience as its principle for the interpretation of reality, and is thus spiritualistic. Moreover, its conception of the spirit is one which places stress upon its purposive and active, rather than purely contemplative features, and which finds will the most descriptive term for its essential nature. Thus its metaphysics is to be classed as voluntaristic spiritualism.

The reality of every phenomenon is for Schweitzer that it is will-to-live, or creative impulse toward realization of life and fulfillment of its inherent possibilities. Will-to-

live is not considered to be merely the form of reality in me and other persons, but also is read out into the world. It thus furnishes, Schweitzer says, a "Naturphilosophie, die die Welt so lässt, wie sie ist,"¹ but which enters into sympathetic understanding of its inner character. Will-to-live is much more than individual impulse; it is World-Ground. Schweitzer says, "in Welt- und Lebensbejahung und in Ethik erfülle ich den Willen des universellen Willens zum Leben, der sich in mir offenbart"² and "der im Universum in die Erscheinung tritt."³ "Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben," he says again, "ist Ergriffensein von dem unendlichen, unergründlichen, vorwärts treibenden Willen, in dem alles Sein gegründet ist;"⁴ and "Durch sie (Welt- und Lebensbejahung) geht meine Existence auf die Ziele des geheimnisvollen, universellen Willens zum Leben ein."⁵ Thus, I am one center of will-to-live among manifold other centers of will-to-live which are due to an eternal, unoriginated, dynamic Will-to-Live.

(2) The Character of the Will-to-Live Is Ethical Purposiveness. For Schweitzer's conception of the metaphysical principle the term will-to-live is not a satisfactory designation. It is borrowed from Schopenhauer, and is unescapably colored by his usage, whereas only in its fundamental voluntarism and in the verbal identity does Schweitzer's conception have anything in common with Schopenhauer's." Particularly in English translation, where Wille zum Leben is rendered as will-to-live, is the term by which the fundamental reality is described unfitting. The translation gave a correct representation of Wille zum Leben in

Schopenhauer's conception of it, which was that of the imperious and ruthless will for survival and gratification. Not the term, but only the delineation, however, enables us to realize what the nature of this principle is in Schweitzer's thought. Except in its crude unreflective stage, it is scarcely at all what is usually meant by "will-to-live," and it is only Wille-zum-Leben in the sense of "will-toward-life" or "will-for-the-furtherance-of-life." It might even be better described as the impulse to care for life. In Schweitzer's conception of will-to-live, there is inherent in it the necessity of self-denial and of complete self-sacrifice out of regard for the sacredness of life as such. In this, the principle is essentially the antithesis of that of Schopenhauer, which found its material expression in claw and fang. It is, in fact, not different from what we mean by ethical will, and the heart of Schweitzer's philosophy is the doctrine that the clearest and most philosophically fruitful experience of reality is in its manifestation in subjective experience as ethical will. It is on this, not on any nature philosophy or any compromise of ethical experience with one, he insists, that our philosophical attitude is to be founded.

Schweitzer's conception of the most primary consciousness, and of the most fundamental reality, is then that it is will directed to the maintenance of life and realization of its fullest perfection. He says, of the will-to-live,

Er trägt den Drang in sich, sich in höchstmöglicher Vollkommenheit zu verwirklichen....In allem, was ist, ist durch Ideale bestimmte, vorstellende Kraft am

Werke. In uns freibeweglichen, eines Überlegten, zweckmässigen Wirkens fähigen Wesen ist der Drang nach Vollendung in der Art gegeben, dass wir uns selber und alles von uns beeinflussbare Sein auf den höchsten materiellen und geistigen Wert bringen wollen.

Wie dieses Streben in uns entstanden ist und wie es sich in uns entwickelt hat, wissen wir nicht. Aber es ist mit unserm Dasein gegeben.¹

Thus the fundamental character of life in me is said to be experienced as life-affirmative and ethical will. The aspirations and ideals which life manifests are not borrowed, but are the autonomous expression of its own character. Its regard for life, and its self-sacrifice are essentially irrational but are manifestations of its inner nature and consistency.

(3) The World-Ground as God. In his view of the World-Ground Schweitzer draws his conception from the subjective experience of reality in the form of ethical will. To characterize it he uses the term *Wille zum Leben* in common with Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer, however, formed his conception of the character of will primarily from the lower types of life, and from the standpoint of ethical judgment condemned it, taking a position of life- and world-negation. Schweitzer's concept, on the other hand, not only in its view that reality is will, but also in its interpretation of will, is taken from inner experience. In this fact Schweitzer carries his fundamental metaphysical concept to a point of more definite characterization than philosophy has before done by such a method. He accepts the view of reality which has been the current one since Leibniz, conceiving of it as that which acts, and follows

Schopenhauer in further defining it as not mere energy but will. Reality, then, through the experience of it which I have in myself, is known not only as that which acts, but as will, or that which acts purposively. Schweitzer says, further, that it is not merely experienced as an existence which is will, but as ethical will. Existence is not will which is undetermined, but which is innately life-affirming and ethical, and when consistent with itself is nothing less than will to raise all existence affected by its influence to the highest material and spiritual degree of value. Metaphysical reality is known not as mere power, but as a "durch Ideale bestimmte Kraft."¹ The universal will-to-live of which Schweitzer speaks is, thus, not Schopenhauer's craving, aggressive, unprincipled Power, though it bears the same name, but an aspiring, creative, and self-negating Will.

In its thought of the World-Ground Schweitzer's system is idealistic and religious. Werner says,

Man sieht, es handelt sich wie in der liberalen Dogmatik um eine idealistische Deutung des Weltgrundes, nur dass Schweitzer nicht dabei stehen bleibt, Gott als den „absoluten reinen Geist“ zu erfassen, sondern dieses rein geistige Wesen Gottes als des Weltgrundes sofort näher bestimmt als Willen, und zwar als Willen zum Leben. In der Formel stammt dieser Begriff von Schopenhauer, in der Sache handelt es sich um das, was die christliche Glaubenslehre von jeher mit der Vorstellung vom Schöpfer sagen wollte.²

The most primary reality is an eternal Will which is creator and creative, and through co-operation with which our life takes on meaning. Through world-affirmation, Schweitzer says,

geht meine Existenz auf die Ziele des geheimnisvollen, universellen Willens zum Leben ein....Mit Bewusstsein und Wollen gebe ich mich dem Sein hin....Damit setze

ich meinem Dasein einen Sinn von innen heraus.

Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben ist Ergriffensein von dem unendlichen, unergründlichen, vorwärts treibenden Willen, in dem alles Sein gegründet ist.¹

4. Pantheistic Personalism.

(1) Metaphysical Monism. In another place Schweitzer expresses the same religious outlook, in even more distinctly theological terms, but in a way that opens again, in a new connection, the questions of dualism. He says that,

in Welt- und Lebensbejahung und in Ethik erfülle ich den Willen des universellen Willens zum Leben, der sich in mir offenbart. Ich lebe mein Leben in Gott, in der geheimnisvollen ethischen Gottespersönlichkeit, die ich so in der Welt nicht erkenne, sondern nur als geheimnisvollen Willen in mir erlebe.²

Our active optimism and ethics are derived from the innate impulse of our natures alone, and not in any measure from the objective world. That the principle of objective occurrence is not seen as identical with that of ethical will then creates a difficulty for our spirit. "Alle Probleme," Schweitzer says, "gehen....auf eines zurück: dass ich Gott in mir anders erlebe, als ich ihn in der Welt erkenne."³

Schweitzer's solution of this problem is that,

Unsere Erkenntnis Gottes aus der Natur ist immer unvollkommen und inadäquat...In mir aber erkenne ich die Dinge von innen. In mir offenbart sich die schöpferische Kraft, die alles, was ist, hervorbringt und erhält, in einer Art, wie ich sie sonst nicht erkenne, als ethischer Wille....Dieses erlebte Geheimnis ist für mein Denken, Wollen und Verstehen entscheidend.⁴

This may, to be sure, be taken as a statement about the ethical character of the God of religion only, with no bearing on the character of the world, but that is not Schweitzer's meaning. An ultimate dualism of metaphysical principles is a conception

which he does not seriously entertain. He speaks of that which "in mir offenbart sich....als ethischer Wille" as also "die schöpferische Kraft, die alles, was ist, hervorbringt."

The question is only that of two ways of knowing: one, that of external observation, which is always inadequate and incomplete, the other, that of subjective and inner experience, which is accepted as valid and decisive. Schweitzer does not even suggest that the reason why our knowledge of God from the world of nature is incomplete and inadequate is that any matter or nature is intractable to Him. The full implication of his thought is that it is wholly the expression of God. He does not presume to judge that the world is an imperfect expression of God, only that it is enigmatic to us. It is our knowledge which is limited and imperfect, in as far as it does not secure from nature an apprehension of the true character of the power behind it, which comes to us only in our inner experience of it as it expresses itself in us. Schweitzer is satisfied in the assurance of comprehending the nature of Being in his inner experience of it, and willing to accept that this is the character of it even where intellect does not understand how it is. He says,

In der Welt tritt er (Gott) mir als rätselhafte, wunderbare Schöpferkraft entgegen; in mir offenbart er sich als ethischer Wille. In der Welt ist er unpersönliche Kraft, in mir offenbart er sich als Persönlichkeit. Der Gott, der in dem Denken über die Welt erkannt wird, und der, den ich als ethischen Willen erlebe, lassen sich nicht zusammenbringen. Beide sind eins; aber wie sie es sind, verstehe ich nicht.¹

(2) Immanence of the World-Ground. Another question, however, has been obtruding itself in the previous discussion.

It is that of Schweitzer's conception of the relation of God, or the World-Ground, to the natural world and to persons. The question of his position on the relation of God to the natural world has been partly settled in the preceding discussion. Schweitzer nowhere seems to think of God as the mere fashioner of a distinct and independent principle, or as giving independent existence to a physical world through a creative act. God is, at least, the constantly creative and sustaining Power of all that is. The relation to natural world and to persons cannot, however, be made two separate problems. We must keep in mind the fact that Schweitzer does not recognize any non-spiritual being. He does not consider the distinction between man and the animal world, or between the organic and inorganic realms, as one of metaphysical nature, but interprets all existence as spiritual. All being is will-to-live. The question, then, is whether each individual is conceived of as an independently existing will or only as a manifestation of one universal will.

Schweitzer's doctrine of the relation of God and the manifold phenomena of will-to-live is one of the points of his philosophy which is most difficult of definite interpretation. He does not deal with it as a distinct problem, and his statements concerning it, and concerning the involved concepts of God and individual, are hard to form into a definite view.

Toward any conception of a metaphysically transcendent God Schweitzer is clearly unfriendly. When he says that a universal will-to-live expresses itself in all reality, he wishes to be

understood that it is not something distinct from the individual realities in which it is found. "Es gibt keinen Inbegriff des Seins," he declares, "nur unendliches Sein in unendlichen Erscheinungen."¹ This might, of course, suggest that a continual multiplicity of individuals is the only reality. This in one sense is what is meant, but not in a way which denies the universal unoriginated Will. What it does mean is that the eternal Will has its being immanently in the manifold phenomena of will-to-live which constitute the universe. It is only on such an interpretation that reconciliation with a multiplicity of other expressions can be secured - e. g. that "In der Natur tritt uns der unendliche Geist als rätselhaft schöpferische Kraft entgegen. In unserem Willen zum Leben erlebt er sich in uns als welt- und lebenbejahendes und als ethisches Wollen;"² that "in Welt- und Lebensbejahung und in Ethik erfülle ich den Willen des universellen Willens zum Leben, der sich in mir offenbart;"³ and that "Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben ist Ergriffensein von dem unendlichen, unergründlichen, vorwärts treibenden Willen, in dem alles Sein gegründet ist."⁴

The combination of Schweitzer's doctrine of the non-transcendence of God and of his spiritualistic interpretation of objective nature, makes the separateness of God and finite wills impossible. It is directly in the individual manifestations of will-to-live that the universal Will exists. Finite wills are parts of the universal willing. Thus Schweitzer speaks of human persons as sparks of the will-to-live, and

of the universal will-to-live as that of which the self is¹
one among many phenomenal expressions.

(3) The Individuality of Particular Wills. The general nature of Schweitzer's conception is manifestly pantheistic. But on the other hand, he holds to the real individuality of finite wills. If there is an absolute being, it is not simple but concrete, it is not behind the phenomena but the whole of them. Schweitzer, in fact, would avoid the concept of the Absolute altogether as tending to abstraction from reality. "Der Inbegriff des Seins, das Absolute, der Weltgeist, und alle derartigen Ausdrücke," he asserts, "bezeichnen nichts Wirkliches, sondern etwas in Abstraktionen Erdachtes, das deswegen auch absolut unvorstellbar ist. Wirklich ist nur das² in Erscheinungen erscheinende Sein." He insists that the mysticism which affiliates with respect for life must deal in realities, throw away the abstractions which it usually employs, and become as indifferent to the absolute as is a converted³ negro to his fetish.

There is, then, no will-to-live apart from the will-to-live which works in the manifold phenomena of the world. The demand that philosophy remain elemental, which appears prominently in Schweitzer's thought, means that it is to keep clear the truth that relation to the universal Will-to-live must be through relation to will-to-live in its particular individual forms about one. Self-surrender to the Absolute, he considers to be not a real objective fact, but a purely intellectual act performed with abstractions and symbols, and a dead form of spirit-

uality. The only mysticism of which his system allows is an "ethical mysticism" or "mysticism of reality," which consists of practical devotion of the self to particular forms of the will-to-live. That is, in his view, spirituality and ethics are "ein und dasselbe."¹ No phenomenon of the will-to-live can enter, he thinks, into relation with the totality, or spiritual essence, of existence. It can relate itself to the will-to-live only in some one of its forms, and become one with the universal will-to-live in identifying itself with other will-to-live and ridding the universal will of the contradictions in its members.

There is not one Being, but many beings. They are not primary realities, but parts or forms of the universal Will-to-Live, and not eternal. Still they have individuality; and they both possess value in themselves as inherent parts of the eternal Will-to-Live and meaning through their unity with it. Each will, though it is embraced in the universal Will and expresses it, possesses that which is the fundamental nature of will as a whole. That is, each part is truly will, and is therefore self-active, purposive, ethical agency.

The origin of the particular individual centers of will is due to the operation of the eternal, unoriginated Will - which is Will-toward-Life. The Will, in creating, acts, in a manner of speaking, out of a necessity of its nature - which means, as becomes free purposive creativity. This is the nature of will, and is true also of the individual forms of will. They are free ethical agency, and when they work for the pres-

ervation and enhancement of life, although they act in accordance with their essential nature this is not causal determination. No ethical action is governed by objective canons or performed in expectation of fulfilling any purposes, but expresses an inner constraint of the spirit. Moral conduct is undetermined and autonomous. In obedience to the principle of life-affirmation one acts out the innate impulse in one, as the chemical does in its crystalization, the flower in its blooming and the animal in its instinct. Only in man the impulse is not blind, but can reflectively apprehend and think out the ideas inherent in it, and arrive at general world-affirmation. Individual will is in this way free and yet in accord with, or attuned to, the aims and purposes of the universal Will-to-Live. This Will lives in a multiplicity of differentiations which are not bound by any law of necessity, but by spiritual relations. In respect for life in its individual relations the individual will-to-live enters into spiritual unity with all will-to-live.

PART THREE

CRITICISM

CHAPTER TWELVE

INFLUENCES

1. Biographical Factors.¹

Character, philosophical theory, and practice in Schweitzer flow into each other in a remarkable way. In the philosophy and practice of the principle of respect for life there are, in the first place, features to which traits exhibited in childhood, and experiences of early youth, make significant contribution or commentary.

A strong and immediate feeling of sympathy for the experiences, the joys and the sufferings of all life is central in Schweitzer's philosophy. It has its cultural supports, but its first source is in personal disposition. Some measure of this apparently comes from Schweitzer's esthetic sensibility and its feeling for the unmarred fullness of things and for the contribution which each makes to the artistic whole. In part the respect for crystal, flower, and insect is born from the ability to see, and to thrill at, the perfection of line and of proportion in them, to find them valuable, and to be moved by their fate. In even greater measure, however, it has its source in the closely allied, but not primarily esthetic feeling of sympathy. In the story of his childhood he professes a sense of sadness at the amount of misery in the world which goes back as far as his memory. The cries of pain of a dog which he had struck with a whip, he says "klang mir noch lange nach. Durch Wochen hindurch konnte ich sie nicht los werden."² The pleasure and pride of trotting a neighbor's

horse, which was old and asthmatic, was wiped out when, in unharnessing it, he observed its working flanks and its tired eyes. When at about the age of seven or eight he went, under the leadership of another boy, to shoot birds with home-made slingshots, the sound of the church-bell came to him, he says, as a voice from heaven commanding "Thou shalt not kill," so that he scared the birds away from his friend's sling and fled home. Fishing, although he tried it, was impossible for him because of the treatment of the worms and the tearing of the mouths of the fish. Childish, one may say, and a squeamishness at the sight of wounds! but it is a practical surgeon who gives the narrative, and who concludes,

Aus solchen mir das Herz bewegenden und mich oft beschämenden Erlebnissen entstand in mir langsam die unerschütterliche Überzeugung, dass wir Tod und Leid über ein anderes Wesen nur bringen dürfen, wenn eine unentrinnbare Notwendigkeit dafür vorliegt, und dass wir alle das Grausige empfinden müssen, das darin liegt, dass wir aus Gedankenlosigkeit leiden machen und töten. Immer stärker hat mich diese Überzeugung beherrscht. Immer mehr wurde mir gewiss, dass wir im Grunde alle so denken und es nur nicht zu bekennen und zu bestätigen wagen, weil wir fürchten, vor den andern als „sentimental“ belächelt zu werden, und auch weil wir uns abstumpfen lassen. Ich aber gelobte mir, mich niemals abstumpfen zu lassen und den Vorwurf der Sentimentalität niemals zu fürchten.¹

The conscious setting of himself against the influence of being laughed at for sentimentality to which Schweitzer refers in the last sentence, is an important biographical factor. He is intense in his feelings and enthusiasms, but at the same time reserved. Restraint of the earnestness with which he has tended to throw himself into all interests by the claims of conventional manners, and a shyness about showing his inner

life have often made him appear actually indifferent. It was only in a measure accidentally, and under a special stimulus, that Schweitzer allowed his feeling for music to break through the "wooden playing" which he had presented to his teacher. In his confirmation he was the occasion of deep trouble to the pastor because of apparent indifference, although he says, "In Wirklichkeit....war ich in jenen Wochen von der Heiligkeit der Zeit so bewegt, dass ich mich fast krank fühlte."¹ This reserve in the manifestation of his real feelings led Schweitzer in some cases, such as the bird-hunting and fishing, to try at first to conceal his natural reaction. The latter, however, was in such cases stronger, and later he came consciously to recognize and to combat the shyness as a cause of unfaithfulness to his true nature and convictions. The apparent callousness and indifference to suffering common to men, Schweitzer thinks, is originally due to shame-facedness about their innate impulse, fear of being considered sentimental, and habitual hardening of natural feeling. This experience and belief form, then, the background of his insistence that the subjective disposition is not to be modified by the experiences of life, or to be subjected either to external canons or to the consideration of what is rational.

The universality and democracy of Schweitzer's principle of respect for life is one of its conspicuous characteristics. He will not so much as enter the path of rational classification of life as more or less valuable. Reverence for life, he says, does not ask how far any life deserves saving, but treats all life as sacred. It does not permit one to appropriate one's

happiness or advantage as a matter of course, or one's rights as those of the more capable. In this Schweitzer carries out in wider range a protest against class distinctions which he had uncompromisingly registered in his boyhood. That, as the pastor's son, he was viewed as better off than the village boys, and had advantages beyond theirs, distressed him. Regardless of embarrassment to his parents, he would wear no gloves except a fingerless kind, and on week-days no other shoes than wooden clogs. An overcoat he refused altogether, since that was a garment which the other boys did not have. This was in part, of course, the aversion which any boy has to being different from his associates, but in Schweitzer's case it had the distinct and strong factor of reaction against being considered a member of the gentry and as "having it better" than others.

An ethical spirit cannot be considered a simple element in character. It is rather the sum of sensitive sympathy, fellow-feeling, and ideals. Taking it in this composite character, however, it may be said that the prominence and strength of moral disposition is the greatest personal factor in the determination of Schweitzer's philosophy. It requires a man in whom the moral impulse is the most evident and significant experience of life to thus build a philosophy wholly from it. To this extent Schweitzer's philosophy is a relative one, the expression of his own personality. The artist, or the genius in any line, however, is only a person with somewhat heightened sensibility and insight. Without this riper development he would not be a leader, but there is necessarily a common experience which he

evokes and sharpens. Thus Schweitzer seeks to make men aware of, and to bring to clear consciousness in them, what he considers to be the common fundamental experience of all men.

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2. Cultural Factors.

(1) Music. The effect of music must not be overlooked among the influences which determined Schweitzer's viewpoint. The tendency and principles of his thought are severely rational, - referred by him to a rationalist grandfather. However, without allowing mere feeling or emotion to dictate belief, the artistic disposition, which also belonged to him by family inheritance, has militated against any intellectualism or one-sidedness of thought. Music has given him experience in expressing the organic wholeness of spirit, and has made it possible for him to estimate the integral function of its several elements of intellect and feeling. It has confirmed him, further, in the experience, which was originally ethical, that spiritual achievement flows from subjective impulse not from objective impression or canon. The quality of noble unity and grand simplicity amid Gothic elaborateness of detail which Schweitzer extols in the musical 'compositions of Bach has worked itself out through the details of his life and thought, which form a rich elaboration of a single theme. Mystical experience, in the usual understanding of the term, is foreign to Schweitzer's mentality. The operation of some such experience, however, when its function is not performed by a rational process as in Hegelianism, seems to be required for making the monistic and pantheistic features of the system intelligible.

The place seems, then, to be taken by the artistic spirit and its activity, and through it there is apparently developed in considerable measure the monistic disposition of mind which enters into Schweitzer's world-view.

(2) Religion. The influence of the Bible and of Christianity in the development of Schweitzer's thought would be difficult to over-estimate. We must here allow that world-view and theological theories exercised a reciprocal influence, but the life and work of Jesus and the history of the early church constitute without question the greatest cultural influence in Schweitzer's life.¹ One might almost say that Schweitzer's philosophy is his personal accomodation to the vital religious spirit of Christianity. The quality of ethical earnestness binds them inseparably together, and leads Schweitzer to regard the essential heart of Christianity as man's highest spiritual expression.

The conceptions of the world and of the course of history which belong to Christianity Schweitzer regards as wholly incidental and actually varied elements. It is in considerable degree through this opinion (together with his subjectively strong moral disposition) that Schweitzer develops his thought that our general life- and world-affirmation have some origin and foundation other than such theoretical views. The spiritual element from practically every feature of early Christian thought, however, is carried over into his system. He rejects the other-worldliness of Christianity as a theoretical outlook, but accepts it in the form of a fundamental judgment by the ethical spirit upon the principles of the natural world as

given to scientific knowledge, and regards it as a self-assertion of the innate ethical judgment. The esoteric character of Jesus' message, heralded by his phrase concerning those who have ears to hear, is duplicated in Schweitzer's philosophy by the doctrine of the non-rational intuitive nature of ethical optimism. The inner spirit, not external facts, furnishes the active anticipation of the realization of ideal ends, as in the case of the expectation of the coming of the Kingdom. Just as in Jesus' thought, according to Schweitzer, there was no organic connection between the achievement of the Kingdom, which was to be God's act, and the ethical acts of men, which were appropriate to its coming but not its efficient causes, so, he says, we are to be ethical, "nicht in der Erwartung damit irgend einen Zweck verwirklichen zu können, sondern aus innerer Notwendigkeit, um Kinder des Geistes Gottes zu sein und in dieser Welt schon in seinen Willen einzugehen."¹ Here we see that two features of Schweitzer's philosophy - the thought of ethical unity with God secured through obedience to the inner spirit, and the non-utilitarian ethics (which Schweitzer calls non-rational, or, irrational ethics) - have very direct relation to Christianity. To Christ, of course, the feature of vicarious sacrifice in Schweitzer's philosophy also is chiefly due. Particularly when Jesus' death is viewed, as Schweitzer views it, not as an appointed act in a legal atonement or as a consequence of opposition to established institutions, but as a voluntary and great-hearted attempt to save the mass of men from the terrors and sufferings of the

last days, does the relation become apparent. Irrespective of the relative and mistaken world-view in which he considers that it was manifested, it is for Schweitzer the absolute and faultless expression of the ethical spirit, - and of the Universal Will. Its spirit of regard for human woe and of uncalculating self-sacrifice for life are regarded as of absolute worth and of universal authority. The impact of the spirit of this sacrificial act upon the mind of Schweitzer, and his reflection upon its meanings and relations, are to be regarded as among the most effective forces in the development of his world-view.

(3) The *Zeitgeist*. Schweitzer is responsive to several currents in the thought of the time, even when he is not entirely friendly to the systems in which they are most sharply expressed. Thus, while he has a strongly philosophical disposition and interest, and is insistent also upon the practical necessity of a reflective theory of the universe, the positivistic temper of the time is reflected in him, though mainly in the form of his conception of natural science and in his anti-intellectualism. In the latter of these particularly, Schweitzer shares in the prevailing spirit of the time, despite his criticism of it for its prejudice against rationalism.

The voluntaristic conceptions of cognition and of the self which appear in Schweitzer's system belong to the philosophy and psychology of the last half century in a general way. Moreover, in his very marked reference of knowledge to will and in his whole conception of the role of philosophy as in

elementary relation to ethical action and civilization, Schweitzer strikes the note of the pragmatic philosophies. This does not mean, however, an adoption of the pragmatic epistemology and logic by Schweitzer. To them he is definitely hostile. They mean not thought, but dictation of belief by will, and they introduce something like a modern doctrine of the double standard of truth. They contain an inherent cynicism about truth, to which Schweitzer opposes an evangel of belief in truth and of confidence in thought. To its ethics his attitude is the same. Whether an action works or not, or has rationally desirable results, is not the criterion of rightness for Schweitzer, but only whether it is performed out of respect for life. The less rationally considered an action, the more ethical it is in Schweitzer's sense. Nevertheless the pragmatic spirit has an influence in Schweitzer's thought. Belief is active not theoretical, and it is perfected in action. Thus in religion Schweitzer insists that knowledge of Jesus is not given in historical acquaintance with his life but in action in accordance with his will, and in philosophy that insight into the nature of reality does not come by objective observation of it but by acting out its innate impulse. Action produces knowledge, and again knowledge is for action. Our interest in a world- and life-view is conceived as for the purpose that it may produce optimistic ethical action and civilization.

3. Pragmatic Factors.¹

The philosophical influences upon Schweitzer from the hist-

orical systems and thinkers have been both wide and varied. With his strong historical interest, his prodigious energy, and the breadth of his outlook, Schweitzer knows the forms and development of philosophical thought comprehensively and thoroughly. His interest, however, is not primarily that of the pure historian. He grasps the whole of the history of philosophy not as a collection of systems and thinkers, but as the search for a reflective view of the universe on which civilization may rise; and he asks what it has achieved, or contributed to this search. In this elemental thinking, which he insists is the business of philosophy, his relations to philosophers and systems are widely varied, often very significant but free. Schweitzer owes some insight to many different philosophers, without being a follower of any one of them. Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer, to mention a few of the most prominent thinkers who have influenced him, have all had profound effect upon Schweitzer's thought, but his philosophy is not Criticism, not Absolutism, nor pessimistic Voluntarism. No more is it an eclecticism. It is the highly individual spiritual response of Schweitzer to his experience of life and to the general accomplishments of historical philosophy.

Probably no single thinker, unless it be Schopenhauer, has had more effect as a whole on Schweitzer's thought than Kant. In the positive features of Schweitzer's world-view, however, the Kantian system is very little represented. The epistemological type of idealism which Kant developed, and its method of dealing with the objective world by depreciating its

reality, Schweitzer rejects. It is vainly, he believes, that ethical idealism still cherishes the hope that it has something to gain by this method. "Die Herabsetzung der Realität der Sinnenwelt," he declares, "bringt ihr nur scheinbaren Gewinn."¹ In reality neither ethics nor world- and life-affirmation can be derived from such an interpretation of the world, he thinks, but they must be founded on themselves. So, he mocks at the philosophy of the academic text-books, which, in the hope of attaining a meaning of the objective world, rages "gegen das unbefangene Denken, welches zu Weltanschauung gelangen will, ohne von Kant mit Feuer und dem heiligen Geiste getauft zu sein."² That the ideas of pure reason, when established in accordance with the original plan of Critical Idealism, are ethically indifferent, and that thus there is no real relation of epistemological idealism to moral experience, is a conclusion which Schweitzer regards as established by his study in the Religionsphilosophie Kant's.

Epistemological idealism fails then, as Schweitzer sees it, to arrive at any meaning of the objective world by the consistent use of its method. Moreover, its depreciation of the reality of the objective world is, he thinks, an "unberechtigte Vergewaltigung der Weltwirklichkeit."³ It is against the phenomenalism of Kant, as much as against abstract Absolutism, that Schweitzer directs his declarations that the only existence is in the phenomena; and the form of his pantheism is largely determined as reaction against a thing-in-itself. Reality must be the universal existence in a multiplicity

of forms which are real members of it, and have no being outside its phenomena. For the philosophy of ethics it is enough, he thinks, to know that the whole world of sense is a phenomenon of forces, or is composed of enigmatically manifold will-to-live. In that it is spiritualistic. It is also materialistic, however, in the sense of rejecting critical idealism, for it regards individual existents as in a common relationship with reality. That is, they are not passing, ineffectual pictures or shadows of reality, but real and acting existents.¹ This is true not merely of man, but of each individual existent, whose nature is that it is will.

Kant's idea of the practical reason and doctrine of its primacy might be said to be taken over by Schweitzer. Thus Grützmacher, as we noticed,² considered the philosophy of civilization to be essentially a development of this idea from Kant's moral philosophy. This feature of Kant's philosophy is regarded by Schweitzer, however, as a bit of simple practical naïveté combined with keenly critical and subtle epistemology. Diplomatically, but none the less actually, will demands of intellect that it furnish the interpretation of the world desired. This is an escape from the necessity of thinking out a world-view which is intolerable to Schweitzer's rationalistic principles and intellectual sincerity. In his own view, will and intellect must cooperate in thought, but the relation between them which Kant suggests is a false one. Reason means will thinking out its own meaning and reflectively deriving the ideas inherent in it by rigidly logical thought. In

this, nevertheless, Schweitzer owes more to Kant than he seems to realize. While the idea which appears in Schweitzer is not taken directly from Kant, the development of it in Schweitzer's mind has evidently come in large measure through his working out in the Religionsphilosophie Kant's the conclusions that the identity of the ideas of reason in pure and practical employment is only apparent, and that the moral postulates are not secured in any other way than from the moral will. More positively than at any other point, Schweitzer is influenced by Kant in this theory of the innate and autonomous moral law.

The "disappearance of reality"¹ is a feature which Schweitzer criticizes in all the idealism of Kant and his followers. In defense of the reality in the phenomena he tilts several times against the Hegelian Absolute. In this and in his conception of the relation of the Absolute Will and individual existents, he is, of course, indebted to Hegel himself, through the latter's insistence upon the concreteness of the Universal. Schweitzer credits this where he says, "Dass er der geistige Vater unseres Wirklichkeitssinnes ist, lässt sich nicht bestreiten. Er ist der erste Denker, der dem Bestehenden gerecht zu werden suchte."² Schweitzer parts ways immediately with Absolute Idealism, however, where it identifies thought and reality. The Absolute as pure being exists for Schweitzer only as an abstraction of thought, not as a stage in reality at all. So much does Schweitzer put the actual reality of the individual existent into the foreground, that while he also retains the embracing Whole, his system is in its general bearing quite

antithetical to Hegelianism as it is generally current. Such Hegelianism, in Schweitzer's judgment, does violence to reality and is a magnificent creation of imagination; ¹ its Absolute is a figment of the intellect which does not exist.

Schweitzer's thought of the Universal Reality, however close it may come to the Hegelian conception of the Absolute when the concreteness of the latter is insisted upon, differs again sharply in its anti-intellectualism. Reality is not Idea, but Will. It is not Thought, but Creative Energy. In reversal of the Hegelian doctrine, Schweitzer's theory is that what is real is something irrational - namely, ethical will.

The speculative method of Hegelianism furnishes a foil for that of Schweitzer. While he is at one with Hegel in his reaction from romanticism toward thought as the method of philosophy, Schweitzer does not consider that thought can begin with ideas, but insists that it leads ultimately and inevitably to the non-rational. The logical method of Hegel seems to find meaning in the world, but it assumes that the world is a thought-process and rational, and that it can develop a logical discussion of pure being into a view of the universe. Schweitzer insists that thought begins with our knowledge of the world as a manifold of will-to-live. This does not permit, then, of any apriori interpretation of the world about us according to a unitary purposiveness.

The dialectic movement of reality is also rejected. There is no power by which well-thought-out progress inevitably issues from the conflict of wills. No necessity exists by

which the individual will passes into wider and wider syntheses until it merges into the unity of the Absolute. Will-to-live is in conflict with itself in individual wills. In respect for life the individuals do bring themselves into harmony with all will-to-live, but this demands reflection and development in thought of the ideas implicit in the will-to-live. This is not, then, made inevitable by any logical necessity, but is a free moral achievement. It is not to the operation of facts upon each other, but to the spirit, as Hegel knew much better than his followers, that progress is due.

The Hegelian conception of history plays a larger part in Schweitzer's thought than any other feature of the system. History is regarded not as a succession of facts, but as a spiritual process with a unity of inner principle. Without mechanical employment of the concepts of Hegelian thought, Schweitzer's historical interpretations show the dramatic form of thesis, antithesis and solution. History develops in successive oppositions - for example, in the course of the *Leben-Jesu-Forschung*, between the miraculous and natural Jesus, then between the liberal life and the eschatological. Progress, according to Schweitzer, is always achieved by the radicals, the ones who bring out the oppositions in their sharpest contrast and fullest development of consequences. There, however, Schweitzer and Hegel reverse their respective positions as champions of rationality. Hegel accepts that reason is in this irrational, for it defies the law of contradiction and accepts opposites. Schweitzer believes that truth excludes contradiction. Progress toward it depends upon the consistent

development of opposite positions until the falsity of one is demonstrated and one of the alternatives is chosen. As he says in the Von Reimarus zu Wrede, "Der Fortschritt besteht¹ jedesmal in der Einseitigkeit, im Nichtmehrvereinkönnen."

The direct influence of Leibniz on Schweitzer seems to have been less than that of either Kant or Hegel, but his views have a closer affinity with the former's monadology than with the system of either of the latter. To his thought there belong the Leibnizian conception of reality as that which acts, and the idea of the universally spiritual character of the natural world. Schweitzer's views of the individuality and freedom of particulars have also in some degree the background of the monadology, and the similarity to Leibniz' thought continues in Schweitzer's theory that the individuals derive their knowledge, and act (at least when they act freely) out of their own nature alone. Schweitzer's individuals are not, on the other hand, necessarily free and self-contained. Interaction occurs between individuals, and they affect one another. Knowledge of other individuals, so far as their real nature is concerned, is, as in Leibniz, due to community of nature, but other knowledge is empirical and of a descriptive kind; no pre-arranged harmony is posited. The eternal and unoriginated existent, further, is related to the individuals not merely as creating them but as embracing them.

With Schopenhauer, Schweitzer characterizes dynamic reality more definitely as will. The conception of will which he has, however, as has already been pointed out, is very different

from that of Schopenhauer. He interprets it from the standpoint of self-experience which is of a strongly ethical type, whereas Schopenhauer, according to Schweitzer's statement, carries through consistently the development of Critical Idealism to its eventual conclusion, without the moral earnestness which made Kant replace its ideas by postulates which had genuine moral content that was derived from the will. Even though Schopenhauer's conception of reality comes primarily from subjective experience, he finds the disposition of will through objective experience of the natural world. On this point Schweitzer sharply divides from him, as one of the main principles of his new rationalism.

Intuition is the heart of Schweitzer's insight into the nature of the world. In this he derives something from Bergson also. He refers to the incompleteness of empirical knowledge and to its inherent inability to know reality. He thinks of it in the Bergsonian way as always knowledge about the thing, or a view of it, which never apprehends what it is, or adds up to be what the thing is in itself. Bergson, Schweitzer says, "Uns über die Wissenschaft des äusserlichen Konstatierens und Berechnens hinausführend, zeigt...dass das wahre Wissen vom Sein durch eine Art Intuition zustandekommt," that "Philosophieren heisst unser Bewusstsein als eine Emanation des in der Welt waltenden schöpferischen Triebes erleben."¹ He regards Bergson's thought as incomplete, however, in that it remains primarily an epistemology; and he criticizes him that "er hat nicht...das Bedürfnis, eine Welt- und Lebensanschauung aus ihr hervorgehen zu lassen."² What Schweitzer misses is a recognition

of the definitely ethical character of our consciousness, of the elan vital in our experience as not merely creative power but ethical impulse. Moreover, Schweitzer does not propose that thought remain in an immediate unreflective experience of reality, but that it think out the meaning of its immediate intuition. He disparages intellect, as an adequate means of knowledge, but does not adopt Bergson's doctrine that it is merely an instrument of practical adjustment and gives us only a conventional and untrue picture of reality.¹ Moreover, multiplicity and distinction are for him included in the positive nature of reality.

There is much that is common in Schweitzer and Nietzsche; and Schweitzer regards the latter as belonging "in der ersten Reihe der Ethiker der Menschheit." The most fundamental and comprehensive agreement is in an elemental and life-affirming ethics. Schopenhauer had an ethics only in the rejection of life and world; but Schweitzer and Nietzsche, in common, regard the highest ethical law as obedience to the innate impulse of life to live itself out and to realize its implicit possibilities. Together they also attack hedonistic and utilitarian considerations, whether personal or universal. In Schweitzer, however, the perfection of the individual is considered less biologically and more spiritually than in Nietzsche, and the recognized virtues are supported. No things, in fact, could be more antithetical to each other than Nietzsche's Will-to-Power and Schweitzer's Will-to-Live. Schweitzer recognizes the struggle for existence as an expression of will-to-live, it is true, but one in which it is in contradiction with itself.

When the will-to-live is thought out, he holds, it involves belief in the value of life and reverence for it. Thus the service of life, and self-sacrifice out of respect for it, are the only logical consequences of the will-to-live.

With the philosophy of William Stern Schweitzer's philosophy has probably more in common than with any other system. This is true both in regard to ethics and metaphysics, though Schweitzer seems to recognize the fact only on the side of the ethics, and though the viewpoint is on both sides developed independently on the basis of other suggestions and experiences. That the fundamental principle of ethics is respect for life, in all of its forms without limit, is a suggestion which Schweitzer finds made by Stern in 1897.¹ His conception of the essence of morality as the impulse to maintain life by warding off all harmful interference with it, is adopted by Schweitzer, with more emphasis upon the positive perfection of life and its spiritual elements. Already in the ethical discussion the suggestions of mystical experience and pantheism enter in, and Schweitzer has probably been affected by them in the development of his thought. Stern had suggested that in the service of other life a feeling of community with all spiritual being arose. Schweitzer praises this as containing a deeper insight than Darwinism, which discovers only herd feeling and exalts conflict, and as providing solidarity with all being. Ethics which is thus universal, he says, can alone come into agreement with nature philosophy in a comprehensible way. The ethical spiritualism in which he has himself sought this agreement, is a pantheistic personalism of the same general class as that of Stern.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

CONTRIBUTIONS

1. Ethical and Social Values.

Among the merits of Schweitzer's philosophy there are to be noted first its practical and social values. One of the most distinctive features of Schweitzer's thought, as also of his character and personal history, is the central place of ethical experience. This has its distinctly theoretical aspects, but it means also that there is a close relation between his philosophy and the realization of personal and social values. It is the business of philosophy, in Schweitzer's view, to present a world-view which is not only able to meet the criticisms of pure thought but also to furnish and support a healthy popular philosophy. It must give the support of reflection to the ethical and spiritual elements of civilization.

(1) Moral Conception of Civilization. One of the most prominent of the particular ethical values in Schweitzer's work is his vigorous representation of the spiritual nature¹ and ethical conditions of civilization. There is no reactionary attitude to natural and material achievements, but their dependence upon spiritual factors, and the relative nature of their value in reference to ethical spirit, is made clear. In the clarity and conviction of his proclamation that progress lies in the spiritual development which is achieved in the mass of persons, and that the essence of the civilized spirit is moral, Schweitzer makes a contribution to the life of society, and one of which there is need in a period of rather

general economic absorption.

(2) Doctrine of Respect for Life. Probably nothing is more socially significant or more vitally necessary in thought, particularly in the face of the moral and spiritual tendencies of the last few decades, than Schweitzer's preaching of reverence for life as the fundamental and absolute law of morality. It must be remembered that this is not merely regard for the existence of life, but even in that meaning alone it is a needed and significant emphasis. Life itself has been made a secondary consideration to material advantages and general objectives to such a degree that consideration of persons, and mutual confidence in such consideration, on which the integrity of society rests, are very largely lost. What is most vital for all of human life is a restoration of direct regard for individuals, not simply in an impersonal and calculated way but in a sympathetic and human relationship. Only such a spirit, which is in Schweitzer's sense non-rational, or determined by ethical volition simply, can manifest enthusiasm for life, and arouse it in all classes generally for the performance of the necessary tasks of life. This spirit, moreover, as was said, is not limited to the preservation of physical life, but involves respect for the spiritual life of the individual and its richest fulfillment. As such it constitutes a disposition of respect for personality which is essential to social confidence, and of active social effort which is the condition of all types of achievement and culture.

(3) Defense of Individual Freedom. Another important way

in which the principle of respect for personality operates is in defense of the individuality and freedom of the person as it is threatened by the forces of social cohesion and standard-¹ization. It is a real service which Schweitzer performs in pointing to the individual as the source of ethical law and spiritual achievement, and in attacking the "pathological" susceptibility of the individual to the views of society and of its organs of expression. Schweitzer's attack upon the subjection of the individual reason and sensibility to communal disposition or interest, and particularly upon the erection of the latter to a principle of morality, is a justified one. An individualist theory, which is in the fullest sense social in its operations and interests, but which frees the individual from the narrow and opportunist social theory of the time, and gives him ground on which to stand over against the community in his personal moral judgment, is a contribution to a very real practical need.

(4) Attack on Ethical Relativism. In opposition to the moral scepticism and relativism of our time, Schweitzer asserts the possibility and fact of an absolute ethic.² It is his view that in the individual there is a reason which is valid and objective when it is properly employed. Like Socrates and like Kant, he faces anarchy in moral judgment with a theory of an innate and universal function of the human spirit.³ The law of morality is not external but self-imposed, but it is none the less common and universal; it is both social and cosmic in its meaning.

As is evident, Schweitzer's individualism and moral serious-

ness are related to a faith in the validity of the operations of reason and in its ability to realize objectively significant principles.¹ The energetic championship of this faith in reason is itself a value. Not alone for the confidence which may be secured for a body of knowledge or a set of principles, but for the establishment of the reflective frame of mind and method in all phases of life, a belief in thought, and trust in its use for the solution of problems, is to be desired.

(5) Rejection of a Non-Spiritual Faith in Progress.² It is, Schweitzer further asserts, through thought, as it gives itself to the solution of men's problems, as it fashions ideals, and as it provides spiritual content to the age, that civilization may alone be preserved. That is, not only is spiritual achievement the form of civilization, but it is the sole means to its attainment. He attempts to withdraw easy optimism, whether based on a faith in inevitable natural evolution or in a transcendent God, and to challenge men to the task of realizing civilization through spiritual efforts. There is a transcendent hope, it is true, not merely a humanitarian but a religious one, which is to be realized in the mysterious purpose of the universal Will-to-Live, but it is in the active will of individuals that the universal Will exists and strives toward its purpose. Only through the vigorous efforts of individuals can man master life and wrest from it a progressive realization of value. Moreover, in this effort it is the contribution of the moral spirit alone which counts. Through no external machinery, institutions or social arrangements are the ends possible of realization, but only through the inner regard

for life and enthusiasm for its purposes.

(6) Ethical Activism. The philosophical outlook of Schweitzer is one which is idealistic, but which nevertheless does not lift the responsibility for the realization of his purposes from man. The achievement of value is made to depend upon his spiritual earnestness and activity. There are, of course, certain comforts and assurances which are thereby sacrificed, but these are more than compensated for by the reality and significance which are given to the ethical situation and to moral effort. There is here an idealism which would satisfy Professor James in his demand for hazard and moral adventure. There is no whole of reality which is and always has been perfect, as in Absolutism, with its unreality of moral distinctions and futility of moral struggle, or even an omnipotent transcendent Being on whom one depends for the abiding power, and final fact, of victory by fiat, as in traditional theism. This does not mean, as James suggested, a finite God in company with whom one struggles against alien principles, but an infinite God who strives in one toward the realization of further value. It is a conception which sacrifices some of the traditional religious values, but which gives new meaning and new religious spirit to ethical activity.

(7) Emphasis Upon Obligation. Schweitzer makes the experience of ethical obligation, and loyalty to it, the foundation for personal life and for civilization. Faith in this experience of obligation is one element of Schweitzer's trust in reason in general. In contrast to the disregard of obligation

in current thought, the emphasis which is placed upon it by Schweitzer is regarded as an element of value in his thought.

It may well be that Schweitzer does not give the consideration of values, as the ends of action, the place which it is necessary for it to have in an adequate ethics. On the other hand, there is a merit in his opposition to the utilitarian consideration in ethics. There is in reality something wholly incompatible between the principle of ethics and of utility. The decisive factor in ethics cannot be the desire to realize some purpose, or the expectation of achieving some end, but the sense of inward necessity to be true to the ethical spirit.¹ An ethic which is directed to the realization of specific values is relative, and does not provide a categorical and absolute element such as is characteristic of the ethical ought.

(8) Liberation of Moral Obligation from Dependence upon Metaphysical Theory. It is a further merit in Schweitzer's ethical thought that he definitely and clearly liberates moral obligation from its too common dependence upon metaphysical theory. Moral experience is direct and obligatory, and it is not from the work of critical intellect that it arises. There is not as much practice of pessimism and resignation as there is profession of its principle, but outstanding piety in it is possible. Men renounce theism, belief in immortality and other such ideas, but continue for the most part, illogically, to act as believers do. Schweitzer does not regard it as unimportant what men think,² but he emphasizes, nevertheless, the fact of

the immediacy of moral experience and obligation, and their independence from knowledge of facts.

(9) Extension of the Field of Ethical Relations. The extension of the scope of ethical relations which Schweitzer¹ proposes, is a movement in the right direction for ethics. The ethical treatment of the lower forms of life is one feature of morality which does not arise from theoretical considerations, but which nevertheless enters into our sense of moral obligation. To find place for it in a wholly homo-centric ethics as an element of personal worth, if there are no values implicit in the objects, is only an artificial systematization. The extension of the relations of direct sympathy, and of ethical obligation of a primary sort, to all forms of life is a positive contribution to current ethical theory.

2. Critical Contributions.

In the philosophical material of Schweitzer's which we have considered, some contributions of a critical nature must be taken account of. In the study of Kant's philosophy of religion, Schweitzer made acute and significant criticisms. He brings to light the failure of Kant's projected plan for a philosophy of religion in connection with Critical Idealism, the alteration which it has undergone in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, and the ultimate failure of the plan in either form. He reveals with convincing clarity the practical indifference of the ideas of pure reason, and the lack of relation between them and the postulates of the moral will. That

being the case, so far as Critical Idealism is concerned, we are left in entire ignorance about the theoretical ideas. The ideas for which the system of Critical Idealism would make place are, in fact, not those in which there is practical interest. The practical questions are distinct from the theoretical, they have their source in moral will, take a different form and have a different solution. It is possible to conclude that the assumption, made by Kant and commonly accepted, that the ideas of pure reason have finally been given practical grounds for belief is incorrect. The postulates of the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft are established by moral will, but when brought into conjunction with the critical epistemology they lose their connection with morality. Since the sensible world is the appearance of the intelligible world, natural causation is made identical with free "moral" causation, and moral judgment is destroyed; the end of ethical development is placed in the beyond; and, since God appears only as guarantor of a conjunction of virtue and happiness in that beyond, He is in only apparent connection with moral activity in the sensible world. The moral and religious elements in Kant develop only in independence of the critical.

One of the common criticisms which is directed against the ethics of Kant has reference to its complete individualism. It is then an interesting feature of systematic criticism that Schweitzer refers this to the epistemological standpoint of Kant, and represents it as inevitable within the framework of Critical Idealism. Where, however, in the Religion inner-

halb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft the plan of Critical Idealism is set aside, and the ethical and religious ideas are treated as they develop from the moral will, the individual is brought by Kant into intimate and vital relation to society in his religious and ethical life.

All that Schweitzer finds of value in Kant comes from what is extraneous to Critical Idealism and is concerned with the innate moral will. Because of the lack of relation of epistemological idealism to moral experience, and what he regards as the unjustified violence to reality in its theory of the ideality of phenomena, Schweitzer rates the whole movement from Rationalism to the present time as an intermezzo of philosophical thought. This is, of course, a sweeping and unjudicial judgment to pass upon one of the periods of most acute and lively philosophical speculation in all history, but in the light of Schweitzer's criticism, which strips from Critical Idealism all the philosophically positive features associated with it, and attributes them to practical (or moral) reason, there is justification for the attitude, to the extent of the dominance of critical features in Kant's system and in the general constructive activity of philosophy since his time. There is not wanting, furthermore, a strong support in present philosophical thought for Schweitzer's claim that in Criticism philosophy was travelling a blind alley from which it must retrace its way.

The disparagement of Rationalism which has been popular in the last century and a half has been due in some measure to

the way in which German Idealism has been supposed to have transcended it, though its superficiality has also been apparent. It has, however, as Schweitzer insists, a right to respect for its faith in rational thought. In the failure to accord recognition to this feature of Rationalism, much succeeding philosophy has shown itself inferior; and in giving credit for the permanent value of its rational principle, Schweitzer makes a just correction in historical criticism.

3. Contributions to Philosophical Theory.

(1) Recognition of Moral Experience as Non-Rational and Immediate. Some of the factors which have been mentioned as practical values are to be considered also as contributions to the development of philosophical thought. This is true in the case of Schweitzer's doctrine of the independence of moral¹ disposition from metaphysical views. It is not that this is a unique suggestion, but morality is so customarily treated as the product of theories about life and the world, and left out of account among the data for a philosophical view, that the definiteness and emphasis with which Schweitzer insists upon the primary and immediate nature of moral experience means the introduction of a truth generally unrecognized in philosophical thought.

(2) Moral Experience Treated as Central in the Interpretation of Reality. With the principle of the primacy of moral experience and of its non-theoretical character there is combined, as a further distinctive feature in Schweitzer's system, the procedure of taking ethical phenomena as significant

and central for indicating the nature of reality. Together with his declaration that morality does not rest upon metaphysics, Schweitzer insists that metaphysics depends upon the experience of morality. His world-view is one that definitely has its outlook in ethics. This idea is, of course, not new with Schweitzer. Fichte had said that the kind of view of the world a man held depended upon the character of the man, and had thought that an apprehension of its free and moral spirituality depended upon the exercise of these qualities in the individual; but, after all, it was epistemology rather than ethics which was essential to his system, and the idealism was subordinate to the creativity of mind in its relation to the world. Kant derived his metaphysical beliefs from the ethical will, but this was a feature incidental to a theoretical system, and the beliefs had to do with transcendent realities not with the world of experience. The closest kinship in thought on this point is to Lotze. The latter had taken account of the non-theoretical factors in knowledge and conduct in his declaration that life is more than logic, and had furthermore said that metaphysics begins in ethics. However, he had not carried out the idea in any fundamental way in the actual construction of his metaphysics. Ethics remained in the place of a not unimportant, but nevertheless supplementary part of philosophical theory. In recent theological writings, such as Sorley's Moral Values and the Idea of God, the experiences of value and obligation begin to take a new place and to be recognized as having metaphysical significance, but this

is rather narrowly conceived, in relation to the one question of the existence of God. It is a novel and significant proposal in Schweitzer, to take the data of the science of ethics not merely for the construction of a philosophical theory of conduct, but, in a definite and thorough-going way, in place of the data of the physical sciences, as the material of experience for the construction of philosophical theory in general. It is recognized in the consideration of the weaknesses¹ of Schweitzer's system that this is too restricted a basis for the comprehensive interpretation of reality, unless the data of all other experience is really related to the ethical experience, but even so it is more justified than the many philosophical efforts from the viewpoints of chemistry, physics, biology or some other such field of experience, since it is not a case of taking merely one field of experience among others, but of putting in the forefront a body and type of experience which is regarded as primary, universal and systematically significant. To bring moral experience as definitely into the foreground as Schweitzer does, and to relate it in his manner to the determination of the world-view is an important philosophical contribution.

Idealists who have used the human spirit as a principle for the interpretation of reality, and this is largely true even of Lotze despite his pronouncement about the relation of ethics and metaphysics, have accorded more fundamental significance to the qualities of consciousness, unity and the like than to the moral nature. There is reason for this, in that these are

the qualities which are significant for meeting certain theoretical questions, and that they lend themselves to a more demonstrative method. It is taken for granted that in establishing the mind-likeness of nature the ethical nature is provided for. It is a merit of Schweitzer that he takes account, not merely of the intellectual, but also of the active and ethical quality which is inherent in spirituality and is more fundamental than critical thought, and that he insists upon this quality of personality having its part in the determination of our thought about reality.

(3) Recall of Philosophy to its Function as a Rational Theory of Life. The demand which Schweitzer makes upon philosophy, that it give itself more definitely to the development of a philosophy of life, is a much needed one at present. Not only is it well for philosophy to be reminded that its usefulness lies in giving currency in general thought to its results, but it must recognize the more-than-theoretical interests for which it must provide. It is its business to furnish, in a full, dynamic, rich form, a body of thought which gives coherence and nobility to life. Philosophy has been busy at its technical questions, which is proper enough, but in its preoccupation it has, as Schweitzer charges, neglected this necessary function. Though not alone in this expression, Schweitzer is to be credited for a share in recalling philosophy to its duty at this point.

(4) An Empirical Rather than A-Priori Idealism. That Schweitzer derives his philosophy from reflection upon the will-to-live gives to his idealism an empirical foundation. Even

though in his system the appearance of reality in objective experience is not taken as having philosophical significance, the conception of reality which it contains is not an a-priori construction from thought, as it is in Kantianism and in the general world-view of Hegelianism despite Hegel's recognition of reality and provision for it in his system.

(5) Adjustment to Natural Science. Through the above fact, there is possible a much more friendly relation of natural science with Schweitzer's idealism than with the forms mentioned. It claims no means of anticipating subjectively what forms the life impulse will take in nature, or in our experience. The features or phenomena in which Force or Life shows itself, it says, are mysterious and enigmatic to thought. There are no general principles by which we comprehend its practical working, but that must be known in experience. On account of this attitude, and of the derivation of the philosophy of life from will-to-live, no claims are made upon the descriptive sciences and no pressure is brought to bear upon them in their findings, but they are left free to describe phenomena as they are, to classify them and to anticipate on the basis of their classification.

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Schweitzer, as we have seen, rejects the epistemological type of idealism. His approach to idealism is, in its general form, that type which has been most prominent since the middle of the last century. Though the idealistic systems of that period have all owed a debt to Kant, in their philosophical method they have subordinated the epistemological consider-

ations, and have developed a spiritualistic interpretation of nature in the general fashion of Leibniz. Schweitzer even more definitely repudiates the idealistic treatment of the objective world. It is not possible here to go into the whole problem of perception, and Schweitzer does not elaborate his views on the subject. His position, however, is in general a realistic one. There are, of course, serious difficulties which realism must face in the facts of error, but Schweitzer has, on the other hand, the advantages of a type of idealism which does not depend upon "the ego-centric predicament" and which thus stands closer than epistemological idealism to the direct form of experience and to general thought.

(6) Method. Schweitzer's work may be considered to be a contribution on the side of right method in philosophical thought. There is no element of the method which is entirely new, but there is a distinctive and uncommon character to the whole, and to the adjustment within it of elements which stand dissevered in many traditional systems. Schweitzer gives due, and not inconsistent recognition both to the non-rational elements in life and to the necessity for thorough and unrelenting thought. In the inclusion and adjustment of these two factors he has the only valid, and only possible, method for knowledge. Allowance must be made for a material which is that of experience and non-rational, but our knowledge depends upon thinking out the meaning and relations of this experience.

In view of pragmatism alone, not to mention other systems, it can scarcely be asserted that Schweitzer's doctrine of the

necessity of a factor of active faith in the establishment of knowledge is unique. However, the presence of such a feature of moral venture is an essential element in valid philosophical method, and Schweitzer's combination of it with an intuitionist and non-utilitarian view is novel. In common with pragmatism he asserts that belief must be determined by an element of volition in absence of conclusive rational demonstration, and that knowledge comes only through such a venture of faith. In distinction from pragmatism, however, the certification of truth which comes in action is not in any cash value, but in the inner experience of the nature of the acting self.

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It is pointed out elsewhere that Schweitzer does not give rational ground for his belief that ethical will such as one experiences in oneself is the nature of all reality with which one comes in contact, and of the general reality of which one is a form. Apart from what has been said about factors which dispose Schweitzer to this outlook, the belief is the manifestation of just such an act of faith as has been spoken of. It arises out of reflective treatment of experience, and represents a view which is most meaningful, but the conclusion can never be rationally arrived at; there must be the act of will to accept, - the leap of faith. This belief in the nature of all reality as ethical will toward life, may then be further strengthened in action in which it is accepted, where reality is experienced as so acting, and unity with reality about one is realized.

(7) Doctrine of the Ethical Conditions of Knowledge. In

Schweitzer's system, as in no other, there is brought to the forefront the idea of the ethical conditions of knowledge. Socrates had said "Knowledge is virtue," but it is strange to hear that virtue is knowledge. We have heard that "Beauty is truth; truth, beauty; this is all ye know and all ye need to know," but it is new to hear that virtue is truth, truth is virtue, and that is all one knows or needs to know. "Ethisch werden," Schweitzer says, "heisst wahrhaft denkend werden."¹ That is, truth belongs to the ideas regarding reality which are implicit in the inherent disposition of respect for life and which may be derived from it by reflection. In this conception, that to be ethical is to think truly about life and the world, Schweitzer presents a more valid view of the relation of ethics and thought than is embodied in the Socratic doctrine that to think correctly is to act properly.

(8) The Cosmic Nature of Morality. Schweitzer relates ethics to metaphysical reality more fundamentally than has been done before. Oftentimes they have been brought into a kind of relation through views of natural right, or of morality as conformity to the Universal Mind in nature. Where this has been carried out rigorously, however, it has tended to lose its connection with a genuine ethical spirit and activity, as it did in Stoicism. In Spinoza the disposition became even more manifest, and the perfect (rational) activity is distinct from morality. This is the logical fate of morality in Absolutism also, though that system seeks to prevent its lack of relation to moral judgment from becoming evident or coming

into effect. Spinoza regarded the body of moral law as representing interests of the individual or of society which were relative and grew out of imaginative forms of thought. In this fashion the ethical factors of life have frequently been treated as accidental features in our world (mere expressions of the individual will or desire; devices in the interest of the ruling and wealthy class, or of the weak and poor; or rules of social interest against individual tendencies) out of relation, in any of these cases, to metaphysical fact, unexplainable by it, and without cosmic significance. Even in the traditional theistic thought, the ethical rules entered in a somewhat artificial way. They were more or less arbitrarily established by the will of the Creator and Ruler, even though they had then a metaphysical basis to this extent, that moral action meant accordance with the rules of the power which was World Ground. In Schweitzer's system, however, morality has a much more primary and immediate metaphysical relation. Our actual morality, in its fundamental and genuine principles, does not refer to utility, either individual or social, or to the results of action in human experience, but expresses the essential nature and tendency of Reality. Whereas in theism, furthermore, the realization of the end of the metaphysical process was the work of God, it is here thought of as the product of this very life-affirming activity. Our morality is thus metaphysically grounded and cosmically significant.

(9) Fundamentally Ethical Nature of the Metaphysical Principle. That Schweitzer, through making moral impulse, as

an immediate element in life, the central fact for philosophical reflection, presents an ethically-characterized Force as the fundamental metaphysical concept, is one of his most distinctive theoretical contributions. Matter, Mind, Spirit, Force, Will, and some modifications of these, have been offered as the concepts of ultimate reality; and, where Reality has been conceived of as Mind or as Spirit, ethical attributes have been assigned. This has been in an incidental way, however, for reality was interpreted primarily in accordance with the attributes of mind such as unity or consciousness, which do not necessarily involve morality, and this was then argued from evidences of design and beneficence. In his notion of a primarily ethical purposiveness Schweitzer contributes what is, in any definite way, a somewhat new manner of conceiving of the metaphysical principle, which places it in a new light, and which lends itself to a different outlook on life and the world as a whole.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

DEFECTS AND WEAKNESSES

1. Lack of Completeness.

From the standpoint of many theoretical interests it would be easy to find fault with Schweitzer's system for what it does not treat at all, or in detail - in the cases of the natural world, psychology, perception, or logic. This would not, however, be entirely fair. There must be allowed to Schweitzer the right to assign to these matters their place and importance in accordance with his philosophical viewpoint and not with that of a different one; and we must note that for him philosophy is not the science of the sciences, or an attempt to interpret and unify their results. We must rather ask, whether the elemental problems of life which are taken up by thought are reflectively explained in reference to their ultimate reality, consistently, and in a way that is justified to thought. On the other hand, it cannot be claimed that what Schweitzer offers may be taken, without further development, as a full and complete system.¹ Since Schweitzer proclaims the failure of all preceding philosophy, and the incapacity of any future philosophy which begins with objective observation of the natural world, to secure an intellectual apprehension of life and of its relation to the world, and proposes a new beginning and method for philosophical thought, it might be expected, if we are to be satisfied in the new province and are not to take excursions in the old, that the intellectual problems which puzzle us would be settled.

While it may be sufficient for ethics, to know that the whole world of sense is a phenomenon of forces, or is composed of enigmatically manifold will-to-live, our intellect insists at least upon knowing how we may consistently conceive this. It may be true that one is no longer driven, by the necessity of securing meaning for one's life or guidance for one's conduct, beyond the general conceptions and principles which have been given. That being so, however, one is ready, in quietness of spirit, and with no ulterior purposes or emotions to hinder one's achievement of truth, to develop a world-view which is both detailed and coherent.

Schweitzer seems to feel, in some measure, that one does not need to think out one's relation to other will-to-live or to the universal Will-to-Live beyond the point of realizing the practical and ethical relation, and that there is danger in the attempt to do so, that one will regard the optimistic and ethical attitude as dependent upon the theory, and that in this way the validity and strength of the ethical impulse will be affected by confirmations and contradictions out of objective knowledge. Accordingly, Schweitzer's metaphysical doctrines are not well-developed, and must in the main be deduced as the implications of various incidental and sometimes equivocal statements. One may, however, accept that self-experience gives adequate and conclusive evidence for practical and reflective life- and world-affirmation, but still want to know in what fashion one can coherently think of one's self as a real individual will-to-live and also a part of a universal Will-to-Live. We must not, of course, hold the volumes which

sketch the general ideas of a new system, and announce that they are to be supplemented by other writings, accountable for a detailed development of the outlook, but we must recognize that the view is incomplete as a philosophical system, and that on many logical, epistemological, and methodological points, as well as metaphysical ones, its position is not fully expounded or adequately justified.

2. Conception of the Nature and Function of Philosophy.

Schweitzer's conception of philosophy and of its function is on the whole too practical. One may have a great deal of sympathy with his protest against philosophy becoming only chamber music, and agree that the test of its worth is its ability to take the problems of life, and, after more thorough reflection upon them than exists in popular thought, to return them to general circulation; but this does not mean that ethical action, and loyal support of life and civilization, are its only end. Schweitzer neglects the theoretical interests, and the place of knowledge as an intrinsic value. Even though his emphasis upon the wider-than-theoretical function of philosophy is needed, the demands of thought for consistent and comprehensive ways of thinking about experience of every sort are not to be neglected.

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3. Undeveloped Theism.

(1) Vagueness of Conception. Schweitzer speaks of an eternal and unoriginated, universal Will-to-Live. He also uses for it the term God, and says that God reveals himself differently in the world and in my inner experience. Again he refers to it

as "the ethical divine personality....which I experience in myself as a mysterious impulse."¹ If the concept of God is to have a place in Schweitzer's philosophy, however, it should be more clearly developed. Furthermore, there needs to be a more rationally satisfying exposition of the relation of the universal Will to individual wills, which must be conceived metaphysically as well as ethically.

(2) Lack of Proofs. Perhaps a more definite statement of the concept of God would help in the problem of its establishment, but there is not sufficient justification apparent for the use of the concept. Schweitzer does not, in fact, give ground at all for his belief in the unity of reality. Philosophies are accustomed to argue this on the basis of interaction and system, or the internal character of relations, or to find it as the unshakable conviction resulting from mystical experience. Schweitzer does none of these. Except that it is evidently the only way of attributing any meaning to the objective world under the conditions of his other views (and Schweitzer does not state this), there is no rational argument for the continuity and community of nature in all existents which he assumes. The remaining ground (of which there is some suggestion) is that it is the innate disposition of our ethical will to treat all reality with which we come in contact as expression of a personal will, and that the ethical impulse is to be accepted as valid for our thinking. Reflection upon impulse may, as in Schweitzer's system, find meaning and significance in it, but impulse as such does not give us belief.

(3) Religious Value of the Conception. The assumption of continuity and community of spiritual nature in all reality, is a vital feature in the philosophy of Schweitzer. It is through it that self-negation and ethics are involved in will-to-live. The religious values which belong to the conception might, however, be questioned. Religion is, in Schweitzer's view, the active preservation and enhancement of life. Spirituality¹ and ethics, he says, are one. While we are accustomed in the Christian religion to think of service to God as taking the form of service to man, this would seem to mean simply discarding the values which are the distinctive ones of religion. This is apparently not true in the case of Schweitzer, but still some of the religious values are lost, at least in their traditional form. No relation of the individual to a Universal Being is recognized, but only the relation to other individuals. In the theistic way of thinking this would mean that there is never any relation to God, but only to persons and things. For Schweitzer, however, the individual comes into relation with God in his spiritual community with particular existents, and the religious values seem to be actually united with, and realized in, daily activity. The relation to a transcendent Spirit, which is lost, Schweitzer regards as an unreal and dead spirituality.

4. Precarious Provision for Metaphysical Unity.

The question of unity has other significance for philosophy than its religious interest. Schweitzer has been chiefly concerned to show the possibility of spiritual unity with the

universal Will-to-Live, realized in the fact that the individual becomes conscious of the nature of himself and of all reality, and that he removes conflict between the will-to-live in himself and in other phenomena. This, however, does not provide the unity which constitutes a natural universe and which provides order and law in it. The type of conscious ethical unity which is aimed at must have behind it some type of metaphysical unity.

The difficulty of providing for unity is greater for Schweitzer's philosophy, in proportion as the individuality and freedom of particular wills is stressed, together with the doctrine of the non-transcendence of the universal Will. The universal Will is not regarded as a will in addition to those in individuals, but as having its existence in the wills of the individuals. There is, however, in these single wills no common purposiveness, except as an abstraction. This universal Will-to-Live would include in itself a multitude of particular purposive tendencies, often in conflict with each other, but no general purposes or universal laws. There might be said to be a common self-fulfilling power working in all the particulars, without agreement in them, but the unity assigned to it in that case seems meaningless. There would be a multitude of diverse, clashing, individual purposes, able to take account of each other and sympathetically forward one another, but no purposiveness. There is no place in the will of any of these individuals, or of a will which is simply the whole of them (a really unthinkable and contradictory will), for any system,

any universal purpose, or any universal law. The universal Will must, for possession of such factors, as well as for its existence as an individual and unitary being, transcend the particular wills in some sense, at least as a unity which is more than any of its parts or the sum of them. The primary metaphysical unity is recognized in Schweitzer's statements,¹ but it has a precarious position.

5. Conception of the Natural World.

Schweitzer's conception of the natural world has, from the angle of the above consideration, an appearance of inadequacy. His anti-intellectualism and realism, combined with his interpretation of metaphysical reality through self-experience, does not allow for any distinction in the manner of existence of natural phenomena and of persons. The natural objects or events are individual forms of will-to-live, which strive to live out their possibilities in accordance with their natures. The pan-spiritualistic - one might say animatistic - view of the natural world which is involved, while it is not an impossible one, is not a wholly clear conception, particularly as regards its provision for the unity and system of the world in which universal natural law rests.

6. Relation to Natural Science.

The relation of Schweitzer's philosophy to natural science has two faces. In one aspect the relation, as we saw, is very friendly.² His world-view leaves the natural world be what it is, as he says; and does not seek in its representation to

distort in any way, its actual features. It finds the significance of life in another manner, and does not modify the natural phenomena in order to derive it from empirical observation. Thus the objectivity and freedom of descriptive science is assured.

The importance of objective experience, on the other hand, is discounted by Schweitzer's view. It has a practical usefulness and gives a relative kind of knowledge, but it does not lead to insight into the nature of reality. Moreover, intuition, outflanking it, has provided an interpretation of reality, and one which, as indicated above, leaves the ground of natural law in uncertainty. In the mysterious and contradictory manifold forms of will-to-live which are allowed in nature there is not secured a unity and concentration of control which gives any expectation of certainty to scientific prediction.

7. Dualism in Experience.

The above criticism is intimately related to another: that of the dualism in experience which is so prominent a feature¹ in Schweitzer's system. This, as has been made clear, is never presented as indicating a duality of principles, but only as a dualism of appearances. There are, even so, two ways in which the dualism may be regarded. One of these is as a dualism of two ways of knowing, an inner and an outer. The other is as that of two parts of reality with which knowledge is concerned, self and the natural world. We will leave aside for the moment the first sense. For knowledge then, there appear to be

the two manifestations of reality to which thought can be directed, and to either one of which priority could be given in determining our judgment of the character of reality. It might then be allowed as true that, if we should abstract from one part - namely, personal life -, experience would not lead us to a world- and life-affirmative view, and that at the very least the world would not give any certain and decisive evidence of a single life-regarding purpose. When, however, such an interpretation has arisen, by virtue of subjective experience, the aspects of the natural world are not incompatible with that interpretation, if pleasure is not regarded as the highest value, and if due allowance is made for limitations of our outlook. Then, too, personal life is not so different from nature, for it also shows evil as well as good. Taking personal life and nature as two materials of experience, they present much the same phenomena of unethical and destructive processes. All personal life, one's own as well as that of other persons, when it is known objectively, falls in with the natural world, and appears only as active force. Its disposition toward ends and its element of moral obligation are known only in intuition. The dualism of appearances is thus not one that can be maintained as existing between the natural world and personal life, but only between intuition and objective observation; so far as it is represented in the former way, it is a case of confusion.

Ultimately, then, a sharp and irreconcilable dualism in experience, such as Schweitzer asserts, cannot exist, and is

not retained in his thought. There is not finally a situation in which different parts of reality are of different seeming, but only different understandings of the same realities through immediate intuition and objective experience. The latter never exhibits any determination by moral obligation; that is known only in subjective experience. This difference of intuition and observation is an ineradicable one, but the apprehension of moral disposition in self-experience is introduced as an element in total experience. We do not allow the two impressions to stand over against each other, creating two different and unrelated attitudes. The types of experience come into an organic whole, and the intuition determines how experience of an objective sort is interpreted.

It must be recognized that Schweitzer does not sufficiently justify this use of self-experience as a principle of interpretation for all reality. The reasons for it which are more or less clearly implicit in his system are significant, but they need to be supplemented before they can be regarded as adequate or as able to carry general conviction.¹ Nevertheless, the inner and outer experience which enters into life cannot be kept distinct, but must be reconciled. Experience has to be taken as one, and every element must be brought into a coherent whole. This may give to some parts of experience a different importance and meaning than that which they have when isolated, but this does not mean that the conclusion does not take them into account.

Stress upon certain often-neglected elements of experience - such as moral experience - may be very desirable, but any

conclusion which is based upon them must be able reflectively to reconcile other experiences with them. In such a theory as Schweitzer's for example, one is able to reject the primary impression of objective experience only because one has a way of regarding it which is thought to do justice to it in the light of other experience. Philosophy may reinterpret some of its experience in view of other experience, but it does not base its view on some part of it rather than another; its conclusion is justified only if it can include all experience in its view and still be warranted. It can say, as Schweitzer does, that life-view is the decisive datum for its world-view, not the product; but it must seek to bring the experience of the natural world also into relation to its world-view.

From the above propositions, however, Schweitzer would probably dissent. They would in all likelihood seem to him to be a compromise with the old attempt to derive the vital world-view from a theoretical view of the universe which did not take it into account as a primary and direct manifestation of reality, and to threaten both the free spontaneous exercise of the ethical will and the attainment of a correct world-view. There is good ground for the fear, but what is essential in Schweitzer's view is the recognition of the primacy of life-affirmative will and of the dependence of world-view upon the experience of this fact, not a division of experience either into two bodies of experience or two methods of experience, one of which is rejected.

An illustration might help. To our sensory observation the

sun apparently rises above the eastern horizon, passes overhead and moves down the western sky. Our reason assures us, however, as we take other data into account that the appearance is due to a revolving motion of a round earth, through which its various faces are successively turned toward the sun. We do not, then, speak of an irreconcilable dualism between observation and reason, because of the diversity of view, but incorporate and transcend the sensory impression in a larger process of knowing in which the objective observation does not remain what it was. There are not said to be two kinds of knowledge, which contradict each other, but reason in the larger sense is taken to involve the apprehension of the appearances and their correction.

It might be replied that in the case of the illustration a set of hypotheses are secured which make the appearances understandable, whereas in the case of the disteleological features of the world, the hypotheses which have been advanced have neither been faithful to the essential nature of the experiences nor made the phenomena understandable. There is no set of principles by means of which, without destroying the integrity of moral judgment, I may understand in the particular features of the world about me the operations of a reality in which life and its activities have significance. Still, one does not have two kinds of knowledge, which contradict each other, between which one must choose, but one knowledge which is the result of all varied experiences and of whatever adjustment one can make between them by all the faculties of mind, and in which

the individual features of experience do not remain what they were in isolation. Knowledge may not be perfect, and some features of experience may not be satisfactorily incorporated, but the most comprehensive system of experience must be regarded as true. Schweitzer's proposal that world-view be based upon the experience of ethical will in the self alone, separated from objective knowledge of the world and in complete independence of it, is, then, in that form, philosophically unsound, and impossible in the very nature of human thought. The suggestion is at variance with the distinctive function of philosophy to think experience together and as a whole. It is, of course, understandable as a reaction against "philosophies" which are based exclusively upon the data of descriptive sciences of nature, and is even a preferable philosophy. Further, we may allow to Schweitzer that our active optimism and ethical will do not wait for an intellectual understanding of the natural world, that they are not derived from it, but are primary facts of which it must take account, and that when this is recognized the free descriptive work of science may be contemplated without alarm. We cannot, however, secure any intellectual peace or satisfaction through dividing experience into non-communicating compartments, or keeping our experience of ethical will and of the natural world apart.

8. Treatment of Value.

The treatment of value by Schweitzer is peculiar. One might say that value experience is the foundation upon which he constructs his philosophy; and this is true in so far as it is

the experiences of moral will, and of the disposition of regard for life and for its objectives, which for him furnish the basis for a conception of reality; but, on the other hand, it is quite clear that Schweitzer does not regard effort for life as justified by experience of value in it or in its spiritual incidents. The value of life is an implication of the disposition to strive for it in one's self and to respect it and promote it in others. In the case of service of other life, for example, one does not have any rational theory of its value, or any value experience of it, only a disposition of active regard. The metaphysically real value of the forms of life is in their character as phenomena of the universal Will-to-Live. It might be granted that without a relation to an external purpose any very abiding or significant value would not be conceivable to thought, but without some experience of intrinsic values in life, our notions of value, and our aspirations for its more perfect fulfillment, would be meaningless, and active effort for life could not be evoked. Schweitzer, however, depends only upon the intuition that I am will-to-live. Ethics, and metaphysics building from it, proceed from the inner impulse, which is unrelated to value experience.

9. Irrationality in Ethics.

All conduct, in Schweitzer's view, so far as it is ethical, flows from the nature of the individual. The ethical principle is not purely formal as in the case of Kant, for there is apparently a body of potentialities which the individual realizes, but there is neither experience of value from which it proceeds,

nor anticipation of definite values to which it is directed. There are, however, serious objections to this. It officially places the uncritical conscience above the rational conscience. On the other hand, then, it has to admit obligations which sometimes and in some measure set aside the impulse of humanness. In this, however, it destroys the meaning of ethicality, if it can be distinguished from that which it is right for one to do in any case.

In referring the rightness of acts solely to impulse, and refusing to accord place to consideration of the rational consequences, Schweitzer is illogical. Respect for life may be a good designation for the general form of morality, if life is not conceived too narrowly, but apart from experience it is empty. What one does out of respect for life is indisputably based on experience of its needs, of its experiences of value, and of its methods of realizing them. This would have to take consequences into consideration, and would not be genuinely respect for life unless it had them in view so far as possible. The question is only one of narrower or wider extension of vision in the determination of the content of the disposition. Unless Schweitzer would assert, as he evidently does not, the inclusion of all the features of life-respecting action in intuition, a more or less extensive reference to value is necessary. Without a fairly definite body of experience to guide it, respect for life becomes mere regard for biological existence - self-preservation and preservation of life in others, though this is not at all what Schweitzer has in mind.

10. Account of Evil.

Another difficulty in Schweitzer's system appears at this point. If every existent is in its nature will-to-live, how can it act in any other way than affirmatively of life? How does conflict enter in between the different phenomena of the universal Will-to-Live?

Schweitzer's answer to this question is only suggested. He speaks of the Will-to-Live as being in contradiction in the individual to its manifestation in other phenomena; but how it enters upon this self-contradiction, or why it is divided manifoldly against itself, he does not attempt to explain. There is an implication that evil is negative - a weakening of the will! Active vital regard for life is the good, and is the nature of being; evil is the diminution, or want, of good and of being. How evil enters in, or the will to live is divided against itself, however, is not satisfactorily expounded.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE FACTOR OF IMMEDIATE INTUITION

The heart of Schweitzer's philosophy is its non-rational factor.¹ He urges, it is true, the necessity of reflection upon the fundamental questions of man's relation to life, to world, and to fellowman, and of a world-view which is the product of thought and capable of carrying conviction.² In fact, insistence upon thought about fundamental philosophical positions, and faith in rational reflection as the only means of arriving at truth, are among the merits which are to be attributed to him. Beyond presentation of his own philosophical outlook,³ Schweitzer seeks, if we may accept his assertion, to contribute to the awakening of rational reflection upon the fundamental problems of life. The only creditable and serviceable outlook on life, he urges with vigor, is one which the individual has secured by reflection, and which can be justified to thought. Schweitzer's system is in this, and we must keep the point steadily in mind, distinct from the familiar types of intuitionism. It is by no means his idea that feeling and will should arrogate to themselves any freedom from the criticism of thought. Nevertheless, it is still the case, that the essential and vitalizing factor in Schweitzer's philosophy is its non-rational element, which depends upon immediate intuition and is incapable of empirical confirmation or rational justification.

1. Analysis of the Intuitionual Elements.

(1) Ethical Intuitionism. Ethical intuitionism and intellectual intuitionism are both present in Schweitzer's philosophy. On the ethical side, the principle of moral action is freed from social connections which are commonly assigned to it. It is not, either genetically or normatively, a representation of social codes, or of social tradition and development. Neither is it directed to social objectives. In fact, it might be said to have no objective or objectives at all. This is, in one sense, incorrect, for it has the objective of life and its fulfillment, but even in this it acts on its own inner impulse, and not on a rational judgment of the value of life or an accounting of the outcome of its efforts.

Any hedonistic or utilitarian calculus for conduct is rejected by Schweitzer. We have only to recall his assertions that the less rational conduct is, in the ordinary sense of the term, the more ethical it is, that the extent of self-sacrifice for life cannot be rationally determined but must be decided by the strength of the enthusiasm for life, and that where intellectual calculation of results and prospects of success enter in, it is an indication of the decay of the moral sense.¹ Thus, in the personal and subjective determination of ethical conduct represented by Schweitzer, there is freedom not only from social dictation or objective canons, but also from the influence of objective observation. The moral decision is autonomous and categorical. To violate the subjective principle of morality, the principle which is given in the spirit, through any consider-

ation of ends or results, whether personal or social, is to incur guilt.

Although the ethical determination of conduct must be left wholly to the individual, and to his subjective and unspoiled impulses, however, the general form of morality can be specified - it is action in accordance with the principle of reverence for life and for its aspirations and potentialities.¹ For no individual, in any situation, can the right course of conduct be determined by objective laws, but it must be inspired by this spirit of respect for life. It cannot be reflectively determined what this spirit requires, but conformity to its impulse is regarded as the sole rightness of conduct.

It would be difficult to classify this ethical intuitionism of Schweitzer's. It includes some positive features of each of the types, even of the mythical with its definition of conscience as the voice of God; but it is not identical with any of them. There is no inner power of judgment which discerns and legislates with instant and infallible insight about good and bad, right and wrong, in every case, but there is an inherent and constitutive disposition which cannot be violated except as a division and an abnormality of the will. There are no innate ideas of right or wrong, there is no faculty of immediate apprehension of a difference of better and worse, there is no esthetic sensibility to fitness, but there is a striving, on-going, creative disposition which is one's being and in which one has a place in the universal creative Will. What its end is, one does not know, but whatever meaning and value life has,

lies in participation in it, and in unity with it through the elimination of conflict between one's particular will and the universal Will in its multiplicity of manifestations.

The impossibility of any genuinely rational canons of the service of life and of self-sacrifice, arises from the wholly non-rational character of our valuation of life and of its furtherance at all. We do value life, and make efforts for its preservation and furtherance, but we would be at loss to show that such an attitude and behavior is rational. It would be only for a few individuals, and for some part of their lives, that the intrinsic pleasure could be considered to show any positive balance; and there, it would seem to justify no great sacrifice or endurance for its sake. Its tenure is so transient and insecure; the cosmic place of any life among the myriads of life and in the perspective of cosmic history is so insignificant; its objective accomplishments, even in the case of the most gifted and favored, are such meager and unimportant things, in any unprovincial prospect, and are so liable, even ultimately certain, to be brought to nothing by the merest chances and changes of history or of social conditions, or by the simplest sports or processes of nature! The attempt to show that the value which is attached to any life, either one's own or that of another, is rationally justified, would be a miserable failure.

Nevertheless, we do value life, and we strive with severe labors, and sacrifice, to maintain and to further it. We can, through such reflection as the above, introduce division into

the will, and cause checking or thwarting of free effective expression, but these are all features of repression of will and of duality in it. They are definitely pathological conditions of the spirit, and apathy toward life or attempts to destroy life are rightly regarded as aberrations and abnormalities which do not represent the coherent whole of will or the real will of the individual. They are impulses, obsessions or assertions of a partial mind, but will is always will-to-live. We are will-to-live, and cannot, except in a pathological and partial way, be any other will. The fundamental attitude, that of respect for life, is something irrational, but yet thought shows it as ultimate and authoritative. Our actual judgments of worth go back to the worth of life as their presupposition. Reflection, also, reveals one's nature as will-to-live, and refers it to unity with the universal Will-to-Live for its meaning. It is this will which is the source and criterion of moral conduct.

(2) Intellectual Intuitionism. Ethical intuitionism and intellectual, or metaphysical, intuitionism are inseparably connected in Schweitzer's system. Not only is the rule of conduct given in an inner disposition which is not based upon consideration of objectives of action or upon prospects of success, but the nature of reality is thought to be known directly rather than inferred from its manifestations.

The knowledge which we have of reality, according to Schweitzer, is from within outwards. Reflection, to be sure, must join with intuition in order to make it a genuine knowledge,

for the naive attitude of life- and world-affirmation which arises from the will-to-live is not adequate, or able to maintain itself, but must be related to thought and replaced by a thought-out form; and one's philosophy is the result of two factors: of consciousness of reality in one's self as will-to-live, and of reflection upon the implications of this fact for life and the world. Philosophy begins, however, with an immediately certain truth, instead of finding it as the conclusion of a process of thought. It is, moreover, a truth which is superior to the criticism of all objective experience. This certain truth is no self-evident idea or axiom, but is immediate self-experience. It is, thus, not a rational basis, but in a sense an empirical one. The experience, however, is not regarded as a phenomenon among others, to serve as the basis of a generalization, but as an immediate apprehension of truth by means of which all subsequent knowledge is possible; and is thus rationalistic. Philosophical knowledge is not thought to proceed by the extension of observation and collection of facts, but by interpretation which has grasped the inner essence of reality in immediate intuition. On the other hand, the fact must not be lost sight of, that the intuition is not a single flash of experience. It is not proposed to take a lone, unrelated experience as final, and ascertified in its one moment of occurrence. The experience of self, and that in the form of active will for the maintenance and enhancement of life, is a common element in all awareness; it is the vital, repeated,
1
constant form of experience.

In what sense the experience is to be considered as intuitive and immediate, as contrasted with any experience whatsoever, should be definitely examined. In the first place, that I am will-to-live is asserted to be direct experience, and not an inference from it. If so, it has this immediacy in common with all experience. The will-to-live, further, is something which cannot be known reflectively, but must be experienced. The experience of myself as will-to-live, more distinctively, is not by any of the channels of sense. It is not objective experience at all. To affirm in reflection that I am will-to-live, the reality is nominally divided into subject and object, but metaphysically, what has been treated in the two aspects is identical. Schweitzer does not deal with the epistemological questions, but no set of beliefs can escape being involved with them. He does, as we have seen, ¹ reject idealistic epistemology, or the notion of creative activity of mind in knowing. He maintains the reality and objectivity of the known, and treats the knowing relation as an external one. One knows other phenomena of the will-to-live, not strictly empirically, it is true, by observation of their behavior, but interpretatively by analogy with one's self, still not by becoming identical with them. I may never be said to be one with any other phenomenon of will-to-live, or with the universal Will-to-Live in any other way than by agreement of will. I am never even in the knowing-relation to the whole of reality, or the essence of reality, but only to particular manifestations of the will-to-live. Thus intuitionism of the traditional

mystical sort is excluded. Knowledge involves duality of knower and known, but in the case of self-knowledge the duality is merely formal. The object of knowledge is not really an other, only logically so. The form of reflective thought, or intellectual apprehension, requires their distinction, but knowledge arises in a unity deeper than the intellectual division. In the case of self-knowledge there is an immediacy of apprehension which is unique, and which makes the knowledge of reality in the self more direct than one's knowledge of it in any other manifestation.

In the consideration of intuition in Schweitzer's philosophy, however, there is involved not only the formal question of method, but the questions of material or content. There belongs to Schweitzer's system, as knowledge which is supposed to be directly intuited, or at least is not referred to objective observation, the voluntaristic spiritualism in the conception of the self and of every existent, and in the notion of an¹ unoriginated universal Will.

In what way the latter bit of content is secured is a question.² That phenomena are not a collection of independent realities, but are all manifestations of a single reality, whose nature alone is in question, has the appearance of a presupposition of Schweitzer's philosophical cogitation. It is certainly not the result of observation of the world. Schweitzer does not regard the world as showing a purposiveness, merely undecipherable as to its intent, but considers it to be diverse and contradictory in its appearances, with no

evidence of any unitary system or purposiveness. The belief must in a certain sense, then, be intuitive. Schweitzer's notion of the universal Will is, of course, not that of a transcendent Deity, and its existence is not therefore a thing to be inferred. The existence of the sum of the things which exist is logically demonstrable. But that there is a common spirit which exists in all of them, if it is not evidenced by the manifestations can be known only in intuition. This, of course, is not given in my daily-repeated experience of myself as will-to-live. Of the nature of others there is no direct intuition; I must know it by analogy. This method presupposes, however, the knowledge of a similar nature at least, or as Schweitzer thinks of it, a common nature in all. But there is, we may repeat, no direct experience of the essence of reality. Schweitzer has from some source, however, an unwavering conviction of the community of the will in me with the reality in all being. The conviction may be an irrational one which, as we suggested, ¹ rests in large measure on esthetic feeling. It would apparently, however, in some degree also depend upon the consideration that in this way alone meaning is given to reality. This is, in other words, faith in the relation or conformity of the human faculties to the environment, without which no thought is possible.

Intuitionism and apriorism merge in Schweitzer's system. Thus, in the sphere of ethics, the value of life is not directly experienced any more than it is rationally demonstrated.

Rather, it is the logical implication, the rational a-priori, of our will-to-live and of all our value judgments. It is on that ground that respect for life, wherever it is found, grows out of the naive will-to-live. Then, again, in Schweitzer's metaphysical thought, the idea of the community of spirit in all reality, except as it gains unrecognized support from mystically colored esthetic experience, is, as was suggested above, founded on its position as the implication of any and every truth.

That I am will-to-live, however, does not take a place as inference or implication, but is regarded as immediate intuition. Furthermore, even though the worth of any life is not directly experienced, but is only a rational implication which is recognized by will when it becomes reflective, the will is innately and by its nature, prior to intellect, life-affirmative or ethical. In the reflective realization of the nature of itself and of all reality, release may be secured from some of the contradiction which commonly exists between the will-to-live in me and in other phenomena. However, since there is not a material measure of the rightness or wrongness of conduct, but only the criterion of expression of the inner conformity to the disposition to preserve and enhance life, the will-to-live is innately ethical will. The eternal, ongoing power in me and in the universe is not unqualified force, but is creative will, directed to the production, maintenance and perfection of life. It is not unequivocally manifest as

such, or able to be known in that character from objective observation of nature, but is experienced in that form in me. So, in the knowledge which belongs to the content of intuition there is included, not only the acquaintance with one's self as will, but as life-affirmative or ethical will.

2. Problems of the Doctrine of Intuition.

There are, then, several problems about the immediate intuition alleged by Schweitzer. These problems are: whether his will-to-live is an actual experience; whether, if so, the will is innate and primary, or is derived; what the extent of the original nature and content of the experience is, if it exists; what the relation of the disposition to ethical will is; what degree of validity it has as an experience; what implication its existence as experience has for what ought to be; and what implication it has for what exists in a metaphysical sense.

(1) Is the Experience which is asserted a Psychological Fact? The questions interpenetrate; and the consideration of one cannot be carried through entirely in distinction from the others. We are interested first, however, in the question whether self is actually experienced in the way which Schweitzer asserts. That even below the level of conscious purpose the native impulses and behaviors are directed to the preservation of the life of the individual or of the species, and that in the most highly conscious beings, a large background of intellect is made up of imperious dispositions which

have the service of life as their end, are descriptive facts which are among the best established material of the science of psychology. But this cannot be the experience that Schweitzer means, for although he suggests it as instance of the non-intellectual but fundamental nature of will-to-live within reality, this is a body of external observations. It does not enable us to know the nature of reality, particularly its ethical character.

The experiences of will-to-live for which we are looking are of an inner, intuitive sort. Whether there are such experiences is a difficult question, and one which cannot be answered decisively and finally by any individual. There are, of course, experiences of distress at the suffering of others, of empathetic sensibility in general, and of beneficent impulses. These appear, from Schweitzer's narratives, to be principally what he has in mind; and he seems to be right in regarding them as on the whole the expressions of an innate unreflective disposition rather than of experience or reason, and as being in many cases checked by sensitiveness about irrational tenderness or by considerations of inutility. It may be said, however, that the sympathetic feelings and beneficent impulses are not alone in human nature, but are accompanied by contrary feelings and impulses, so that personal dispositions are as indeterminate and equivocal with regard to moral principle as the natural world appears to be. Schweitzer would recognize that this is true of them as they present themselves to external observation, and that will-to-live

enters into conflicts with itself in different phenomena, or even undergoes perversion in some circumstances; but he holds that from within will is revealed, normally and universally, as will toward the preservation and enhancement of life, and that there is no normal will against life. Schweitzer's views are born out by personal experience; its testimony is that there cannot be destruction of any life, or thwarting of its efforts, however unimportant or worthless these may seem to be from a rational point of view, without a sense of guilt. Furthermore, with Schweitzer, it is believed that this is, despite appearances to the contrary, a universal experience, even where it is not admitted, and where it is dismissed as irrational. We like, not simply for the sake of the feeling of safety which it gives, but for the sense of secret kinship, to read of irrational acts of sympathy in others whom we admire. It is true that action has a great range of stimuli and patterns, and that the objectives are varied, so that to say all action has the preservation of life, or its enhancement, as its immediate object is psychologically false. It is getting this special object, or doing this particular thing, toward which the individual strives, and with the accomplishment of which he identifies himself. The particular ends are the things sought, and activity may disregard the principle of respect for life. This is responsible in large measure both for the appearance of ruthlessness which belongs to much of conduct, and also for the disregard of personal interests which constitutes self-sacrifice. Still, whenever the consciousness of life

and of purposive striving enters, the experience of regard for it arises; it may be dismissed on one ground or another, but it has been there.

There are probably persons in whom the experience is less strong than in others. There are individual differences in all psychological functions, but the disposition and experience may be regarded as common and normal. Objective appearances do not clearly manifest it, and there are individuals in whom it does not seem to exist, or in whom its presence seems to be contradicted. Where, however, this is not, as in the majority of cases, due to suppression of natural feelings through one type or another of self-regard or through considerations of rationality, it gives the appearance of pathological perversion of a natural feeling. The power of vicious acts to catch and fixate the attention of the mentally unstable, until their impulse becomes overmastering, or, in other cases, the sense of power and self-enhancement which they give, are due to the strong impression of unnaturalness and abnormality which they make.

While, then, it is not denied that there are many and varied tendencies which do not involve experience of reverence for life, and which in their execution come into conflict with, or override will-to-live, it is accepted that such a disposition is a strong and definite element of immediate experience. Reflection cannot be considered to be its source or to support it. Whether, however, it is to be regarded as an innate dis-

position, is still a problem which cannot be considered settled. It is clear that it is not established on theoretical grounds, but it may, nevertheless, be constructed in the course of early and simple experience. How this may occur, can be seen through conditioned arousal in us, of sensations and feeling tones which were originally due to action upon our own organism. The common elements in the situations which act as stimuli, however, do not appear to be sufficient, and the character and content of the experience do not seem to be adequately accounted for in this way. The experience is deserving of further psychological investigation, but it gives the appearance of having an innate content or character.

There is, however, some indefiniteness in Schweitzer's writings, about the experience in which respect for life is given, whether it is in such experiences as are discussed above, or is in an experience of personal will-to-live. There are places where he undoubtedly suggests the former class of experiences, where he refers to them as the most vivid and significant impressions of his life, and where he insists upon the necessity of keeping them unweakened by consideration of abstract ends or of rationality.¹ In other places, and in a more definitely systematic connection, on the other hand, he speaks of reverence for life as the immediate implication of one's individual will-to-live. Schweitzer quite clearly believes in the real and absolute value of life. This belief he does not, however, refer to a direct experience of value, and to it he does not assign the status of an intuition.

The worth we attach to life is, nevertheless, non-rational, since it is given in the non-rational dispositions of life. The value of life is determined, however, Schweitzer seems to assert, whenever he deals directly with the point, not as the implication of my sympathetic and beneficent dispositions, but of my will-to-live, though it would seem to be as validly the implication of the one as of the other, unless the latter might possibly be more fundamental, and be the source of the former.

Is there, however, an experience of will-to-live? If, as we found reason to assert, there is experience of regard for any life independent of, and even contrary to, rational judgment of its value, and if this is a sympathetic projection of dispositions which refer to the self, then there must be such a subjective disposition. Again, we may note, perhaps in other life better than in our own, that the individual exerts itself constantly, and with intensity commensurate to necessity, by the employment of unconscious function and intellect alike, to keep itself alive. This tells us something about Reality, or about realities, but does not provide knowledge of any general meaning or significance of life or the world, and it is the knowledge from which Schweitzer distinguishes, and to which he opposes, his intuition.

An immediate experience of will-to-live which can be considered significant, on the other hand, is somewhat elusive. There is (in some respects comparable to the experiences we have in relation to other life) the experience of panic at

any suddenly presented prospect of imminent death, and of the concentration of energy in a supreme effort to preserve one's self. There belongs to the reaction itself, it is apparent, more than is accounted for by previous experiences and their elements of disagreeableness. We call it instinct, but the instinct is simply the common behavior-pattern in which the life-force expresses itself. It is highly probable that there is more in the experience, over and above the presentative elements, than the sum of the particular bodily sensations of digestive, respiratory, circulatory, and muscular changes. The positive assertion of an experience of some inherent force in operation for the preservation of life, which cannot be analyzed into such sensations, is not justified, however, and is apparently not meant by Schweitzer.

If it is a question of conscious will-to-live, we must say here again, that the usual experience of will is of the disposition to go to some definite place, to have dinner, to read a book, to make the goal in a game, or to achieve some one of a number of definite objects. Certainly, if the matter comes in question, however, I shall will to live. One may, of course, as in the case of Jesus, choose to die, but that is after all in affirmation of the actual worth of life, and is an expression of will-to-live in its fullest strength. In any other form than this, we regard absence of the choice to live as a symptom of ill-health, either physical or mental. In the normal person, the suggestion may be entertained under strain of excessive demands or of severe disappointments, but

it is not willed. But why do we so certainly will to live? It is not that the experiences of value or the pleasantness of life give this determination to conduct, but that this is the nature or the disposition of the force which is in us. But, by the experience of the will-to-live, Schweitzer means more than this general and repeated choice to live. Even where varied experiences, apparently not life itself, are being sought, the will-to-live is manifested. Life as a spiritual reality is the process of consciousness or of experiencing, and in the effort of consciousness to maintain or sustain itself, and to find content, there is experience of the will-to-live.

It is undoubtedly the experience of will-to-live in the self which is fundamental. It is this experience which enables the self to enter sympathetically into the understanding of other beings and to adopt an attitude toward them of helping their purposes. The native will-to-live which is experienced in one's self, however, is not so narrow as the impulse to realize and to preserve one's own life. The disposition which is immediately experienced, and is inner and underived, is a disposition of regard for life as such. So much as that, Schweitzer's view would require. The mere will-to-live, in its common meaning, cannot give the ethical conception of the nature of reality as experienced in the self which Schweitzer holds, and insight into reality through it would be no different than that through objective phenomena. The will-to-live which is experienced, is my inner will, but it is not a will directed solely to my exist-

ence. It includes, together with my devotion to the furtherance and perfection of life, regard for other will-to-live, and active sympathy with its efforts. This attitude, and the valuation of life which it implies, have no inferential basis, but are the ones which are inherent in the nature of reality.

(2) Is the Disposition Innate and Underived? The disposition of respect for life has been accepted as a fundamental and characteristic experience, but the possibility that it is not innate is not excluded. However, as has been pointed out, it is not produced by observation and reflection, but is weakened by them. It is not, moreover, the product of social education, but on the contrary the individual shields his impulse from notice as something which society would consider a weakness. Schweitzer asserts that humaneness belongs to personal ethics, whereas social ethics sacrifices it to material considerations and abstract principles. The disposition seems also to go beyond anything that is built up in affective experience and its projection, and to be richer in its content than it.

This disposition, apparently innate, has been credited with being wider than the tendency to self-preservation, - that is, no less than a regard for life. But although an innate tendency is recognized, this is not to be taken to mean either innate ideas or an innate axiom. It is not primarily an intellectual factor. It is a principle, but a formal one, and, at that, of action, in so far as it is determined by the inner nature which is unaffected in its disposition by objective observation or by conclusions from it. Just as in the case of Kant's categorical imperative, however, the content of each act must be

decided in the individual case; this is done autonomously and on the motive of respect for life, but, nevertheless, the content of the act represents what has been acquired through experience. For instance, the consciousness of the existence of life in Africa and of its needs, and the knowledge of the methods of medicine and surgery, are due to impression and to the course of experience. That which is subjective and innate is only the spirit of reverence for life in which the acts of healing are done. The principle is not so empty or indeterminate as Kant's mere rule of consistency, but it is a spirit rather than a content, and it leaves the latter to be progressively determined in experience. It is not an innate knowledge of any facts or ideas, but it can exist non-conceptually, and it becomes a maxim only when it is reflective about itself.

(3) The Relation of the Disposition to Ethical Will. How the disposition to live is related to distinctly ethical action has already been touched upon. If it were merely disposition to live, this relation would present greater difficulties. The activity which flowed from the impulse to preserve life might be considered to be perfectly natural, but there would be no added meaning in designating it as ethical. The innate disposition, however, is not simply one of living itself out, but of affirming life and its potentialities. Moreover it is free, and may be either consistent with its own nature or untrue to it; it may be in conflict with will-to-live in its other manifestations, or in agreement with them. The disposition of ethical life-regarding will is natural, but not necessary.

Necessity does not attach to it, but obligation. Schweitzer holds a doctrine of an original perfection, fall, and salvation in which what is by nature life-regarding will contradicts itself and then overcomes conflict in fellowship. In this, his views are more suggestive of Neo-Platonic mysticism than at any other point.¹

Schweitzer's ethics is both empirical and metaphysical. If we take the actual facts of ethical judgment, he thinks, and introduce consistency and unity of principle into them, the common element of morality will be found to be respect for life in its broad sense. The sense of obligation is a genuine element of experience, and it originally attaches to responsibility for life, Schweitzer believes, even though it is often confused by various observations, social purposes and artificial ethical systems. Regard for life is an inherent disposition, and has implicit in it the factor of responsibility. The experience of ought is derived from it, even though it has often become separated from it or turned against it. The healthy and unartificial sense of obligation agrees with, or is, as a matter of fact, identical with the disposition of humaneness; and this disposition asserts itself in a sense of guilt, even when the individual tries to justify unhumane acts by the rule of some rationally determined rightness.

(4) Implications of the Experience for Obligation. Schweitzer regards the sense of responsibility toward life as not simply descriptive fact, but as constituting actual obligation, and as referring to real value. The disposition of regard

for life is considered to be valid and authoritative. Schweitzer speaks of native and inherent rights of the individual being, which are sacred and may be violated but never voided, as the basis of our social conduct. Respect correlates to genuine rights and actual value. Even granting, however, that the feeling of respect for life and of responsibility in relation to it is real, the question whether the fact of valuation establishes the real value of its object must be faced. The fact that we can ask such a question indicates a distinction between thought and reality, and brings to mind the occurrence of contradiction and error in our experience. This dualism in epistemology, and these contradictory experiences, make it impossible to take experience as such as giving reality, or to regard any experience taken by itself as final truth. No experience, however clear or significant in meaning, can escape criticism or the need to validate itself. This is the weakness of any of the traditional theories of intuition - mystical, esthetic, or perceptual, and of realistic epistemologies.

Schweitzer's system meets the difficulty and faces the problem with the following weapons. The actual value of life does not have the status of a single impression, but is the implication of all active dispositions and of every value experience. That this, then, agrees with objective reality depends upon faith in the conformity of our faculties to objective reality. This cannot be proved, but it is a presupposition of all understanding. Unless we are to surrender meaning, which is impossible to mind, we must find it through inner

experience, and through faith that reality at large accords with the fundamental and general characteristics of our being. This must be true no less of the affective and volitional principles of our nature, than of the intellectual. These are all equally elements of reason, which, if we are to know reality at all, must be taken as akin to reality in general and as representative, in its processes, of it. This faith is that with which, and with which alone, Schweitzer's philosophy is equipped to meet the problem of the meaning of subjective experience for objective fact.

(5) The Metaphysical Import of the Experience. The question of the implications of the innate experience of respect for life, has been discussed above from the viewpoint of the bearing of such a subjective experience upon any absolute obligation, but it has involved the whole problem of the metaphysical import of the intuitive experience. The consciousness of being an active self directed to the perpetuation and rich elaboration of life is not a conclusion of general objective observation and inference from it, but is the general form of experience, and the fundamental apprehension through which there exists a principle for its interpretation. It is the beginning of philosophical knowledge, and the factor through which it becomes possible. The immediate intuition is self-experience, and the nature of spiritual life in that experience is taken to be representative of reality as a whole. The justification for this is in the necessity, for knowledge, of an ultimate act of decision among appearances, and in the fact that it is the

nature of reality, as it exists in the will, which determines the decision. The decision of will is not relative or capricious, but it represents a universal determination of reality. Knowledge of any sort depends upon such a faith in the objective grounds and validity of the spiritual processes. Thus the content of metaphysical apprehension is given in immediate intuition, but the formulation of it, and the defense of the viewpoint, is carried out in rational thought.

CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

PROPOSITIONS

The chief conclusions which result from the foregoing study may be formulated in the following propositions:

1. The philosophical view to which Albert Schweitzer has given expression in his Kulturphilosophie is not a complete and systematic philosophy, in that it does not critically examine and justify all the particulars of procedure, method and metaphysical theory which are involved; but, despite this incompleteness, it represents a comprehensive and elemental philosophical outlook in which thought about life and its relations achieves coherence, and in which significant unity, direction and meaning for life are secured.

2. In his world-view Schweitzer is not, as has been represented, a literal eschatologist, a dualist or a positivist. The semblance of the latter positions is due to a positivistic interpretation of the work of the natural sciences, a contrast of the apprehension of reality in the self through immediate intuition, and in the natural world through objective observation, and a theory of the inadequacy of intellect alone for the attainment of knowledge.

3. The basis for a world-view is found by Schweitzer in a factor of immediate intuition, which is an element of direct self-apprehension belonging to all experience and capable of being the object of reflection. In this understanding and use of it, such an element of experience is accepted as actual and valid.

4. A theory of the definitely ethical character of reality, regarded as essentially active and spiritual, which is discovered in the immediate experience of it in the self, is one of the most distinctive of Schweitzer's doctrines. Whether this is the nature of self-experience, and whether it represents a native disposition, cannot be decisively determined by the individual, but the suggestion is regarded as significant and as possessing the appearance of being justified.

5. Schweitzer's metaphysical theory is a pantheistic spiritualism of a voluntaristic type. Every existent is regarded as a will-to-live which is one of many individuated forms of a universal Will-to-Live which has its reality in them and in its eternally successive forms. The view is an organic part of Schweitzer's whole philosophical outlook. It is not a manifestly impossible conception, but it involves serious logical difficulties, and it makes the unity of the ultimate metaphysical reality difficult, if not impossible, to conceive in any adequate and satisfactory way.

6. In Schweitzer's metaphysical conception the influence of Hegel's notion of the concrete universal is observable, but an abstract Absolute and also Hegel's intellectualistic conception of reality are sharply rejected. Schweitzer is influenced by Hegel's philosophy of history, but abandons the dialectical conception at the point where progress is made to result from the synthesis of contradictions.

7. The voluntaristic conception of reality is derived from Schopenhauer, but through the interpretation of will-to-live

out of inner experience of a moral sort, and through bringing nature into relation to ethics rather than the reverse, Schweitzer separates sharply from him in a world- and life-affirming attitude, which is like that of Nietzsche in its optimism and enthusiasm, but which is affirmative of gentleness, service and self-sacrifice. In this optimistic voluntarism, despite the influence of the above thinkers, the chief determining factor has been a keenly sympathetic and strongly ethical personality.

8. Schweitzer rejects the idealistic theory of perception and epistemology. He holds that Critical Idealism is untrue to our sense of reality in its epistemology, is without relation to the realm of morality, and fails to arrive at an interpretation of the world and life. He does not offer a definite theory of perception, but his view is manifestly realistic, though not that of naive realism, since he interprets reality as a community of active wills within an embracing Will.

9. Schweitzer's philosophical construction involves the employment of self-experience as a principle for the interpretation of reality in general. He takes the self as representative of reality, and its processes, in so far as they are inherent and universal in spirit, as valid for, and representative of objective reality. Whether more or less consciously, this assumption has commonly to be made for reason at least, and what Schweitzer does is to make reason broader than intellect. Schweitzer does not give a definite and adequate justification

of the procedure, but it would seem to be, in its general form, essential to any theory.

10. The feature of ethical intuitionism in Schweitzer's philosophy does not refer to a divine revelation or a faculty of infallible discrimination, but to a somewhat formal disposition in the nature of the self which it cannot deny without violation of its character. Since this disposition is regarded as fundamental in the nature of being, and is related to the carrying out of a world purpose and process, not to the realization of experiences which are regarded as pleasant or as rationally desirable, the subjective ethical dispositions are related to ultimate reality and given cosmic significance. This is regarded as highly significant, as are also Schweitzer's liberation of the essential spirit of morality from considerations of utility and his emphasis upon a fundamental non-rational factor in ethics, in the element of moral obligation. Schweitzer must be regarded as erring, however, in so far as he represents moral action as ultimately irrational, even though it may be said to be such from the viewpoint of immediate pleasure or utility.

11. Religion, in Schweitzer's view, becomes something realized in ethical action. This does not mean that ethics takes the place of religion, but that the religious spirit and values are secured in different practices than those of traditional religion. Though Schweitzer avows mysticism, mystical experience as traditionally conceived in religion is impossible in his system. Mysticism is present only in the

form of non-rational elements in knowledge (and ethical unity with the Will-to-Live in its particular forms), and is accompanied by insistence upon a reflective theory of life.

12. The spirit and method of Schweitzer's philosophy are fundamentally rationalistic, but it is his view that a reflective theory must discover and incorporate non-rational elements, and further that the commitment of will to an active and ethical optimism, in the case of the dualism of appearances, represents something universal and is thus significant of the objective truth of its judgment.

13. Schweitzer's logic is not deductive but synoptic. It can be considered as essentially the coherence logic. Some incompatibility with the method of coherence and its criterion appears in Schweitzer's insistence upon disregard of the objective appearances of the world in our philosophical theory, and of the rationally-determined value of the acts in our ethics, but this is due to the attainment of an interpretation of the objective phenomena as being different in their essence from the appearances, and of the acts as manifestations of a universal power whose significance for it is not known or reckoned by our relative calculations. Thus these factors are not left out of account, but are interpreted in a new way in which they can enter coherently into a more comprehensive whole of experience which takes account of self-experience and its element of moral obligation. The method, furthermore, is synoptic in that, for the attainment of truth, it takes into consideration all the faculties of spirit and its varied

processes of intellection, evaluation and volition.

14. Empiricism has a place with rationalism and intuitionism in Schweitzer's method. It is said that an adequate world-view must be reflective, and that it must also allow for non-rational elements, but the non-rational elements are daily repeated experiences of the nature of the self. In Schweitzer's ethics, moreover, experience of an objective sort is actually involved. In the first place, though the moral disposition is not created by experience, it is called out by it. Secondly, the disposition of regard for life is really empty without experience, which reveals where life is, and what methods one may use, or what ends one must realize, in order to serve it.

15. In Schweitzer's philosophical method, as it is represented above, there is no wholly new feature. There has been recognition before of the need of reflective establishment of philosophical theory, of non-rational elements in thought, and of the solely practical and descriptive character of the natural sciences. But in the combination of them, the clarity of their enunciation, and the manner in which they are used to support each other in a philosophical theory which develops from reflection upon the experience of reality in one's self, they take on a new and vigorous form. This method, after the doctrine of the distinctly ethical nature of reality as known in immediate self-experience, is the most distinctive feature in Schweitzer's philosophical theory, and its clear proposal is a contribution to philosophical discussion.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

SUMMARY

The study of Schweitzer's philosophy, and exposition of what is distinctive in its method and foundation, has been obliged to take his life and works in their full scope into view. This is not merely on account of anticipations of the theories of the Kulturphilosophie in the earlier writings, although there are such, but also because of the intimate relation between all aspects of Schweitzer's life and his particular outlook. Every activity has its place either in the development, or in the expression, of his view of the nature of reality and of the principle of life. Accordingly, Schweitzer's personal history, his treatment of Kant's philosophy of religion, his theological writings, his musical training and study of Bach, and his medical missionary work in Africa, have been presented in some detail as preparation for his philosophical theories.

What is most distinctive in Schweitzer personally is the depth and strength of his ethical character; and his primary concern in philosophy is with the reflective foundations of ethical judgment and obligation. These were sought in Critical Idealism, with the conclusion that the theoretical considerations of that system do not give rise to the ideas which are of moral interest, and that the ideas which belong to moral will are distinct from those of theoretical reason and incapable of identification with them. After a quest for the authority of the moral ideas in historical religion, also, it was Schweitzer's

judgment that our ethical dispositions and optimistic world-view are not derived from those of Jesus and the early church, but are different, and are nevertheless convincing and authoritative.

In the study of Kant's religious and moral theory the features which impressed Schweitzer were: the conception of the innate and autonomous moral law, with its demand for perfection; the notion of the ethical community in which the demanded perfection is alone possible, as the "Endzweck der Natur;" and the conception of an ethical Creator which is realized in relation to this idea - none of which belonged to the system of Critical Idealism. What he found to be significant in Jesus was not His specific ideas, but the spirit of uncalculating devotion and of self-sacrifice for the social good, which he regards as of universal and ultimate authority. Knowledge of Jesus and of the secret of His personality, he holds, do not come through historical understanding, but through surrender to His spirit.

Under the influence of these ideas, not yet developed into a conscious world-view, Schweitzer put his attitude into expression in devoting himself to the medical relief of the neglected natives of Africa. Through this objectification, and through accompanying reflection, his theories came to self-conscious form, and were expressed in his Kulturphilosophie.

The distinctly philosophical theory which belongs to Schweitzer has been presented in this setting of his development and work, and against that background the attempt has been made to understand it correctly, and to isolate and examine its

particular features. It is Schweitzer's theory that an active and ethical world-view is not, and cannot be, founded upon observation of the world about us, which never enables us to know its significance for life. This world-affirmative and ethical attitude, however, is primary in spirit, and is persistent in the individual in the absence of theoretical grounds for it, or even quite resolutely in opposition to them. It is non-rational, and belongs to the fundamental nature of reality as it is manifested in self-experience. Thus, although reality, in its multiplicity of appearances, is equivocal for objective experience, and does not reveal any single or unitary meaning, the meaning of reality as active force directed toward the production, maintenance, and enhancement of life is known in subjective experience, - the only method of knowing through which meaning is found. Reflection upon the disposition of regard for life as a non-theoretical, inherent and underived characteristic of reality as it is known in immediate intuition, though not by deduction from its various manifestations, gives rise to a conception of reality as a multiplicity of forms of will-to-live in which a universal and eternal Force which is directed to the perfection of life, is expressed. Morality, then, is regarded, not as being built up by experiences of pleasure or utility, but as representing an inherent tendency in which the purposiveness of reality is manifested. To be ethical, accordingly, is not to act on considerations of practical consequences, but out of the subjective world-affirmative disposition and enthusiasm for life in which one is a part of the universal process.

It is shown in the above exposition that Schweitzer, in interpreting the consciousness and ministry of Jesus as wholly eschatological, is not himself a literal eschatologist, but that he finds in the life of Jesus and the history of Christianity, evidence of the primacy and independence of moral impulse in its relation to observation of the world and to theoretical understanding. Furthermore, it is made clear that, despite the extended and forceful denial of the possibility of finding meaning in the world about us, Schweitzer is not, as he has been represented, positivistic, but that he considers a knowledge of reality as ethical Will to be given in immediate intuition of it in the subject. It is also shown that no theory of a dualism between the world and the spirit is held by Schweitzer, as has been claimed, but that the inherent nature of the self is taken to be representative of a universal reality. The disposition of Schweitzer to assume the last point is regarded as referable, to considerable extent, to his artistic disposition and to influences in the field of music, but as having little specific logical justification in his writings. The system as a whole is considered to be a noteworthy example of a reflective philosophy of life, containing both practical social values and significant theoretical suggestions.

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NOTES

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1. 1. Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur (Kulturphilosophie, Erster Teil), and Kultur und Ethik (Kulturphilosophie, Zweiter Teil).
4. 1. Aus meiner Kindheit und Jugendzeit, p. 48.
2. Ibid., p. 49.
6. 1. For titles see the bibliography, p. 314-315.
7. 1. See bibliography, p. 315.
8. 1. Aus meiner Kindheit und Jugendzeit, p. 22.
2. Ibid., p. 18.
3. Ibid., p. 31.
9. 1. Ibid., p. 36.
2. Ibid., p. 18.
3. Ibid., p. 38.
4. Ibid., p. 39.
5. Ibid., p. 18.
10. 1. Loc. cit.
2. Ibid., p. 42.
11. 1. Loc. cit.
2. Ibid., p. 46.
12. 1. Die religionsphilosophische Skizze der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 71.
2. Ibid., p. 71.
3. Hibb. Jr., (1914), p. 872-873.
13. 1. Mead, L. A. Boston Herald, Oct. 26, 1927.
2. Westermanns Monatshefte, 140 (1926), p. 309-313.
3. Christianity and the Religions of the World, p. 8.

Chapter II.

19. 1. Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, p. 3.
2. Religionsphilosophie Kant's, p. v.
3. Loc. cit.
20. 1. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Ph. Reclam., Ed. K. Kehrbach, p. 603-628.
2. Religionsphilosophie Kant's, p. 1-2; cf. p. 312.
21. 1. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 290; quoted in the Religionsphilosophie Kant's, p. 313.
2. Religionsphilosophie Kant's, p. 24.

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21. 3. Ibid., p. 19.
22. 1. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 608; quoted in the Religionsphilosophie Kant's, p. 28.
2. Religionsphilosophie Kant's, p. 30.
3. Ibid., p. 32.
4. Ibid., p. 66f.
23. 1. Ibid., p. 67.
2. See *ibid.*, p. 312f.
3. See *ibid.*, p. 80.
4. See *ibid.*, p. 99f.
24. 1. Ibid., p. 103f.
25. 1. Ibid., p. 179; see Kant, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, p. 69.
2. Ibid., p. 178.
3. Kant, Religion, p. 69; quoted, Religionsphilosophie Kant's, p. 179.
4. *Loc. cit.*; cf. p. 194.
5. Religionsphilosophie Kant's, p. 184f.
6. Ibid., p. 197.
26. 1. Ibid., p. 185.
2. Ibid., p. 194.
3. See *ibid.*, p. 187.
4. Ibid., p. 187f.
5. See *ibid.*, p. 188.
6. See *ibid.*, p. 190.
27. 1. See *ibid.*, p. 197.
2. Ibid., p. 195.
3. Ibid., p. 203f.
28. 1. See *ibid.*, p. 206f.
2. See *ibid.*, p. 216f.
3. Ibid., p. 207, 220; see Kritik der Urteilskraft, p. 29.
4. Ibid., p. 289.
5. Ibid., p. 234, 236.
29. 1. Ibid., p. 237.
2. Ibid., p. 281.
3. Ibid., p. 288f.
4. Ibid., p. 240.
5. Ibid., p. 290f.
30. 1. Ibid., p. 291f.
2. Ibid., p. 295.
3. See *ibid.*, p. 303.
31. 1. Ibid., p. 302.
2. See *ibid.*, p. 304f.

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33. 1. Ibid., p. 315.
34. 1. Ibid., p. 311.
2. Ibid., p. 200.
3. Loc. cit.
35. 1. Loc. cit.
2. Ibid., p. 316f.
3. Ibid., p. 321.
36. 1. Ibid., p. 322.
2. Ibid., p. 324.
3. Loc. cit.

Chapter III.

41. 1. Ency. of Rel. and Ethics, VII, p. 547.
42. 1. Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung, p. 631f.
2. Ibid., p. 232; cf. Von Reimarus, p. 235.
3. In his Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes, 1892; "one of the most important works in historical theology," Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung, p. 233.
4. Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung, p. 233.
43. 1. Ibid., p. 234.
2. Ibid., p. 391.
44. 1. Ibid., p. 631.
2. Ibid., p. 369.
3. Schweitzer's own earlier work, Das Messianitäts- und Leidensgeheimnis, which appeared on the same day as Wrede's Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien, which is referred to.
4. Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung, p. 369.
5. Ibid., p. 370f.
45. 1. Ibid., p. 390f.
47. 1. Ibid., p. 233.
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3. Ibid., p. 272.
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3. Ibid., p. 84f; Geschichte, p. 88.
49. 1. Geschichte der paulinischen Forschung, p. v.
50. 1. Ibid., p. 185.
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3. Loc. cit.
4. Ibid., p. 186.

51. 1. Ibid., p. 193f.
52. 1. Ibid., p. 149-150.
2. Ibid., p. 150.
3. Ibid., p. 150.
4. Ibid., p. 162.
5. Ibid., p. 159.
53. 1. Ibid., p. 163.
2. Ibid., p. 169f.
54. 1. Ibid., p. 174.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Ibid., p. 126.
4. Ibid., p. 65.
5. Ibid., p. 63.
55. 1. Ibid., p. 65f.
2. Ibid., p. 19.
56. 1. Ibid., p. 194.
2. Werner, M., Albert Schweitzer und das freie Christentum, p. 28.
3. Von Reimarus zu Wrede, p. 281.
4. Loc. cit.
57. 1. Ibid., p. 281f.
2. Dissertation, p. 65-71.
3. See Von Reimarus zu Wrede, p. 400, also p. 91f.
See, further, Bundy, W., The Psychic Health of Jesus, p. 219.
58. 1. Von Reimarus zu Wrede, p. 247.
2. Ibid., p. 400.
3. Ibid., p. 400f.
59. 1. Ibid., p. 400.
2. Int. Rev. of Miss, 14 (1925), p. 48. Cf. Wellhausen, Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien, p. 150f.
60. 1. See treatment in Bundy's Psychic Health of Jesus, p. 119-122, 215-219.
2. Holtzmann's impression of Schweitzer's Jesus is that of an individual with fixed idea, Messianische Bewusstsein Jesu, p. 80; H. Werner says that Schweitzer's Jesus "is so consistently controlled in all his acts, teaching and suffering by eschatological expectations that there is nothing left to do but assign him a place in the ranks of the psychopaths," Die psychische Gesundheit Jesu, Berlin: Runge, 1909, p. 13. To the same effect also Loofs, Ziegler, Wellhausen, and Jülicher, quoted by Bundy, op. cit., p. 215.
3. Die psychiatrische Beurteilung Jesu, p. 14; cf. p. 24.
61. 1. Ibid., p. 14-16.
2. Ibid., p. 3f.
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62. 1. Ibid., p. 27f.
 63. 1. Ibid., p. 27f.
2. Ibid., p. 31.
 64. 1. Ibid., p. 33.
2. Loc. cit.
3. See ibid., p. 35f, 44.
 65. 1. Kritik der von medizinischer Seite veröffentlichten Pathographien über Jesus, p. 43.
2. Dissertation, p. 44.
 66. 1. Von Reimarus zu Wrede, p. 310.
2. Living Age, 322: 229, Aug. 2, 1924.
3. Von Reimarus zu Wrede, p. 70.
 67. 1. Ibid., p. 77f.
 68. 1. Ibid., p. 396.
2. Ibid., p. 309.
 69. 1. Ibid., p. 397.
2. Ibid., p. 399.
3. Loc. cit.
4. Ibid., p. 398.
 70. 1. Ibid., p. 400.
2. See Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung, p. 640.
3. Von Reimarus zu Wrede, p. 401.

Chapter IV.

72. 1. Aus meiner Kindheit und Jugendzeit, p. 33, 34
2. Ibid., p. 11.
73. 1. Ibid., p. 12f.
2. Ibid., p. 11.
74. 1. Ibid., p. 26.
2. Ibid., p. 32.
75. 1. Ibid., p. 32f.
2. Deutsche und französische Orgelbaukunst und Orgelkunst.
3. J. S. Bach, II, p. 8.
76. 1. Aus meiner Kindheit und Jugendzeit, p. 58-59.
2. J. S. Bach, II, p. 8.
3. Loc. cit.
4. Ibid., p. 13.

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77. 1. Ibid., p. 12.
2. Aus meiner Kindheit und Jugendzeit, p. 18.
78. 1. J. S. Bach, I, p. vi.
79. 1. Ch. M. Widor in preface to Jean Sebastien Bach, p. ix.
80. 1. Aus meiner Kindheit und Jugendzeit, p. 26, 27.
81. 1. See J. S. Bach, II, p. 468, where he says, "May this perception (of the need of a consecrated mood as well as of technical mastery, for the performance of Bach's works) penetrate everywhere; then will Bach help our age to attain the spiritual unity and fervor of which it so sorely stands in need."
2. J. S. Bach, II, p. 15.
3. Ibid., p. 16.
82. 1. Ibid., p. 15.
2. J. S. Bach, I, p. 167.
3. Ibid., p. 169.
4. Ibid., p. x.
83. 1. J. S. Bach, II, p. 468.

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84. 1. Aus meiner Kindheit und Jugendzeit, p. 37.
2. Ibid., p. 50.
3. Loc. cit.
85. 1. Ibid., p. 49.
2. See dissertation, p. 80.
86. 1. Zwischen Wasser und Urwald, p. 164.
2. Ibid., p. 168.
3. Ibid., p. 36f.
87. 1. Ibid., p. 89f.
2. Ibid., p. 90.
88. 1. Ibid., p. 147.
2. Ibid., p. 148.
89. 1. Ibid., p. 3.
2. Ibid., p. 143.
90. 1. Loc. cit.
92. 1. Mitteilungen aus Lambarene, II, p. 62, 56f.
2. See Micklem, pref. to Christianity and the Religions of the World.

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93. 1. Mitteilungen, I, p. 29.
 2. Mitteilungen, II, p. 57.
 3. Mitteilungen, I, p. 28.
94. 1. Mitteilungen, II, p. 14.
- Chapter VI.
96. 1. Zwischen Wasser und Urwald, p. 142f.
98. 1. Although he is apparently not influenced by him, and is wholly different in outlook. R. H. Grützmacher says, "Sie bietet eine - unbeabsichtigte - Parallele oder richtiger noch Gegenerscheinung zu Spengler, mit dem sie sich trotz aller Bedeutung an geistiger Höhenlage und Originalität doch nicht gleichstellen lässt." Theologie der Gegenwart, 21 (1924), p. 21.
 2. Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, p. 35.
99. 1. Loc. cit.
 2. Ibid., p. 35f.
 3. Kultur und Ethik, p. 8.
101. 1. Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, p. 12.
102. 1. Kultur und Ethik, p. xii.
103. 1. See further, dissertation p. 155-161.
 2. Kultur und Ethik, p. xii.

Chapter VII.

105. 1. Von Reimarus zu Wrede, p. 1
 2. Ibid., p. 397f.
 3. Hastings Ency. of Rel. and Ethics, VI, p. 346.
 4. Christian Century, Sept. 3, 1925.
106. 1. Von Reimarus zu Wrede, p. 235.
 2. See ibid., p. 238.
 3. See references to William Sanday, dissertation, p. 108, 111; also Sanday's article, Hibb. Jr., 10 (1911), 83.
107. 1. Von Reimarus zu Wrede, p. 283.
 2. Ibid., p. 249.
108. 1. Lake, K., Hibb. Jr., 89 (1924), p. 18.
 2. Sanday, W., The Life of Christ in Recent Research, p. 45f.
109. 1. Ibid., p. 68.
 2. Ibid., p. 77.
 3. Ibid., p. 90f.
 4. Ibid., p. 108.

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110. 1. Dobschütz, Ernst von, Eschatology of the Gospels,
p. 18.
2. Ibid., p. 19.
3. Ibid., p. 185.
4. Ibid., p. 7.
5. Ibid., p. 22.
6. Ibid., p. 23.
7. Ibid., p. 29.
8. Ibid., p. 53-56.
111. 1. Ibid., p. 58.
112. 1. Sanday, W., Op. cit., p. 46.
113. 1. Ibid., p. 168; reference to Neue Linien of Jülicher's.
2. Theologische Literaturzeitung, 31:18 (1906), p. 502.
3. Jülicher, A., Neue Linien, p. 3f.
4. Wernle, P., Theologische Literaturzeitung, 31:18
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115. 1. Loc. cit.
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116. 1. Ib., p. 505.
2. Loc. cit.
117. 1. P. 1, 2, 3.
2. Jülicher, A., Neue Linien, p. 5.
3. Sanday, W., Op. cit., p. 168.
118. 1. Holtzmann, H. J., Das messianische Bewusstsein
Jesu, p. 8.
2. Ibid., p. 44.
119. 1. Peabody, F. G., Harv. Theol. Rev., II, 1 (1909), p. 50.
2. Evans, Daniel, Harv. Theol. Rev., IV (1911), p. 418.
122. 1. Art. "Jesus Christ," Hastings Ency. of Rel. and
Ethics, VII, p. 546, 547.
2. Von Reimarus zu Wrede, p. 83.
123. 1. Jülicher, A., Neue Linien, p. 5.
125. 1. Hogg, Int. Rev. of Miss., 14 (1925), p. 48.
127. 1. Foreword to Christianity and the Religions of the
World, p. x.
2. Hogg, A. G., Op. cit.
128. 1. Mackenzie, W. D., Hastings Ency. of Rel. and Ethics,
VII, p. 547.

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128.

2. See his reference to Strauss, about whose Leben Jesu he said, that it "macht ihn über Nacht zum berühmten Mann...und vernichtete seine Zukunft," Von Reimarus zu Wrede, p. 70; quoted in the dissertation, p. 89.

3. Werner, Martin, Albert Schweitzer und das freie Christentum, p. 6f.

129.

1. Hogg, A. G., Int. Rev. of Miss., 14 (1925), p. 47.

130.

1. Quoted in the foreword to Christianity and the Religions of the World, p. 13.

2. Widor, C. M., pref. to J. S. Bach, p. viii.

3. Müller, Dr. H. von., Westermanns Monatshefte, 140 (1926), p. 309.

131.

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2. Mackenzie, W. D., Op. cit.

3. Pfister, O., Living Age, 322 (1924), p. 229.

132.

1. Hogg, A. G., Op. cit., p. 49.

2. Christian Century, Sept. 3, 1925.

137.

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138.

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1. Montgomery, W., Hibb. Jr., 23 (1925), p. 695.

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2. Civilization and Ethics, p. 258.

143.

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2. Müller, Dr. von., Westermanns Monatshefte, 140 (1926), p. 309.

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146. 1. Ibid., p. 23.
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147. 1. Werner, Martin, Das Weltanschauungsproblem bei Karl Barth und Albert Schweitzer, p. 77.
148. 1. Ibid., p. 77.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Kultur und Ethik, p. 240.
149. 1. Werner, M., Op. cit., p. 80; quotations, Kultur und Ethik, p. 131.
2. Ibid., p. 80f.
3. Kultur und Ethik, p. 131; quoted, Werner, Op. cit., p. 79.
4. Werner, Op. cit., p. 79.
5. Ibid., p. 81.
152. 1. Zwischen Wasser und Urwald, p. 89.
2. Loc. cit.
3. "Es gibt nicht nur eine leibliche, sondern auch eine geistige Schamhaftigkeit, die wir zu achten haben. Auch die Seele hat ihre Hüllen, deren man sie nicht entkleiden soll;" "Ein Mensch soll nicht in das Wesen des andern eindringen wollen;" "Andere zu analysieren - es sei denn, um geistig verwirrten Menschen wieder zurecht zu helfen - ist ein unvornehmes Beginnen." Aus meiner Kindheit und Jugendzeit, p. 56.
4. Doppelband II und III, 1926.
153. 1. Kraus, O., Albert Schweitzer, Sein Werk und seine Weltanschauung, p. 15.
2. Ibid., p. 61.
3. Ibid., p. 40.
154. 1. Ibid., p. 61.

Chapter VIII.

155. 1. Kultur und Ethik, p. viii.
156. 1. Ibid., p. 200.
2. Ibid., p. xii.
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4. Ibid., p. xii.
5. Loc. cit.
6. Ibid., p. xiii.
157. 1. Ibid., p. xivf.
2. Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, p. 50.
158. 1. The Decay and Restoration of Civilization, p. ix.

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159. 1. Ibid., p. ix f.
 2. Ibid., p. x.
 3. Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, p. 50.
160. 1. The Decay and Restoration of Civilization, p. xiii, 85f; cf. Verfall, p. 50ff.
 2. Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, p. 50.
161. 1. Ibid., p. 53.
 2. Loc. cit.
 3. Ibid., p. 50.

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162. 1. See Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, p. 13.
163. 1. Ibid., p. 26.
 2. Ibid., p. 25.
 3. Ibid., p. 25.
164. 1. Loc. cit.
 2. Ibid., p. 25f.
 3. See Kultur und Ethik, p. 210.
165. 1. Ibid., p. 192.
 2. See dissertation, p. 174-177.
166. 1. See Aus meiner Kindheit und Jugendzeit, p. 12.
 2. Ibid., p. 35.
 3. Ibid., p. 44.
 4. Ibid., p. 45.
167. 1. Loc. cit.
 2. Das Christentum und die Weltreligionen, p. 7f.
168. 1. Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, p. 53 f.
 2. Loc. cit.
 3. Ibid., p. 55.
 4. Loc. cit.
169. 1. Kultur und Ethik, p. xvi.
 2. For the views which he considers desirable, Schweitzer uses the term "das neue Vernunftdenken;" and contrasts, with the old Rationalism, a new; Kultur und Ethik, p. xiv and 205.
170. 1. Ibid., p. xii. It is not, however, to be supposed that Schweitzer represents intellect as a distinct faculty; but the term is used to refer to the class of mental operations which are narrowly theoretical.
 2. Loc. cit.
 3. See dissertation, p. 156f.
 4. Kultur und Ethik, p. xii.

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171. 1. Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, p. 56.
2. Kultur und Ethik, p. 237.
172. 1. Ibid., p. 202f.
2. Ibid., p. 203.
3. Ibid., p. 203f.
4. Ibid., p. 204.
5. Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, p. 56.
173. 1. Ibid., p. 57.
174. 1. Kultur und Ethik, p. xvii.
2. Loc. cit.
177. 1. See *ibid.*, p. 238.
2. See *ibid.*, p. 21.
178. 1. See *ibid.*, p. xiv; "Dahin gelangen wir....dass wir die Lebensanschauung und die Weltanschauung nicht miteinander in Einklang bringen können, und uns darum entschliessen müssen, die Lebensanschauung über die Weltanschauung zu stellen."
179. 1. Ibid., p. 237.
181. 1. Ibid., p. 210.
2. Ibid., p. 239.
182. 1. Ibid., p. xvi.
2. Ibid., p. xvii.
183. 1. Ibid., p. 238f.
184. 1. See the conclusion of the Geschichte der paulinischen Forschung; referred to in dissertation, p. 56.
185. 1. See the dissertation, p. 168, ref. 3; Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, p. 55.
2. Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, p. 54.
3. Loc. cit.
4. Kultur und Ethik, p. viii.
5. Loc. cit.
186. 1. See *ibid.*, p. 211.
2. Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, p. 58.
187. 1. Kultur und Ethik, p. 233.
2. Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, p. 56.
3. Kultur und Ethik, p. xv.
188. 1. Ibid., p. xx.

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| 190. | 1. <u>Kultur und Ethik</u> , p. 2. |
| 191. | 1. See <u>Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur</u> , p. 21.
2. <u>Decay and Restoration of Civilization</u> , p. viif. |
| 192. | 1. <u>Kultur und Ethik</u> , p. 2.
2. <u>Loc. cit.</u>
3. <u>Loc. cit.</u> |
| 193. | 1. <u>Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur</u> , p. 22.
2. <u>Kultur und Ethik</u> , p. xv.
3. <u>Loc. cit.</u>
4. <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 239. |
| 194. | 1. <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 239f. |
| 195. | 1. <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 240.
2. <u>Loc. cit.</u>
3. <u>Civilization and Ethics</u> , p. 254. |
| 196. | 1. <u>Kultur und Ethik</u> , p. 249.
2. <u>Loc. cit.</u>
3. <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 241. |
| 197. | 1. <u>Loc. cit.</u>
2. <u>Loc. cit.</u>
3. <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 219. |
| 198. | 1. <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 220.
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| 199. | 1. <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 252.
2. <u>Loc. cit.</u> |
| 200. | 1. <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 241f.
2. <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 237.
3. <u>Ibid.</u> , p. xv.
4. <u>Kultur und Ethik</u> , p. 221.
5. See the dissertation, p. 75f. |
| 201. | 1. <u>Kultur und Ethik</u> , p. xvii.
2. <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 249.
3. See <u>ibid.</u> , p. 251.
4. <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 251.
5. <u>Loc. cit.</u> |
| 202. | 1. <u>Loc. cit.</u>
2. See <u>Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur</u> , p. 19f, 46;
also <u>Kultur und Ethik</u> , p. 255f. |
| 203. | 1. <u>Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur</u> , p. 20.
2. <u>Kultur und Ethik</u> , p. 257. |
| 204. | 1. <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 259.
2. <u>Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur</u> , p. 46. |

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204. 3. Kultur und Ethik, p. 221.
205. 1. Ibid., p. 202.
206. 1. Ibid., p. 237.
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207. 1. Ibid., p. 5, 7, 8f, 11.
2. Ibid., p. 7.
208. 1. Ibid., p. xviii.
2. Ibid., p. xiv.
3. Ibid., p. xii.
210. 1. See the dissertation, p. 132-137.
2. Kultur und Ethik, p. xiii.
3. Ibid., p. 202.
4. Ibid., p. 205.
211. 1. Ibid., p. 204.
2. Ibid., p. 184.
212. 1. Ibid., p. xii.
2. Ibid., p. xiv.
213. 1. Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, p. 36.
2. Ibid., p. 37.
3. Ibid., p. 51.
214. 1. Kultur und Ethik, p. xv.
2. Ibid., p. xvi.
215. 1. Ibid., p. 235f.
2. Ibid., p. xvf.
3. Ibid., p. xvi.
4. Ibid., p. 211.
5. Loc. cit.
217. 1. Ibid., p. 210.
218. 1. Loc. cit.
2. Werner, M., Albert Schweitzer und das freie Christ-
entum, p. 8.
219. 1. Kultur und Ethik, p. 211.
2. Ibid., p. xvf.
3. Das Christentum und die Weltreligionen, p. 54.
4. Loc. cit.
220. 1. Loc. cit.

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222. 1. Kultur und Ethik, p. 235.
2. Ibid., p. xiv.
3. Ibid., p. xvf.
4. Ibid., p. 211.
223. 1. See ibid., p. 211.
2. Kultur und Ethik, p. 234.
3. Ibid., p. 234f.
224. 1. Ibid., p. 235.

Chapter XII.

226. 1. The terms which are here used for the types of factors which explain the development of Schweitzer's philosophy are taken from Windelband's History of Philosophy. It is recognized that the division is not perfect, for "pragmatic" elements enter into what are called "cultural", and vice versa, but the divisions conform well to those which he makes in his familiar classification.
2. Aus meiner Kindheit und Jugendzeit, p. 25.
227. 1. Ibid., p. 25f.
228. 1. Ibid., p. 35.
230. 1. Note 1, p. 226.
231. 1. Kraus declares, "in all dem reichen seelischen Leben dieses merkwürdigen Mannes die Gestalt und die Ethik Jesu die Dominante bildet.." Albert Schweitzer, Sein Werk und seine Weltanschauung, p. 51.
232. 1. Das Christentum und die Weltreligionen, p. 18.
234. 1. See note 1, p. 226.
236. 1. Kultur und Ethik, p. 217.
2. Ibid., p. 200.
3. Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, p. 3-5.
237. 1. See Kultur und Ethik, p. 217.
2. See the dissertation, p. 145.
238. 1. A phrase humorously suggested as a more appropriate title for F. H. Bradley's Appearance and Reality.
2. Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, p. 35.
239. 1. Ibid., p. 3.
241. 1. Von Reimarus zu Wrede, p. 235f.

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 242. 1. Kultur und Ethik, p. 192.
 2. Loc. cit.
243. 1. See note 1, p. 170.
 2. Kultur und Ethik, p. 171.
244. 1. Grundlegung der Ethik als positive Wissenschaft.
 Berlin: Dümmler, 1897. It is interesting that Stern is
 also a physician.

Chapter XIII.

245. 1. See the dissertation, p. 99.
247. 1. Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur, p. 16-20;
 also see the dissertation, p. 202, and references given
 under note 2 of p. 202.
 2. See Das Christentum und die Weltreligionen, p. 18.
 3. Kultur und Ethik, Chs. XVIII and XXI; also, disser-
 tation, p. 199f.
248. 1. See dissertation, p. 166.
 2. Ibid., p. 98.
250. 1. See notes for ref. 1, p. 247.
 2. See the dissertation, p. 158f.
251. 1. Ibid., p. 194f.
254. 1. Ibid., p. 250.
256. 1. Ibid., p. 273f.
258. 1. Ibid., p. 251-253.
260. 1. Ibid., p. 268-270.
261. 1. Kultur und Ethik, p. 237.

Chapter XIV.

264. 1. It is to be recognized, of course, that Schweit-
 zer considers the work incomplete, and has promised two
 more volumes in the series.
266. 1. See the dissertation, p. 219-225.
267. 1. Kultur und Ethik, p. xvi.
268. 1. See ibid., p. 235.

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270. 1. See dissertation, p. 220-223.
2. Ibid, p. 258.
271. 1. See the dissertation, p. 210-212.
273. 1. See the arguments developed by Lotze and Bowne, that consciousness is the only form in which the essential conditions of reality - unity, time-transcendence, and space-transcendence - are realized. See also, dissertation, p. 267-268.

Chapter XV.

280. 1. See the dissertation, p. 169-177.
2. Ibid., 165-169.
3. Decay and Restoration of Civilization, p. xiv.
281. 1. See the dissertation, p. 197-200.
282. 1. Kultur und Ethik, Ch. XXI.
285. 1. Ibid., p. 239.
286. 1. See the dissertation, p. 258, ref.1.
287. 1. Ibid., p. 214-225.
2. Ibid., p. 266-268.
288. 1. Ibid., p. 230-231.
294. 1. Aus meiner Kindheit und Jugendzeit, p. 59-64.
300. 1. See the criticism by W. Montgomery, quoted in the dissertation, p. 142.

1. See classification, p. 120-121.	120.
2. Ibid., p. 121.	121.
1. See the classification, p. 119-120.	119.
1. See the arguments developed by Latta and others that conclusions in the only book in which the full conditions of reality - unity, time-relationship and space-relationship - are treated. See also, classification, p. 107-108.	107.
Chapter IV.	
1. See the classification, p. 103-104.	103.
2. Ibid., 103-104.	104.
3. <u>Logic and Metaphysics of Qualitative</u> , p. 101.	101.
1. See the classification, p. 101-102.	102.
1. <u>Unity and Quality</u> , Ch. XII.	102.
1. Ibid., p. 101.	101.
1. See the classification, p. 101, 101.1.	101.
1. Ibid., p. 101-102.	101.
2. Ibid., p. 101-102.	101.
1. Ibid., p. 101-102.	101.
1. See <u>Major Principles and Principles</u> , p. 101-102.	101.
1. See the definition by W. Montague, cited in classification, p. 101.	100.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

of
John Dickinson Regester

I was born on October 20, 1897, in Duquesne, Pennsylvania, as the son of Enos Dickinson Regester and Vernetta Belle Regester, born Steffy. Through the fact that my father died when I was about two years of age, I was brought somewhat more closely under the oversight of my grandfather, the Rev. John T. Steffy, than would normally have been the case, and I owe much in the educational and professional direction of my life to his influence.

My early education, after the first two years, was secured in rural schools near Norfolk, Virginia. I entered high school in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, but after the freshman year went to New Castle, Pennsylvania, and graduated from the New Castle High School in 1914. I entered Allegheny College that fall, but at the close of my Junior year, 1917, enlisted in the U. S. Navy. After being discharged in the fall of 1919, I found it possible, through the fact that I had carried extra hours during my college course, to enter Boston University School of Theology, and by the transfer of some credits, to secure my college degree at the following commencement. In this way I received the degree of Bachelor of Arts from Allegheny College in 1920, and of Bachelor of Sacred Theology from Boston University in 1922.

In 1922-23 I was Fellow in Philosophy in the Graduate School, Boston University, while doing residence work for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The following year, I studied in the University of Edinburgh and the University of Basle on appointment as Jacob Sleeper Fellow from Boston University School of Theology. Since the fall of 1927, I have been Professor of Philosophy in the College of Puget Sound, Tacoma, Washington. On leave during the year 1927-28 for the purpose of writing the above dissertation I received the Borden Parker Bowne Fellowship in Philosophy at Boston University.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY


of
John Dickinson Hagerman

I was born on October 20, 1891, in Exeter, New Hampshire, as the son of Enoch Dickinson Hagerman and Virginia Ellis Hagerman, born Kelly. Through the last half of my life when I was about two years of age, I was brought up in a closely knit family of my grandfather, the Rev. John Kelly, then would naturally have been the case, and I owe to him the educational and professional training of my life so far.

My early education, after the first two years, was in rural schools near Exeter, New Hampshire. I entered high school in Exeter, New Hampshire, but after the freshman year moved to New Castle, New Hampshire, and continued from the New Castle High School in 1911. I entered Allegheny College in 1911, but at the close of my junior year, 1917, entered in the Navy. After being discharged in the fall of 1919, I found myself, through the fact that I had carried with me during my college course, to enter Boston University School of Theology, and in the summer of 1920, to receive my college degree at the following commencement. In 1921 I received the degree of Bachelor of Arts from Allegheny College in 1920, and of Bachelor of Sacred Theology from Boston University in 1922.

In 1922-23 I was Fellow in Theology in the Graduate School, Boston University, while being ordained into the Ministry of Boston of Theology. The following year, I was in the University of Edinburgh and the University of London, or appointment as Jacob Elmer Fellow from Boston University School of Theology. Since the fall of 1927, I have been Professor of Theology in the College of Saint Louis, St. Louis, Missouri. On leave during the year 1931-32 for the purpose of writing the above dissertation I received the Doctorate in Theology from the University of London University.

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